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This dissertation examines the intersection between narratological theories of 
character and moral understandings of character development in the nineteenth-century 
novel.  Focusing on British and French Bildungsromane, which take character-building as 
their central conflict, I demonstrate how the novel’s presentation of moral character is 
inextricable from the construction of character as a narrative form.  This interpenetration 
between morality and form becomes manifest in character’s multiple meanings: 
“character” denotes both a quality one possesses (e.g. “Joe has an unsavory character”) 
and a constitutive element of narrative (along with story, point-of-view, etc.).  My 
broadest goal is to make character a more fundamental concern within narratology, a 
discipline which tends to privilege the temporal (i.e. plot-centered) aspects of narrative 
texts. 
 I analyze represented thought—that is, the techniques through which narratives 
depict the mental lives of characters—to contest the critical assumption that nineteenth-
century Bildungsromane figure character development as a portrait of increasing 
psychological “depth.”  Moreover, where scholars frequently note the Bildungsroman’s 
celebration of its protagonist’s transformative growth, I demonstrate how 
Bildungsromane resist aligning morality with interior change, either by illustrating the 
losses that attend maturation or by endorsing stasis as a moral value.     
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Chapter One argues that development in Dickens’s David Copperfield and 
Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre requires numerous characters to be “sacrificed” from the 
narrative; the protagonists’ alleged fulfillment relies less on increasing depth than on 
formal techniques of diminishment.  Chapter Two considers how Eliot’s The Mill on the 
Floss and Staël’s Corinne figure development not as transformation but as a resistance to 
change that that can only resolve itself through the protagonist’s death.  The next two 
chapters analyze how the voice of a third-person narrator affects developmental 
paradigms: Chapter Three examines the phenomenon of indecision in Trollope’s Palliser 
novels, illustrating how the narrator’s valorization of his characters’ refusal to choose 
endorses a model of development that diverges from conventions of transformative 
epiphany previously associated with novelistic maturation.  Chapter Four contends that 
Gissing’s Born in Exile and Flaubert’s Sentimental Education estrange the narrators from 
protagonists who develop surface qualities rather than inner consciences; both novels 















Developing Character in the Nineteenth-Century Novel 
 
 Until relatively recently, narrative theorists have left character curiously 
undertheorized. Despite the obvious prominence of characters themselves within narrative 
texts, there are comparatively few studies of what the concept of character itself might 
entail, or even of how character fits into broader models of narrative structure.  In fact, 
literary scholars have long highlighted narrative temporality at the expense of character.  
The critical focus on time in narrative goes as far back as Aristotle, who in his Poetics 
argues that plot—not character—is the defining element of tragedy.  For Aristotle, 
characters are simply agents who move the plot forward: “the imitation of character is not 
the purpose of what the agents do; character is included along with and on account of the 
actions” (11).  One reason that the concept of character does not figure prominently in 
narrative studies, then, is because characters themselves are not temporal constructs: they 
may exist within narrative time, but they are not “of” it in the same way as the events that 
advance the plot.  Accordingly, it becomes difficult to speak about character as a structural 
component of narrative despite the common sense observation that narratives simply do not 
exist without some form of character.   
This dissertation’s broadest goal is to formulate a set of theories that make 
character a more central concern for narrative studies, and it attempts to do so by 
examining the intersection between narratological theories of character and psychological 
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understandings of character development in the nineteenth-century European novel.  The 
principal novels I examine— Germaine de Staël’s Corinne (1807); Charlotte Brontë’s 
Jane Eyre (1847); Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield (1850); George Eliot’s The Mill 
on the Floss (1860); Anthony Trollope’s Palliser series (1864-79); Gustave Flaubert’s 
Sentimental Education (1869); and George Gissing’s Born in Exile (1892)—all figure 
character development as the central conflict of their narratives.  With the exception of 
the Palliser series, each of these novels has been critically linked to the tradition of the 
Bildungsroman (or “novel of formation”) and each novel self-consciously positions itself 
in relationship to this tradition.  I focus on Bildungsromane because they tend to highlight 
the tension between two different registers of the term “character”: they chart the 
development of a formally produced character at the same time that they use the idea of 
moral character to inform that production. My examination of the relationship between 
formal and moral character across multiple novels will demonstrate how nineteenth-
century Bildungsromane use narrative form to create and uphold moral systems.  The 
represented moral and psychological development of novelistic characters, I argue, is 
inextricable from the way that novels formally construct characters through narrative 
strategies.  At the same time that “Developing Character” reconfigures the concept of 
character for narrative theory, then, it also reassesses the prose genre most closely linked 
to the construction of moral character. 
Attending to the interplay between morality and form that coalesces in the 
concept of “character” reveals the often counterintuitive ways that Bildungsromane 
theorize human development.  As I will go on to discuss in more detail, literary critics 
traditionally read the character development novel as a genre that celebrates the 
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protagonist’s advancement and improvement, his or her transformation from naïve youth 
to mature adult.  While it is immediately evident that many development novels feature 
protagonists who fail to “progress” happily (think of Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure 
or Honoré de Balzac’s Lost Illusions, for example), the underlying assumption that 
character development is itself a desirable and morally obligatory process rarely seems at 
issue among novel critics.  This dissertation’s analysis of character’s formal construction, 
by contrast, illustrates how even the most traditional development narratives trouble the 
link between development and morality that they are supposed to uphold.  In fact, I argue 
that nineteenth-century Bildungsromane frequently question the value of character 
development itself, either by illustrating the distortions and losses that attend 
developmental changes, or by suggesting that developmental transformation is a dubious 
ambition.  Instead, many Bildungsromane actually endorse a lack of change—a kind of 
characterological stasis—that formally conflicts with both the temporal development of 
the narrative and the moral modifications that ostensibly accompany the story’s 
progression.     
My formal readings of character often concentrate on represented thought—that 
is, on how novels depict the mental functioning of their characters.  As Alan Palmer has 
recently argued, the ubiquity of represented thought in fiction has ironically rendered it 
“an uninteresting and even invisible norm within narratology” (6); much like character, 
represented thought is only now beginning to receive the critical attention it deserves.  I 
contribute to this emerging area of interest through an examination of what many have 
come to identify as the “depth”—or psychological complexity—of the developing 
protagonist.  In the past, critics have figured the moral development of nineteenth-century 
    
 4
protagonists (Elizabeth Bennet, for example, or Maggie Tulliver) as coexistent with the 
development of their exceptionally heterogeneous interiorities.  But such a conception of 
depth, I will argue, is achieved through techniques of simplification and caricature, 
techniques that prompt this dissertation to reconsider what depth is and to suggest that 
development novels do not privilege depth as much as their readers and critics do. 1  
Along with my discussion of the Bildungsroman’s uneasiness with change, this new 
understanding of “depth” refocuses some of the most common preconceptions about the 
character development novel.  
As “Developing Character” reinterprets both the place of character in narratology 
and the status of development in the nineteenth-century Bildungsroman, it also illuminates 
those narrative forms that help shape our ideas about character development more 
generally—about how and whether or not human beings develop individual, moral 
perspectives.  This work will offer a critical tool both for literary studies and for the 
numerous fields (psychology, philosophy, and politics, for example) that approach human 
development and moral character as theoretical terrain.  Indeed, character development 
narratives remain as pervasive now as they were in the nineteenth century, infusing not 
only contemporary fiction (Frank McCourt’s Angela’s Ashes; Jeannette Walls’s The Glass 
Castle), but also, for example, the moral rhetoric of political memoirs (Mike Huckabee’s 
Character Makes a Difference; Barack Obama’s Dreams from My Father), the acquisition 
of “well-roundedness” that institutions of higher education promise to deliver to their 
students, and, as Joseph Slaughter has shown, the letter of international human rights law.2   
The connections between nineteenth-century Bildungsromane and contemporary 
literature and culture are not accidental; instead, I argue that the largely canonical 
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tradition of novels I consider has had a wide and lasting impact on readers’ conceptions 
of character.   Moreover, I contend that the ongoing popularity of most of my primary 
texts is a function of their treatment of character.  The latter half of this dissertation, in 
particular, deals with the various sympathetic relationships that novels frequently 
engender (between reader and character, for instance, or between character and narrator), 
and landmark texts like David Copperfield, Jane Eyre and The Mill on the Floss continue 
to be re-read in part because of the reader-character sympathy they persistently evoke.  
Moreover, the very structure of the Bildungsroman suggests such a sympathetic 
relationship since, as Slaughter points out, the development novel is “imagined to effect 
in the reader the modernizing process of personality development that it narrates for the 
protagonist” (1417).  Although “Developing Character” does not attempt to theorize “the 
reader” as such, it draws on both individual readers’ published responses to novels and 
rhetorical analyses of narrative to establish how formal techniques of characterization 
help motivate readerly sympathies.  And as we will see starkly with The Palliser novels 
and Sentimental Education—both of which many readers dismiss as “boring”—narrative 
techniques can work just as powerfully to estrange sympathy as they can to obtain it. 
 
A Note on Genre 
It is not this dissertation’s aim to provide a genealogy of the Bildungsroman; 
plenty of studies already exist that analyze the complexity of the term and its specific 
links to eighteenth-century German thought.3  However, disagreement within genre 
studies about what “Bildungsroman” has come to mean compels me to elaborate on my 
own understanding of the term and, indeed, on my decision to use it at all.  I am 
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interested in the concept of the “character development novel” less as a material artifact 
than as a figure in the literary-critical imaginary.  Whether or not we agree with the 
appropriateness of an arcane German word to describe the kind of novel whose plot 
focuses on growing up—on the development of a protagonist’s moral and intellectual 
characteristics as well as his or her physical body —we cannot deny that Bildungsroman 
has become the most pervasive shorthand for such novels.  The Bildungsroman, in short, 
spends the bulk of its energies on the depiction of character development as a significant, 
discernible process.  While such a statement might seem innocuous enough, scholars like 
Marc Redfield and Susan Fraiman each problematize the alignment of character 
development novels with the term Bildungsroman.  Redfield, who is interested in the 
Bildungsroman’s relationship to German aesthetic theory, insists that the genre is much 
more complicated than “a vague idea of individual growth,” and that current scholarship 
seems to want to lump too many novels under its rubric (42).  Fraiman, whose 
Unbecoming Women analyzes character development novels with female protagonists, 
insists that we “jettison once and for all the notion of a ‘female Bildungsroman’” (13) 
because the term Bildungsroman itself is overly associated with the masculine values of 
“linear progress and coherent identity” (x).  Judging by these accounts, “Bildungsroman” 
is at once too general and too specialized a designation.  I argue, instead, that if 
“Bildungsroman” initially meant something more particularized than “character 
development novel,” this is still not a persuasive enough reason to abandon a term that 
has formed part of our shared critical vocabulary for over a century.  Neither does the 
observation that many Bildungsromane focus on traditionally “male” ideals necessitate a 
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new genre-designation for those numerous, and equally canonical, Bildungsromane with 
female protagonists.   
The critical unease that surrounds discussions of the Bildungsroman is 
symptomatic of a broader atmosphere of anxiety among contemporary genre theorists. 
This year’s special PMLA issue devoted to “Genre,” for example, seems to throw the very 
notion of its subject matter into question, with the majority of contributors expressing 
distaste with genre’s “prescriptive taxonomy and…constraint on textual energy” (Frow 
1627).  One featured essay—whose basic message is sounded throughout many other 
entries in the issue—claims that 
[I]f world literature is virtual, so too is every other genre.  For 
virtuality…is the sum of the not yet realized, with no actualized 
shape, a kind of general solvent out of which particular entities can 
acquire particular features.  This is what genres are (Dimock 
1379). 
 
But if too-rigid pronouncements upon genre indeed lead to banal taxonomies and 
oversimplifications of the subject matter they ostensibly elucidate, the insistence that 
genre can only be “virtual” risks depriving genre (or discussions of particular genres) of 
any meaning at all.  In this project, for example, each individual novel I read as a 
Bildungsroman constructs character development in a noticeably different fashion, and 
reading novels as Bildungsromane is only one way to go about analyzing them.  But it is 
also undeniable that certain sets of novels privilege certain topics and formal structures 
over others—that Wilkie Collins’s sensation novels, for example, have markedly 
different thematic interests and aesthetic aims from The Mill on the Floss and Corinne—
and that genre designations provide at least provisional ways of naming these interests so 
that they can be more easily compared and analyzed.  As Jed Esty has recently argued, “it 
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remains true that bildung…has shaped not just literary criticism but also literary practice 
for generations, a fact not altered by the concept's nonfulfillment in any given text” 
(426).4  Associating individual novels with a broad tradition of literary-critical work on 
the Bildungsroman can help us grasp the underlying value systems to which this tradition 
cumulatively gives voice, even if no novel will ever offer an exact prototype for the 
genre.  But before I give my own account of the Bildungsroman in any more detail, I will 
return to the relationship between narrative theory and the figure of the character—a 
figure that centrally occupies the Bildungsroman as a genre.  
 
Narratology and the Concept of Character 
 
 The way narrative theory has tended to conceive of itself as a discipline helps 
explain why narratologists have shied away from discussions of character in the past.  
The very name “narratology”—first proposed by Tzvetan Todorov—attests to the 
discipline’s strong roots in both linguistics and structuralism, its desire to understand 
narrative as a signifying system with its own internal logic.  Like Aristotle before them, 
many of the field’s most celebrated scholars privilege the temporal aspect of narrative: 
that is, they focus on the idea that narratives all constitute a linear “whole” with a definite 
beginning and endpoint, and that most (if not all) narratives exhibit numerous stylistic 
strategies for the manipulation of time.  Temporal structures of narrative provide their 
critics with a quasi-scientific area of inquiry, and it is no surprise that structuralist 
narratology, a field so captivated by refining its critical taxonomy, would prefer to bypass 
the comparative imprecision of character in favor of formal techniques that can be more 
easily codified.   
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Examples of “classic” studies of narrative theory include Paul Ricoeur’s Time and 
Narrative (1983-85), which emphasizes the importance of narrative temporality for the 
construction of history and personal identity; Peter Brooks’s Reading for the Plot (1984), 
which argues that plot is nothing less than narrative’s logic, a dynamic and progressive 
“mode of human understanding,” (7); and Gérard Genette’s Narrative Discourse (1980), 
which uses Proust’s A la Recherche du temps perdu as an illustration of narrative order, 
duration, and frequency (that is, of the ways in which the novel presents its own 
relationship to time). For Genette, as well as for other prominent structuralist critics like 
Roland Barthes and A.J. Greimas, characters become functional “participants” or 
“actors” with circumscribed roles to play throughout the overall composition of a given 
narrative.5  In Narrative Discourse Revisited, Genette defends his decision to minimize 
discussions of character using this kind of markedly technical rhetoric: “I have no regrets 
about having refused to make the concession…for it seems to me that by allowing the 
study of characterization to have the privilege of shaping, and thereby governing, the 
analysis of narrative discourse, we make too much of a concession to what is only one 
“effect” among others” (136, emphasis in original).  Genette thus implies that his vision 
of narrative discourse levels the playing field of narrative elements, with character 
garnering no more attention than effects such as focalization or paralipsis. 
Although Narrative Discourse bears out its author’s decision to put character in 
its proper place, the insistency with which Genette defends this decision suggests how, 
for most readers, character can never be just “one effect among others.” The concept of 
character, as many have noted, poses a difficult problem for structuralist analyses because 
of the way in which character often seems to surpass its own functionality.  In a 
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discussion of this “problem” with character, Mieke Bal writes that “the character is not a 
human being, but it resembles one” (115); in other words, readers tend to treat characters 
as mimetic psychological essences rather than as the “fabricated creatures” or semantic 
“effects” that critics like Bal and Genette insist they are.  J. Hillis Miller has even more 
enthusiastically toed this party line, insisting that those readers who continue to pretend 
as if characters “had an independent psychological existence” have “caught a trick of the 
language of the text, as one catches a disease” (278).  While literary narratives may seem 
to encourage their readers to respond to characters as if they were people with believable 
mental lives outside the text, Miller suggests that giving in to this “trick” reveals a 
pitiably naïve critical faculty. 
  Numerous scholars have cited the tension between the structural and mimetic 
qualities of character as a reason for narratology’s relative reluctance to explore it, but 
fewer have acknowledged that the concept of character presents a second theoretical 
challenge insofar as our understanding of character is created in the very process of 
reading.  Because narrative is a temporal form (that is, it is a represented account of time 
and its reading takes place in time), our attempts to discern characters from the novels we 
read occur while the narrative progresses.  If we think of a narrative as a progression, 
then, we certainly read characters through the novel’s plot.  But character is unlike plot in 
one vital way: character is elusive insofar as its attachment to a plot that is by definition 
in motion prevents it from being “pinned down” by the reader.  Narratologists have 
provided us with so many brilliant studies of plot but with so few of character, I would 
argue, because plot can be more easily delineated: this happens, then this happens, then 
this, etc. Critics can describe characters, but they are hard pressed to capture the 
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“essence” of character in a way that separates it from its construction in the dynamic 
event of reading.     
Rather than continuing to figure the theoretical challenges surrounding character 
as insurmountable sticking points, newer generations of critics have begun, in various 
ways, to embrace the “human” side of character so summarily maligned by structuralist 
narratology. In the fast-growing field of cognitive studies of narrative, for example, 
“character is seen as a mental model of a storyworld participant, constructed by the 
reader incrementally in the course of reading” (Margolin, “Character”).  Following such 
an assumption, Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon have explored how humans’ cognitive 
responses to literary character closely resemble their responses to real people despite the 
knowledge that characters are not “real,” and Lisa Zunshine has suggested that 
interaction with literary characters provides a valuable way to exercise and sharpen our 
uniquely human awareness of other minds.6  Taking a more historical approach, David A. 
Brewer’s The Afterlife of Character has recently examined how eighteenth-century 
Britons used the literary text as “merely a starting point” for numerous  kinds of 
“imaginative expansion” on character (including unauthorized sequels and role-playing 
games), all of which served to position character as a kind of public property (2).  In 
addition, narrative theorist James Phelan has acknowledged the unavoidable 
interconnection between character and narrative progression in his own work, which 
moves away from structuralist narratology toward a more rhetorical stance on narrative 
that posits a “feedback loop” between “authorial agency, textual phenomena, and reader 
response” (Living to Tell, 18-19).  Phelan pays close attention to how character emerges 
    
 12
in particular narratives in order to help elucidate the ethical communications that those 
narratives suggest between implied author and implied reader.7 
Of all the instances of this second wave of inquiry into literary character, Alex 
Woloch’s The One vs. The Many (2003) stands out as especially crucial for narrative 
studies because of its author’s commitment to celebrating the “human-like” aspect of 
character without surrendering too much of narratology’s structuralist zeal.  Woloch’s 
book attempts to account for both the “functional” and the “representational” aspects of 
character by paying attention to how the spatial distribution of minor characters in the 
novels of Austen, Dickens, and Balzac affects the thematic status of those characters.  His 
major contention is that the character-structure of the novel is “asymmetrical”; that is, 
that characterization itself results from forces of “competition” among literary characters.  
Minor characters thus become “the proletariat of the novel,” a group of flattened 
personalities who both support the growth of the protagonist and threaten to destabilize 
her narrative position at every turn (27).  The One vs. The Many is less interesting for its 
politics, however, than for the way in which it reframes the debate between structural and 
mimetic conceptions of character as a false one, arguing instead that structure and 
mimesis work together to produce character, and that this  interpenetration constitutes “a 
dynamic process central to characterization itself” (307).  Literary character is never 
solely a linguistic “trick,” nor is it ever actually a lifelike human consciousness: its 
notoriously fraught status within narrative theory instead derives from its combination of 
these two registers. 
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Moral and Formal Character 
This dissertation’s focus on character development in the nineteenth-century 
novel necessitates its thorough engagement with Woloch’s work on character, and my 
first chapter (about which more later) both utilizes and expands upon Woloch’s theories.  
But while it would be impossible to ignore the major insights that The One vs. The Many 
offers to both narratologists and novel theorists, the book’s magisterial fervor—not to 
mention its considerable heft—risks obscuring how Woloch’s study raises as many 
questions as it attempts to answer.  The most important of these questions, I argue, 
involves the relationship between the structural dimension of character and character’s 
unavoidable moral connotations.  Despite Woloch’s conviction that the nineteenth-
century novel is a rich site for character studies, The One vs. The Many has very little to 
say about the way in which nineteenth-century novels in particular posit different, 
meticulously rendered depictions of “character” as evaluative judgments about fictional 
individuals’ orientation toward the good.8   
  As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I address “character” as a concept with 
two interconnected meanings: first, I use the term moral character to describe the kind of 
essential, personal quality—be it positive, negative, or somewhere in between—which, in 
the nineteenth-century novel, one is said to possess (as in, for instance, the statement that 
Daniel Deronda “has the character of a benefactor” [DD 822]).  Moral character helps us 
understand formal character, that is, “character” as a constitutive element of all 
narratives (along with story, point-of-view, etc.). It is worth emphasizing that neither 
Woloch’s work nor my own is the first to note the distinction between “being” and 
“having” character.9  Those critics who point out character’s multiple meanings, 
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however, have only done so in passing.  In his chapter on Pride and Prejudice, Woloch 
indeed parses what he calls “[t]he dual use of character” in a greater degree of detail than 
previous studies: 
[There are] two different kinds of character that coexist in Jane 
Austen: character as social being (a person is a character) and 
character as inner quality (a person has a character).  The narrative 
structure that mediates between them is precisely 
asymmetry…Characters, in this light, quickly become transformed 
into characteristics: the social relation of individuals rendered as 
the dialectical relationship between discrepant interior states… The 
dual use of ‘character’ thus lies at the heart of the birelational 
process we have been looking at, where the nuanced adumbration 
of inner qualities emerges only through the social juxtaposition of 
different people (53-54). 
 
For Woloch, then, character’s multivalence plays directly into the novel’s schema of 
social competition, ensuring that a vast panorama of individual characters can be neatly 
dehumanized into contending characteristics; Elizabeth Bennet, for example, has “more 
quickness” than her sisters, and thus garners more space in Austen’s novel (58).  The 
novelistic protagonist, Woloch argues, arises out of this “asymmetrical” structure through 
both her superior makeup of “characteristics” and her seeming inability to be subsumed 
by them, as minor characters often are: we have the “sense that the protagonist’s thoughts 
exist outside the novel’s range of description, that their intensity and complexity exceed 
the narrative’s finite parameters” (101).  But the overarching scheme of formal 
asymmetry that Woloch’s work so compellingly depicts leaves little room for exploring 
what “having” character actually entails, or whether character’s meaning changes 
depending on the particular novelist who depicts it.  Though the word “character” had 
overwhelmingly strong moral connotations in the nineteenth century,10 The One vs. The 
Many studiously avoids the phrase “moral character,” referring instead to a vaguely 
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defined “inner quality” that only derives meaning through an oppressive economic 
system.  Focusing more on how “having” character relates to the quantity of one 
character’s represented presence among many, Woloch does not acknowledge that the 
formal construction of “inner” character (most importantly, the ostensibly 
“heterogeneous” inner character of the protagonist) is an ineluctably moral affair.  
“Developing Character” argues, in contrast, that nineteenth-century novels 
illustrate how the concept of character brings out the moral systems embedded within 
narrative forms.  The narratological form of character is inextricably linked not just to the 
desire for social mimesis we find in nineteenth-century realism (as Woloch suggests), but 
more importantly, to novelistic constructions of morality—of a proper way of being and 
thinking—which often conflict with the novel’s commitment to illustrating “real life.”11  I 
therefore investigate the novel’s particular value systems during a historical period in 
which character’s moral valence was equally as important as its structural status.  
Nineteenth-century novels are far more explicit than their modern and contemporary 
counterparts about the existence of moral character as an individual’s relative virtue, and 
they are far more confident that the development of moral character is a suitable subject 
for fictional narrative. 12  Moreover, the nineteenth-century Bildungsroman holds this 
conviction in especially high regard, since its ostensible plotline revolves around a single 
character’s moral and psychological development as well as her exterior, physical growth 
and her ultimate positioning within a social hierarchy.  
The development novels I analyze in the following chapters implicitly address the 
connection between character’s moral and narratological senses.  By continually insisting 
that a given individual has a certain kind of character, and by stressing the way an 
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individual’s moral character dictates how she will act in a given situation, the 
Bildungsroman in one sense attempts to present the formal aspect of character as a 
verifiable, recognizable whole.  Its trajectory traditionally moves toward the ultimate 
moral “establishment” of a protagonist, figuring character’s definitive condition as one of 
stasis (i.e. “the fully-formed character”).  However, the elusive aspect of character—the 
way that characters are constructed in reading and constantly being modified both by the 
reader and the novel’s plot—calls into relief the way that characters can never be 
contained in neat, one-word summations.     
This dissertation examines the concept of character development in light of the 
play of stasis and movement which nineteenth-century Bildungsromane create around 
literary characters.  The moral and formal dimensions of character exist both together and 
in tension with each other, thus dramatizing the philosophical “problem of the self”—that 
is, the centuries-old debate over whether or not a coherent identity can exist over time.13  
As both contemporary philosophers and narratologists have noted, narrative proves a 
crucial ground of investigation into the status of individual identity, since “the very 
meaning of the term ‘identity’ is predicated on constancy, on the absence of change” 
which the inherent temporality of narrative seems to resist (Ritivoi, 231).  I do not mean 
to claim here that “character” and “self” should be considered identical terms; instead, I 
accept philosopher Joel Kupperman’s recent formulation that character is a subset of the 
self which deals with moral issues.14  However, that Bildungsromane by definition invest 
“character” with paramount plot significance makes them uniquely suited to an analysis 
of narrative’s role in the construction of moral development.  And as we will see, 
attending to how character must, paradoxically, develop while remaining fixed reveals 
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the Bildungsroman’s ultimate anxiety with its own subject matter, its continual 
questioning whether character development is a virtuous ambition after all.  But in order 
to understand how even the most traditional Bildungsromane remain skeptical—if not 
downright pessimistic—about their ostensible goals, we must initially explore long-
standing critical beliefs about the particular developmental processes that 
Bildungsromane revere. In the following section, I sketch out two prevalent assumptions 
about the character development novel—that it valorizes characterological transformation 
and sanctifies psychological depth—before offering a reassessment of these assumptions 
through my descriptions of this dissertation’s four chapters.   
 
Character Development as Transformation and Depth 
 
 Despite Esty’s persuasive claim that no novel actually demonstrates the majority 
of characteristics ascribed to the Bildungsroman, many critics have persisted in their 
attempts to delineate a number of the genre’s principal features.  Patricia Alden, for 
instance, writes:  
[T]he Bildungsroman linked the individual’s moral, spiritual, and 
psychological maturation with his economic and social 
advancement…Early examples of the genre ended with the 
individual’s assimilation to an aristocratic or genteel elite which 
represented an ideal standard of cultivation.  Not only did the 
Bildungsroman legitimate the experience of upward mobility, it 
also instructed the middle class in how to accomplish it (2). 
 
Maturation, advancement, assimilation, and cultivation: each of the characteristic 
developmental processes that Alden describes is a transformative one, in which the 
Bildungsroman’s protagonist experiences noticeable changes through time.  These 
changes often entail reversals of status and fortune, as the protagonist goes from single to 
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married (Pride and Prejudice, Emma); unemployed to professional (The Red and the 
Black, Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship); poor to rich (Great Expectations, Jane Eyre); 
or all three (David Copperfield).  The form of the novel proves especially congenial for 
rendering character development as a process of change that unfolds through a series of 
narrative events.  M.M. Bakhtin, in fact, describes the history of the novel itself as a kind 
of Bildungsroman, with earlier novelistic subgenres (such as Richardson’s “novel(s) of 
ordeal,” or “biographical” novels like Fielding’s Tom Jones) featuring “ready-made and 
predetermined” protagonists who remain the same throughout whatever circumstances 
they undergo.  Events in such novels, Bakhtin writes, “do not become formative 
experience for [the protagonist], they do not change him, and in that very immutability of 
the hero lies the entire point” (13).  In contrast, the Bildungsroman illustrates historical 
change through the figure of the developing protagonist, whom Bakhtin loftily construes 
as a figure of transition between different cultural eras: “[w]hat is happening here is 
precisely the emergence of a new man” and a new kind of novel to accommodate him 
(23). Decades later, Thomas Jeffers still agrees that the Bildungsroman’s “crucial theme 
is precisely change—physical, psychological, moral” (2).  All of these critics, in short, 
seem confident that the Bildungsroman conveys its protagonist’s change through 
temporal events, and that this change itself constitutes both characterological and 
novelistic progress.   
 If the Bildungsroman chronicles a social, cultural, or historical change, it also 
promises that this social change will accompany the protagonist’s salutary learning 
process, a passage from blindness to comparative insight that Alden, above, glosses as  
“moral, spiritual, and psychological” transformation.  Take, for instance, Austen’s 
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Marianne Dashwood, who learns, through a courtship narrative, “to counteract, by her 
conduct, her most favourite maxims” (Sense and Sensibility, 333), or even Julien Sorel, 
whose imprisonment and death sentence actually prove the most edifying of events: 
“Never had that head been so poetic as at the moment when it was about to fall” (407).15  
In both of these examples, the protagonists come to think not only differently but 
contrarily to previous occasions: Marianne tempers her excessive sensibility, and Julien 
disavows the very ambitions that drove him to prison in the first place.  These 
transformations manifest themselves in moments of moral epiphany, and character 
development thus appears less as a gradual, painstaking process than as a quick and 
dramatic change for the better. 
This dissertation argues, however, that labeling the Bildungsroman as the “genre 
of change” fails to account for the way in which many well-known Bildungsromane 
devalue the characterological transformation that they supposedly uphold.  If some 
Bildungsromane contain revelatory moments, many also equate moral character with a 
refusal to change that either questions or openly scorns the possibility of epiphanies like 
those of Marianne Dashwood and Julien Sorel.16  Development narratives continually 
demonstrate this resistance to change through formal technique: as we will see, The Mill 
on the Floss orients Maggie Tulliver around a single, constant character trait, and 
Trollope’s Palliser novels illustrate the value of indecision—rather than that of 
transformative decision-making—by highlighting the represented thought of a whole cast 
of characters who cannot make up their minds.  This suspicion of change culminates in 
Sentimental Education, whose protagonist is so involved in his own thoughts that the 
possibility not only of transformation but of action itself becomes an object of parody.  
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And even when characters do seem to change for the better, such moral revelation takes a 
notable toll: novels as conventional as David Copperfield and Jane Eyre both predicate 
the development of their protagonists upon the multiple, untimely deaths of other 
characters.   
As I question the critical elision between development and ameliorative change, I 
reframe a second assumption about development’s effect on the interiority of the central 
character.  Literary scholars often suggest that the most memorable nineteenth-century 
protagonists accrue inner “depth” over the course of the narratives that contain them. 
According to Deidre Lynch, readers’ assessments of characterological depth help buttress 
a ubiquitous “rise of the novel” narrative that positions eighteenth-century novels as 
precursors to the novel’s supposed fruition in nineteenth-century realism.  “It is 
noteworthy,” she writes,    
how often a concept of depth—a concept, more precisely, of real 
depth—provided nineteenth-century literary historians with their 
organizing and periodizing principle…In the nineteenth century, 
those divisions [between surface and depth]—and the concept of 
‘real’ depth on which they were based—were productive mainly 
when they were harnessed to that emergent discourse of canon-
making and criticism that contributed to the making of ‘the’ novel, 
the discourse that constructed that disciplinary object and made it 
literary (252). 
 
Lynch’s discussion suggests how nineteenth-century writers, readers, and critics aligned 
depth with good taste: depth helped clearly delineate the novel from other literary forms 
and, more importantly, the “deepest” novels came to be read as superior examples of the 
genre.  Depth, in other words, is what renders Emma Woodhouse and Jane Eyre better 
characters than, say, the interchangeable heroines of Harlequin romances.  “Developing 
Character” builds on this initial insight, illustrating how, for nineteenth-century novelists 
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and critics alike, the concept of depth allows aesthetic judgment to shade into morality. 
The character of the deep protagonist becomes an object to be emulated not only in 
formal terms but also in moral ones: she is an aesthetically sophisticated representation 
because she has an eminently admirable interiority. For many Bildungsromane, this 
positive valuation of depth helps position character development as the concomitant 
development of a moral consciousness—a consciousness that derives its morality from its 
depth.  Further, that those protagonists most frequently cited as “deep” (Wilhelm Meister, 
Elizabeth Bennet, Emma Woodhouse, Jane Eyre, Pip, Isabel Archer) are central 
characters in development novels suggests a particular alliance between the 
Bildungsroman as a literary genre and interior depth as a narrative phenomenon. 
But how, exactly, does “depth” become discernible across the pages of a novel?  
Although the idea of depth is more frequently invoked than explained—we know a deep 
character, apparently, when we read one—a cluster of critical remarks on the subject 
reveals several consistencies within descriptions of “deep” characters.  First, explanations 
of “depth” often rely on metaphors of fullness; the most famous of these is E.M. Forster’s 
enduring delineation of “round” characters (such as Thackeray’s Becky Sharpe and 
Charlotte Brontë’s Lucy Snowe), whose psychological status conjures a plump, curvy 
image.  Forster reinforces the visuality of round characters—words seemingly made into 
flesh—by contrasting them with a second type of character (e.g. Dickens’s Mrs. 
Micawber) whose “construction round a single idea or quality” makes them as flat as the 
printed pages on which they are written (67-68).  The alignment of developed character 
with figures of psychological plenitude, however, hardly began with Forster’s distinction.  
In fact, such language of repleteness often appears in Bildungsromane themselves, 
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especially when protagonists think reflexively about their own character(s), from 
Wilhelm Meister’s conviction that he will “develop [myself] more fully” (174) to Adam 
Bede’s acknowledgement of “that fuller life which had come to him from his 
acquaintance with deep sorrow” (574).  These moments of reflection illustrate how 
numerous character development novels yoke physical growth to an equally crucial moral 
fulfillment.  
Not only does represented depth ostensibly render these protagonists “whole,” but 
it also promises that they will emerge from their development narratives with harmonious 
internal balance.  Like the circular form to which she is likened, the round character is 
finally disabused of any sharp edges or protrusions that would threaten to disrupt the 
proportion of her interior landscape.  As Michael Beddow writes, Wilhelm Meister’s 
invocation of “harmonious” (harmonisch) development translates as “no more and no 
less than ‘pleasingly proportioned’, a requirement which appertains…to the arrangement 
of elements of the personality” (109).  To grow up harmoniously according to Goethe’s 
novel is to learn to streamline one’s excessive traits, to “settle down” in a psychological 
as well as a social or domestic sense.   
But if the character of the Bildungsroman’s deep protagonist finally resembles a 
proportionate “arrangement of elements,” this sober proportioning hardly accords with 
her excessive effect on readers.  Literary critics continually describe deep characters by 
gesturing toward depth’s ultimate resistance to complete description.  Returning to 
Woloch’s remark that the “intensity and complexity” of nineteenth-century protagonists’ 
thoughts often “exceed[s] the narrative’s finite parameters,” we can see how 
psychological depth appears both as too much for a single narrative to handle and as too 
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intricate for a single reader to untangle. As Lynch has argued, the combination of interior 
inexhaustibility and convolution often compels novel readers to return continually to 
those characters whose roundness eludes them: “No matter how sensitive it was,” Lynch 
writes, “no character reading could ever exhaust the meanings of an interiority…which, it 
was understood, had slipped beneath the surfaces of words.  This postulate of a depth that 
could never finally be sounded ensured that aesthetic dispositions would receive repeated 
and regular workouts” (141-42).  The deepest characters therefore end up resembling 
sympathetic “friends” with whom we become familiar through rereading, and whose 
imagined lives outside the narrative text become objects of continuous, conflicting 
speculation (think, for instance, of a convention of Janeites lovingly discussing what 
Elizabeth’s and Darcy’s children might be like).  In fact, the coexistence of balance and 
excess observable in discussions of characterological depth illustrates in particularly 
broad strokes the larger tension I have attributed to the concept of literary character in 
general: the deep character is both known by heart (because continually re-read) and 
never fully known (because no amount of reading can ever exhaust her infinite potential).  
Finally, those critics who discuss depth tend to associate it with realism.   Deep 
characters seem more believable as human beings than do their flat counterparts: we are 
more likely to know (or to be) a person who resembles Elizabeth Bennet than Uriah 
Heep.  That deep characters should appear as real as the people who read about them 
reinforces the connection between depth and excess that leads readers to imagine 
protagonists who cannot be contained by the narratives in which they originally appear. 
But if no text can fully capture such depth, the realist novel’s excessive length announces 
its intention, at least, to come as close as possible.  As Ricoeur writes, “[n]arrative 
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technique in the golden age of the novel …[relied on] an old narrative formula which 
consisted of deepening a character by narrating more and drawing from the richness of a 
character the exigency of a greater episodic complexity.  In this sense, character and plot 
mutually influence each other” (9).  If the plots of classic nineteenth-century novels are 
Byzantine, all the better for the construction of those equally convoluted characters who 
must traverse them.    
In her analysis of realism in the English novel, Elizabeth Ermarth expands on this 
initial association between deepening character and elongated narration, claiming that 
depth is “series dependent” (5) insofar as we understand deep characters by watching 
them negotiate a succession of discrete, individual moments: 
The subjection of characters to various kinds of journeys, the 
proliferation of episodes and of sequences in realistic novels, are 
devices managed with the reader’s developing depth-perception in 
mind.  The more the characters see of the world, the more we see 
of the characters and, consequently, the better able we are to 
identify in the variety those deep consistencies both within 
individuals and between them that temporal continuities gradually 
reveal (50-51). 
 
The temporal scope of the novel, in which characters pass through a long sequence of 
events, is tailor-made for presenting both individual, psychological depth as well as a 
generalized depth of field in which those individual characters think and interact.  
Ermarth and Ricoeur thus bring a temporal dimension to discussions that see deep 
characters as spatially or pictorially round, and the convergence of these temporal and 
spatial viewpoints seems, at last, to position “depth” as a kind of salutary accumulation, 
an adding-on and filling out of character which becomes manifest through narrative 
repetition and progression. 
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Since depth is an interior phenomenon, concerned with the quality of characters’ 
minds, my analysis of depth examines how novels use formal technique to create fictional 
interiorities.  The varieties of represented thought that I consider include well-known 
narrative strategies such as interior monologue, free indirect discourse, and first-person 
retrospection, and I also investigate the infrequently noted (but no less ubiquitous) 
technique of “thought report,” which Palmer has recently resuscitated for critical study.   
I contend that the novel’s distinctive ability to narrativize thought ensures that the 
development of consciousness and character are mutually informing: like character, depth 
is simultaneously a moral and a formal issue.  However, “Developing Character” reveals 
that the connections between depth and morality are nearly always less favorable than we 
imagine.  Many nineteenth-century novels actually demonstrate both an affinity for 
simplicity of character and a concomitant warning about the moral consequences that 
characterological depth imposes on the development narrative.  This suspicion of depth 
goes hand-in-hand with the resistance to change that I will illustrate across multiple 
Bildungsromane, since development novels often value their protagonists’ psychological 
constancy rather than their willingness to modify established forms of thinking.   
 
Developing Character 
As part of this project’s broader inquiry into the concept of character, the 
following chapters use nineteenth-century development novels to re-evaluate the critical 
assumptions that distinguish transformative change and psychological depth as defining 
elements of the Bildungsroman.  My principal concerns move roughly from a 
concentration on the protagonists themselves (in Chapters One and Two), toward 
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readings that consider how the voice of the third-person narrator affects the novels’ 
developmental paradigms (Chapters Three and Four).  On a more local level, these 
chapters provide new interpretations of several analytical questions (Why do Maggie and 
Tom die in the end of The Mill on the Floss?  Why is Trollope’s writing so tedious to so 
many?) that have dogged these novels for generations.     
Chapter One, “Development and the Sacrifice of Character in David Copperfield 
and Jane Eyre,” uses two well-known Victorian novels to challenge the assumption that 
the Bildungsroman culminates in the formation of a morally and psychologically “well-
rounded” protagonist.  Despite the ostensibly happy endings of these novels, Copperfield 
and Eyre both use first-person retrospective narration to tell development stories in which 
many characters (parents, spouses, enemies, friends) inexplicably die along the way. 
Referencing René Girard’s writing about the “scapegoat” (a figure who is sacrificed for 
the maintenance of social order), I illustrate how the collective phenomenon of sacrifice 
operates on an internalized, psychological level in the Bildungsroman.  In other words, 
the moral development of the protagonist actually happens at the expense of other 
characters being killed off, as Dora’s terminal illness frees up David to pursue Agnes 
Wickfield, for example, or as Bertha Mason’s death in the fire at Thornfield turns Mr. 
Rochester into an eligible widower for Jane to marry.  Moreover, these sacrificial deaths 
help David and Jane to let go of the excessive elements of their own characters 
(Copperfield’s naiveté, Eyre’s unbridled passion) that would otherwise encumber their 
narratives of maturation.  These two novels feature protagonists whose alleged fulfillment 
relies less on steady gains than on numerous kinds of diminishment, thus illustrating how 
even the most conventional Victorian Bildungsromane construe character development as 
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a tragic process.  This chapter begins where Woloch leaves off, considering how the 
“asymmetrical” structure of characterization—in which many characters prove more 
expendable than one central figure—can help revise our understanding of the 
Bildungsroman’s representation of characterological growth.  
In Chapter Two, “‘Roots Deeper Than All Change’: Constancy as Character 
Development in The Mill on the Floss and Corinne,” I couple Germaine de Staël’s influential 
early-nineteenth-century text with George Eliot’s mid-century novel, which structurally and 
referentially alludes to the earlier work.  In stark contrast to the movement toward happiness 
that we find in David Copperfield and Jane Eyre, Corinne and The Mill on the Floss each 
chart the development of a central character who dies in the novel’s end.  While David and 
Jane reach “maturity” through the sacrifice and abandonment of minor characters, Corinne 
and Maggie Tulliver continually sacrifice themselves so that they can hold on to relationships 
that threaten to throw their development narratives off course.  Building evidence for my 
initial claim that the Bildungsroman figures character development not principally as a 
process of enrichment but of loss, this chapter turns its focus toward the dramatic loss of the 
protagonist herself.  Both Eliot’s and Staël’s novels attribute their protagonists’ self-
sacrificing behavior to what I call a “dominant characteristic”—an overriding character trait 
that consistently determines how the protagonists feel and act.  As a result of this 
characteristic’s dominance, neither Corinne nor Maggie learns (as David and Jane do) to 
temper their characters in service of well-roundedness and balance.  Instead, Eliot and Staël 
both suggest that the protagonist’s changelessness is itself a distinct—though tragically 
unsustainable—moral value.  My analysis of Corinne and The Mill therefore begins to 
rewrite the traditional characterization of the Bildungsroman as the genre of change, 
    
 28
suggesting instead that moral character development exhibits a quality of inertia which critics 
have largely ignored.  Finally, at the same time that this chapter attempts to clarify the 
morality of stasis, it also considers what Maggie’s and Corinne’s “dominant characteristics” 
might reveal about the formal construction of psychological “depth” that these protagonists 
supposedly exhibit.  The inflation of a single, dominant characteristic has a “flattening” 
effect more akin to the ostensibly anti-realist medium of caricature than previous discussions 
of the bildungsheld’s roundness have admitted.  Our perception of a character’s “depth,” I 
suggest, is actually sustained by formal techniques associated less with protagonists than 
with simpler, more “minor” characters.   
Chapter Three, “Represented Thought and the Character of Indecision in Trollope’s 
Palliser Series,” considers how the form of Trollope’s six-volume series affects its depiction 
of character development.  Though the Palliser novels differ from Bildungsromane in the 
sense that the series follows numerous characters throughout multiple texts, Trollope himself 
repeatedly cited his abiding interest in character as a motivating factor for writing a series in 
the first place.  But despite this preoccupation, numerous critics from the Victorian period to 
the present have failed to find the Palliser characters as sympathetic or as psychologically 
complex as Trollope claimed that they were.  Drawing on recent narratological theories of 
represented thought in fiction, I attribute this lukewarm critical reception to the way Trollope 
depicts his characters’ mental functioning.  Specifically, the Palliser novels represent thought 
as a seemingly endless process of indecision: from over-cautious Prime Minister Plantagenet 
Palliser, to vacillating fiancé Alice Vavasor, to conflicted MP Phineas Finn, few of the 
series’s central characters seem able, or even willing, to make up their minds.  This process 
of indecision not only pervades Trollope’s characters; it also distinguishes his third-person 
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narrator who, novel after novel, refuses to use the kind of omniscient rhetoric that other third-
person narrators (such as Balzac’s, Dickens’s, Eliot’s, or Thackeray’s) tend to adopt.  Nor 
does the Palliser narrator rely heavily upon free indirect discourse, the most critically 
privileged mode of representing consciousness in fiction.  Trollope’s circular, speculative 
variety of represented thought therefore diverges sharply from the forms of thought that 
characterize sympathetically “deep” characters like Austen’s Emma Woodhouse or James’s 
Isabel Archer, both of whom engage in introspection that leads to epiphanic self-knowledge.  
The narrator of the Palliser novels instead frequently figures indecision as a moral activity, 
suggesting that his characters’ refusal to make choices stems from their extreme sensitivity to 
the difficult problems they face. And since the novel series formally resists the kind of 
closure that results from developmental epiphanies, vacillation also proves a more logical 
narrative enterprise for the series’s multivolume structure.  The considerable length of 
Trollope’s series, then, does not ensure the superior depth of character that critics like 
Ermarth and Ricoeur associate with bulky realist novels.  That Trollopian character 
development occurs as inevitably as time (and narrative) passes illustrates a connection 
between development and suspension which, along with Eliot’s and Staël’s novels, troubles 
the conception of literary Bildung as a transformative characterological change. 
My fourth and final chapter, “Development’s Failures: Unsympathetic 
Protagonists and Narrative Distance in Born in Exile and Sentimental Education,” 
reconsiders the narrative of character development in light of later nineteenth-century 
novels whose protagonists’ endeavors to develop prove unsuccessful.  George Gissing’s 
Born in Exile and Gustave Flaubert’s Sentimental Education offer an ironic twist on the 
“upward” developmental trajectories and moralistic protagonists found in Dickens and 
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Brontë.  Instead of showcasing characters whose individuality singles them out for reader 
sympathy, Flaubert and Gissing present glaringly unsympathetic protagonists who can 
only conceive of development through the imitation of other characters.  Flaubert’s 
Frédéric Moreau, for example, wants to be “the Walter Scott of France” (26), while 
Gissing’s Godwin Peak becomes a religious scholar—despite his atheism—in order to 
endear himself to his wealthy acquaintances.  Presenting protagonists who strive to 
develop surface qualities rather than inner consciences, Gissing’s and Flaubert’s novels 
alternately question and satirize the representation of psychological depth for which so 
many Bildungsromane are known. 
Chapter Four continues the previous chapter’s focus on the relationship of the third-
person narrator to the development narrative’s attempts to win readerly sympathy.  The 
“developmental failure” of Gissing’s and Flaubert’s protagonists is, I argue, intimately linked 
to the narrator’s unconventional distance from them: defying the novelistic tradition in which 
third-person narrators elicit sympathy for the protagonist’s various foibles, the narrators of 
Born in Exile and Sentimental Education use distancing techniques to create a moral divide 
between themselves and the central characters they depict.  While postmodern readings of 
“the narrator” as a formal category (and of the Flaubertian narrator in particular) tend to 
privilege narrators who become dispersed and “unlocatable” or “impersonal,” my concept of 
distance requires us to recognize how narrators, by virtue of their position relative to the 
unfolding story, are always purveyors of moral judgment.  By examining how the 
inescapably present and judgmental third-person narrator withholds sympathy along both 
moral and formal dimensions of character in these two later Bildungsromane, I demonstrate 
that the Bildungsroman requires the narrator’s evocation of sympathy for the protagonist as a 
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precondition for development itself.  This chapter additionally examines how free indirect 
discourse—a technique Flaubert and Gissing use liberally to differentiate the singular 
narrator from the imitative protagonist—affects the construction of narrative distance.  
Where the first-person narrator of Bildungsromane like Copperfield and Eyre cannot help but 
identify with the protagonist because the two are literally one and the same, third-person 
narrators are able to exploit the ironic and mimetic potential of free indirect discourse to 
align themselves against the central character. 
For some readers, the previous descriptions may signal this project’s engagement 
with a cluster of interpretive practices frequently collected under the banner of 
“formalism.”  In the current case, these practices include an attention to literary genres 
(the novel, the Bildungsroman); to narrative techniques including represented thought, 
narratorial distance, and point-of-view; and to the juxtaposition of texts which emerge 
from similar aesthetic perspectives rather than from a single national tradition.  
“Developing Character” therefore diverges from other recent work on character, the most 
popular examples of which offer formal readings of novels in service of ostensibly 
weightier historicizing claims.17  Though such work unquestionably contributes to a more 
socially conscious body of literary criticism, it also risks suggesting that the study of 
form is ahistorical when decoupled from an avowedly materialist line of argumentation.  
In contrast, I offer this dissertation in enthusiastic agreement with a number of scholars 
who have recently begun to suggest that the studies of “form” and “history” are less 
opposed than our overworked institutional categorizations might lead us to believe.  As 
Caroline Levine writes, formalism “is conceptual and abstract, generalizing and 
transhistorical …But it is all about the social: it involves reading particular, historically 
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specific collisions among generalizing political, cultural, and social forms” (632).18  Any 
invocation of genre, for example, must account for particular expectations about literary 
form that both accrue and change over historical time.  “Developing Character” does not 
approach form instead of history, but rather, approaches history through form; it speaks 
not only to scholars of the nineteenth century, but also to a wider community of readers 
interested in exploring the particular forms that bring character into being.










Development and the Sacrifice of Character in David Copperfield and Jane Eyre 
 
 
“Il y a des hommes n’ayant pour mission parmi les autres que de servir d’intermédiaires; 
on les franchait comme les ponts, et l’on va plus loin.” 
 
[“There are some men whose only function in life is to act as intermediaries; one crosses 
them as if they were bridges, and leaves them behind.”] 
    -Gustave Flaubert, Sentimental Education II.IV 
 
 
Imagine for a moment that you stumble upon alternate versions of two well-
known Victorian novels.  In your newly discovered version of Jane Eyre, Mr. Rochester 
marries Blanche Ingram, Bertha Mason lives to a ripe old age up in the attic, and Jane 
courageously but unhappily accompanies St. John Rivers to India.  And in this David 
Copperfield, the title character remains married to Dora Spenlow far into his maturity, 
forever wishing that he had kept his youthful desires in check and waited for Agnes (who 
is now, regrettably, Mrs. Uriah Heep).   
The oddness or even absurdity of such possibilities reveals the degree to which 
we have come to identify these celebrated novels with the movement toward happiness 
that they chronicle.  Even if we have no trouble imagining David Copperfield without his 
joyful family and successful writing career, or Jane Eyre without her “Reader, I married 
him,” these alternate scenarios would drastically rewrite the generic current of the mid-
Victorian development novel.  For depictions of arrested development like those I have 
described contradict the central narrative strategy of what are arguably the two most 
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famous Victorian Bildungsromane we possess, a strategy by which the protagonists 
develop what the novels call “character” by overcoming obstacles rather than by living 
with their mistakes.  Moreover, these obstacles to character development almost always 
take the form of other characters: Jane cannot marry Rochester with Bertha in the picture, 
for example, and Dora prevents David from realizing his true happiness with Agnes.  As 
such, the act of overcoming obstacles turns out in Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels to also 
be the act of dramatically overturning those other people who stand in development’s 
way: developing “character” is the goal of these narratives, but characters themselves 
make this goal harder to achieve.  More to the point, the happiness with which Jane Eyre 
and David Copperfield notoriously conclude their narratives of character development 
depends on the death and loss of other characters.  The combined death toll of 
Copperfield and Eyre is staggeringly high: it includes not only the death of the 
protagonists’ real or potential lovers (Dora Spenlow, St. John Rivers), but of friends 
(Helen Burns, Ham Peggotty, James Steerforth), foes (Bertha Mason, Mrs. Reed, Mr. 
Spenlow) and both sets of parents.19   
This chapter orients such deaths around the concept of sacrifice, arguing that we 
can read the way in which the mid-Victorian Bildungsroman does away with “minor” 
characters in order to depict the protagonist’s development as evidence of a complex 
structure of loss and gain.20  I use the term “character sacrifice” here in a highly mobile 
sense, including three principal operations under its rubric: first and most importantly for 
this chapter, “character sacrifice” refers to the formal expulsion of various characters 
from the narrative.  This type of sacrifice helps novels represent character development 
both by individuating the protagonist (making her consciousness appear “deeper” and her 
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actions more mature as she negotiates loss) and by streamlining the novel’s plot so that 
no character stands in the way of its linear trajectory toward the happy ending that 
commemorates Bildung.   
Second, even as they highlight her increasing development, these novels often 
sacrifice the protagonist’s particular characteristics: as Jane and David traverse their life-
plots, their own moral character (that is, the character they are said to “possess”) 
undergoes a process of limitation that corresponds with the ever-narrowing possibilities 
of a plot that must end.  Moreover, these two facets of character sacrifice frequently 
reinforce each other, since every time a character dies, the protagonist can use the 
experience of that loss as a way to explain the continued refashioning of her character.  
After Dora’s untimely death, for example, David Copperfield is able to put to rest what 
he repeatedly calls his “undisciplined heart,” and therefore to outgrow the boyish 
infatuation that made him want to marry Dora in the first place (757).  Dora’s death thus 
allows the protagonist to commit himself to Agnes (a second, more “practical” wife who 
will help him fulfill his domestic and professional potential) while it also splits off the 
“undisciplined” desire that threatened this developmental progress.   It is as if, in the 
Bildungsroman, the old adage that bereavement “builds character” (or that “anything 
which doesn’t kill you makes you stronger”) becomes a narrative obligation.21   
Finally, “character sacrifice” suggests the rhetoric of self-sacrifice central to 
Victorian notions of character-building: both Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels devote a 
considerable amount of pages to illustrating how the protagonists’ increasing desire to 
give of themselves betokens their developing morality.  The general phenomenon I 
explore in this chapter, then, does not always refer to human sacrifice (i.e., to an actual 
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represented death), or to an explicitly religious variety of sacrifice, but rather to several 
narrative techniques that are “sacrificial” in their structure insofar as they formalize a 
process of renunciation in service of a privileged developmental goal.  By teasing out the 
ways in which two immensely popular Bildungsromane use sacrifice as a method of 
characterization, we can better understand how the structure of sacrifice knits together 
several seemingly disparate narratological and psychological processes. Specifically, 
Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels demonstrate how formal plot elaboration and 
characterization in the first-person Bildungsroman help shape the novel’s construction of 
a developing individuality that results from sustained loss.  This reliance on sacrifice for 
development’s sake, in turn, prompts Copperfield and Eyre to deploy a wide range of 
strategies for neutralizing and deflecting the violence that underlies their presentation of 
character.   Before analyzing these strategies in the primary texts, I will briefly discuss 
the critical material that underpins my readings, attending both to long-received 
scholarship on the Bildungsroman and to alternate interpretive paradigms that will help 
illustrate the structural interdependence between development and loss throughout the 
genre. 
 
Development’s Sacrificial Depths   
Perhaps the most common critical gloss of the Bildungsroman claims that it 
figures its protagonist’s growth as a process of acculturation, a movement from various 
forms of social alienation toward the possession of a comfortable role in society and an 
increasingly resolute moral compass.22  Thomas Jeffers, for instance, characterizes the 
end of the traditional Bildungsroman as an established “harmony” between the 
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protagonist’s self and the social order that he comes to inhabit (31).  To bring this point 
home, one need only reflect on the notoriously—indeed, often eerily—happy endings of 
many classic character development novels, in which the developed protagonist sits 
swaddled in the midst of what Austen famously hails as “the perfect happiness of the 
union” (Emma, 381).23  Moreover, as I discussed at greater length in the Introduction, the 
kind of development that ends in the protagonist’s acculturation frequently constructs the 
Bildungsroman’s central character as dazzlingly “deep.”  When it is applied to literary 
character, “depth” usually refers to the way that a frequent and detailed rendering of a 
character’s represented consciousness creates the impression of a human being’s 
psychological complexity.  A deep character need not live through unusual 
circumstances, but her inner evaluation of everyday situations often reveals an 
extraordinary precision of thought; Thomas Mann aptly calls the Bildungsroman the 
“sublimation and rendering inward of the novel of adventures” (qtd. in Swales, 32).    
Dickens’s and Brontë’s novels figure development itself as a process of 
deepening—of adding more—to the protagonist as she relates her life’s narrative.  Since 
decision-making is integral to the conventional Bildungsroman’s developmental model, 
this “more” often manifests itself as a choice that the protagonist makes after interior 
deliberation: as David’s decision to quit his position as a proctor and become a 
professional writer, for example, or as Jane’s abrupt departure from Lowood school in 
search of “a new servitude” (72).  Such choices indicate that the protagonist has taken on 
a new way of thinking or behaving; she needs new experiences, just as the novel of her 
life necessitates new turns of its plot.  In addition, the retrospective narration in which 
these choices are narrated heightens the novels’ depth-effect, figuring the protagonists’ 
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represented thought as a layering of complexly interacting temporal dimensions.  Indeed, 
first-person narration is an ideal mode in which to figure depth, since it captures both an 
adult and a childhood consciousness through a single narrating voice: both David and 
Jane’s narratives appear to be infused with the wisdom of maturity looking back on 
youth. 
But acknowledging that development involves a deepening of character brings us 
face to face with a contradiction within the schema of maturation that we find across 
many nineteenth-century Bildungsromane.  For, according to the novel’s alignment of 
development and acculturation, protagonists must also learn to give up those particular 
characteristics or proclivities that made them such fascinatingly deep characters in the 
first place.  Franco Moretti addresses this paradox, arguing that the Bildungsroman seeks 
to reconcile the two opposing concepts of “self-determination” (or “individuality”) and 
“socialization”: “How,” he asks, “can the tendency towards individuality, which is the 
necessary fruit of a culture of self-determination, be made to coexist with the opposing 
tendency to normality, the offspring, equally inevitable, of the mechanism of 
socialization?” (15-16).  Similarly, Gillian Beer writes that the Bildungsroman 
“emphasises the full entry of individuality into social bonds—there is a sense always of 
reduction and appeasement in its conclusion” (Darwin’s Plots, 102).  A protagonist, in 
other words, cannot act out her every inner desire at the same time that she settles down 
to become a responsible citizen.24  For all of its implied appeal, the actual state of 
“development” is less interesting than the process of acquiring it, as the relative brevity 
of Jane Eyre and David Copperfield’s final chapters demonstrates.25   
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I contend that a narrative structure of sacrifice underpins the systems of 
acculturation long associated with the ideology of the Bildungsroman.  Both David 
Copperfield and Jane Eyre, as I have noted, figure development as a process by which 
individualizing characteristics—such as Jane’s quick temper and David’s weakness for 
irresponsible women—become corrected or subdued through an experience of loss that is 
formally organized around the removal of minor characters from the storyline.  The 
impression of psychological depth that David’s and Jane’s narratives align with moral 
progress actually relies on a curiously violent aesthetic principle.  In these two 
Bildungsromane, development’s project of “deepening” the protagonist, of her 
apprenticeship to life and projected fulfillment, figures as a kind of stripping away at the 
level of narrative form.  The kind of Bildung depicted in Copperfield and Eyre therefore 
conflicts with the notion (widespread to this day) that development is an adding onto, or a 
deepening, of a germ that already exits.  Character turns out to have been less “deep” than 
it makes itself out to be; what we call “depth”—the perceived “fullness” and articulate 
introspection of a character’s psychological life—requires an isolation of character, an 
anti-sociability, that the densely populated Victorian novel hardly seems fit to endorse.  
By figuring the developing protagonists as socially poisonous (those who get too close to 
David or Jane often end up dead), these novels challenge stereotypes about the 
Victorians, who are often assumed to revere social interaction as a hallmark of moral 
character.  Developmental education in Copperfield and Eyre comes instead to seem like 
the survival of the protagonist’s character over other characters: if nothing else, the 
protagonist develops because she makes it through to the end of her own story. 
    
 40
Two critics in particular—Alex Woloch and René Girard—prove especially 
instructive participants in this chapter’s discussion, since each critic’s work offers clues 
about how represented deaths might influence the structural operations of narrative.  In 
his analysis of the minor characters who provide the protagonist with social relationships, 
Woloch notes the way in which what I am calling “sacrificed characters” can take an 
emotional hold on the reader:      
The strange significance of minor characters…resides largely in 
the way that the character disappears, and in the tension or relief 
that results from this vanishing…We feel interest and outrage, 
painful concern or amused consent at what happens to minor 
characters: not simply their fate within the story (whether they 
marry or die, make their fortune or lose it, find a home or become 
exiled) but also in the narrative discourse itself (how they are 
finally overshadowed or absorbed into someone else’s story, 
swallowed within or expelled from another person’s plot (38, 
emphasis mine). 
 
Though Woloch does not dilate specifically here on the phenomenon with which 
this chapter is concerned—that is, the represented deaths of so many characters in the 
Bildungsroman—the quotation cannot but reveal it.  For to refer to a character’s “fate” in 
a nineteenth-century novel is often the same thing as referring to his death.  As Woloch 
points out, this “disappearance” happens on both the story and discourse levels of the 
novel, as death or an exile that is actually narrated, or as a gradual flattening of or 
decreased attention to a given character.  Such flattening is easily discernable in David 
Copperfield’s major antagonist: Uriah Heep, in Woloch’s estimation, offers no match for 
David’s depth when it comes to character construction.  Constantly harping on his 
“umbleness” throughout the novel, and constantly manifesting the same repulsive 
physical tics, Heep is “always already flat, eccentric, exaggerated, a parody of himself” 
(146).  The same, I would add, goes for Jane Eyre’s Blanche Ingram, who appears a 
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veritable caricature of tediousness when dissected as she is within Jane’s discerning 
consciousness: “She was not good; she was not original: she used to repeat sounding 
phrases from books: she never offered, nor had, an opinion of her own” (Brontë, 158).  
For examples of “exiled” characters, we only need look as far as Copperfield’s Mr. 
Micawber, who is always disappearing to various corners of England (and finally, 
Australia), or to Miss Temple, a schoolteacher whose marriage in Jane Eyre efficiently 
writes her out of the protagonist’s story at the same time that it offers Jane an impetus to 
leave her position at Lowood.  So while I will concentrate in this chapter on characters 
who die (and on the circumstances surrounding those deaths), death is only the most 
conspicuous way in which characters disappear from the development novel: it is the 
supreme sacrifice.   
In Violence and the Sacred and later in The Scapegoat, René Girard treats 
sacrifice as one of the underlying principles of what he calls “human culture” (Violence, 
10).  According to Girard, human “societies” commit a ritualized form of sacrificial 
violence on a scapegoat figure in order to keep violence from spreading throughout the 
entire community: “Society is seeking to deflect upon a relatively indifferent victim, a 
‘sacrificeable’ victim, the violence that would otherwise be vented on its own members, 
the people it most desires to protect” (Violence, 4).26  Because Girard’s work on sacrifice 
is more totalizing than the work of a contemporary literary critic like Woloch’s, it is easy 
to find fault with its sweeping generalizations.  But it is also easy to discern how David 
Copperfield and Jane Eyre have strong affinities with the sacrificial paradigm Girard 
describes: the killing-off of characters in both novels works in particular to ensure that 
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the central narrative of the developing protagonist appears to progress “harmoniously,” at 
all costs.   
The traditional development novel may sacrifice any of those auxiliary characters 
who threaten to harm the single, central character whose life story it treats as its “sacred” 
project.  Such threatening, of course, occurs in the novel on a figurative plane; if Helen 
Burns threatens Jane Eyre’s development, for example, it is not because she wants to do 
the protagonist physical harm.  Rather, as Susan Derwin has noted, Jane’s narrative must 
see Helen dead because the “alternative” life that Helen represents would effectively 
defeat the “imaginary autonomy” that Jane chronicles in her narrative (108).27  According 
to this logic, almost any character could potentially be offered up for sacrifice.  Indeed, 
the assortment of disparate characteristics (in terms of gender, race, age, or social 
standing) among Copperfield and Eyre’s sacrificial victims seems to imply that the 
greatest point of similarity between all of these characters is a negative one: the only 
thing they have in common is that they are not the protagonist.  But in the 
Bildungsroman—when the protagonist’s development is the focal point of the text—this 
negative distinction becomes more powerful than it might initially seem.  For if the 
protagonist spends too much time lingering around any other character (in Woloch’s 
terms, if a minor character takes up increasing “space” in the protagonist’s story), then 
the mere presence of that other character could potentially blur the boundaries between 
“major” and “minor” characters upon which the development novel ostensibly relies.  
With its insistence that the “sacrificial crisis” occurs when distinctions cease to exist, 
Girard’s theory speaks to this dynamic as well.  “The cultural order,” Girard writes, “is 
nothing more than a regulated system of distinctions in which the differences among 
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individuals are used to establish their ‘identity’ and their mutual relationships” (Violence, 
49).  And it is precisely in moments that the protagonist’s “identity” comes into question 
(when David becomes unhappy as Dora’s husband, for example, or when Jane weighs the 
pros and cons of becoming a missionary in India) that the protagonist’s story tends to 
sacrifice characters.28   
The various techniques of sacrifice I describe throughout this chapter build upon 
Girard’s theories by illustrating how the Bildungsroman converts the social phenomenon 
of ritual sacrifice into both an internal (psychological) and a formal (narrative) process.  
In the novel, what needs protection via scapegoating is not the “social order,” but, rather, 
the developing character of a single protagonist.  And what Girard sees as a basic method 
of social maintenance—the purging of a violent element within society—in fact 
resembles the way in which individual members of the Victorian novel’s exhaustively 
represented societies think about eradicating those elements of their own character that 
threaten to harm them from within.  If characters must die in Bildungsromane, their 
deaths serve to simplify a life story whose potential to veer off in many different 
directions or to fall into premature decline becomes narratively unmanageable.   
Another crucial divergence between Girard’s concept of sacrifice and the 
Bildungsroman’s sacrifice of character is the novel’s intermittent repression of its violent 
structure of characterization.  Unlike many of the scapegoat-figures whom Girard 
discusses, the victims of sacrifice in nineteenth-century Bildungsromane must not be 
labeled as such in order that “development” remain free of destructive connotations.  
Copperfield and Eyre thus attempt in numerous ways to keep the practice of sacrifice 
hidden from the reader, who is encouraged to see represented deaths less as instances of 
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scapegoating than as inevitable losses inherent to the developmental process.  Whether by 
allowing death less space in the narrative discourse or by quickly employing instances of 
death to highlight the enrichment of the protagonist who survives it, the Bildungsroman 
continually conceals the sacrifices that hold it together.     
Moreover, the protagonist’s first-person narration both reinforces her survival and 
legitimates it as a sign of development.29 To narrate one’s own story—as Jane and David 
magisterially do—is to structure a narrative world according to one’s own system of values 
(and, therefore, be able to define “development” as “what I am telling you that I did”).  As 
we will see, self-narration allows Brontë’s and Dickens’s protagonists to position themselves 
not as agents of sacrificial violence against other characters, but as zealous proponents of 
self-sacrifice in their own right.  It is hardly coincidental that these two novels do not employ 
the third-person narrative structure so popular in nineteenth-century fiction.  For, as I will 
argue in Chapter 4, third-person narratives often highlight the tension that arises from an 
outside adjudicator passing judgment on the characters he depicts.  Instead, as Audrey Jaffe 
has noted, Copperfield’s first-person narration (and the childhood consciousness it conjures) 
allows its practitioner to sidestep any responsibility for the  narrated events: “Identification 
with the younger self is more than an attempt to create an effect of verisimilitude…rather, 
such identification defines the narrator as unable to articulate the implications of what he 
sees” (125).30  Though Jaffe does not specifically refer to Copperfield’s convenient 
character-sacrifices in her analysis, her insight into the evasion of accountability fostered by 
first-person narration can help us understand how David downplays the casualties of his 
development narrative.  In what follows, I will both examine how Dickens’s and Brontë’s 
novels construct narratives of moral development through the killing-off of multiple 
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characters and illustrate the formal strategies that the novels employ in their attempt to draw 
the reader’s attention away from the sacrificial character of these killings. 
 
Orphanhood: Development and Parents, Lost and Found 
 David Copperfield and Jane Eyre are two of the Victorian period’s most 
memorable orphan protagonists, forming part of an illustrious novelistic family that 
includes Dickens’s Pip and Oliver Twist, Charlotte Brontë’s Lucy Snowe, Thackeray’s 
Becky Sharpe, Hardy’s Jude Fawley, and Kipling’s Kim.31  The pervasiveness of the 
orphan’s presence in the Victorian novel can be explained in any number of ways—as a 
vehicle for social reform, for instance, that could benefit the thousands of actual English 
orphans who were living and dying under deplorable conditions, or as the fictional 
incarnation of the modern individual about whom political theorists like J.S. Mill and 
Matthew Arnold were theorizing in roughly the same period.32  
In terms of narrative structure, it is easy to discern the formal possibilities that 
orphanhood offers to writers and readers of narrative fiction.  For to center a narrative 
around an orphan child is inevitably to pose a question that will move the story forward: 
what will become of this child?  Deprived of parents—of those characters who ostensibly 
desire to look after their child’s development—the orphan must take an agentic stance 
toward her own life at an unusually young age.  Rather than inheriting a fortune or a post, 
she must decide where she wants to go and whom she wants to become; such decisions in 
turn promise that the narrative itself will be out of the ordinary, as it portrays the 
unfolding of a life from a disenfranchised point-of-view.  Without familiar origins to 
return to, the orphan seems, as Nina Auerbach has argued, to be a materialization of 
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“pure selfhood” unleashed (404).  In first-person character development novels like 
Copperfield and Eyre, the orphan protagonist’s agency appears not only through her 
represented actions, but in the very mode of representation itself, since the novel’s formal 
organization relies upon the idea that the narrator has chosen to tell her life story in the 
first place.  And while it is true that many nineteenth-century Bildungsromane do not 
contain orphans, a great number of them depict an act of symbolic orphaning, as the 
protagonist breaks away from her family or the ideals it represents.33  The prerequisite for 
centrality in a Bildungsroman, therefore, is usually some form of orphanhood, with actual 
orphans like David and Jane serving as especially efficient manifestations of a broader 
trend of characterization within the genre.  
If orphanhood allows the developing protagonist to move forward, it does so by 
defining her through what I am arguing are two of development’s preconditions: loss and 
survival.  An orphan attains her orphan status precisely by what it is she has lost—she is, in 
fact, a walking, talking symbol of loss—and her characterization throughout the novel must 
therefore reflect her survival of the family who died before her narrative ever takes off.34  
Baruch Hochman and Ilja Wachs have argued that Charles Dickens’s cultivation of what 
they call “the orphan imagination”—that is, the sense of loss that prompts the orphan to 
both seek out love and to harbor vengeful feelings of abandonment—is one reason that 
Dickens’s novels continue to enjoy a broad readership.  “Loss,” they write, “is a primary 
condition of human life; orphanhood is the ultimate reach of our ineluctable sense of loss” 
(14).  Dickens, then, is able to exercise such a powerful hold on his readers by depicting 
“the human condition” and “the orphan condition” as one and the same (12).35 
    
 47
This novelistic cultivation of a universal sense of loss in both characters and 
reading subjects, I would add, goes hand-in-hand with what might seem to be its opposite: 
the representation of successful character development, which is as good an answer as the 
nineteenth-century novel has to questions about what human growth actually looks like.  
Moving now to Dickens’s text, we can see how even the opening pages of David 
Copperfield set up a reciprocal relationship between development and loss.  The novel’s 
first lines, in which David famously writes that “whether or not I shall turn out to be the 
hero of my own life, or whether that station will be held by anybody else, these pages must 
show” (4), let the reader know that this will be a narrative of development.  For the mystery 
of whether or not the protagonist will turn out to be the hero of his own life (not really a 
mystery at all, since David’s first-person narration effectively positions him as the hero), 
relies for its fulfillment in the narrative of the Bildungsroman.  David begins, as predictably 
he might, with his birth, likening the beginning of his development narrative to the 
beginning of time (“the clock began to strike, and I began to cry” [3]).  But this beginning 
of beginnings is almost instantly met with David’s meditation on the loss of his caul, which 
is sold at auction for five shillings.  “I remember,” David writes,” to have felt quite 
uncomfortable and confused, at a part of myself being disposed of in that way” (4).  At the 
same time that the protagonist comes into being, then, the novel dramatizes David’s 
sacrifice of a part of his physical body that nourished him before he was born.  In fact, if 
we are to go by David’s own words, then his confusion and discomfort at this loss 
constitute his earliest memory; the previous sentence marks the first time in the text that 
David actually says that he “remembers.”36 
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The loss of the caul quickly segues into another loss, this time figured through the 
death of an actual character: David’s father and namesake.  Here, the protagonist-narrator 
tidily packages the narrative of his father’s death—the first blow towards his orphanhood—
in the space of the following single paragraph in the novel’s opening chapter: 
I was born at Blunderstone, in Suffolk, or ‘thereby,’ as they say in 
Scotland. I was a posthumous child. My father's eyes had closed 
upon the light of this world six months, when mine opened on it. 
There is something strange to me, even now, in the reflection that 
he never saw me; and something stranger yet in the shadowy 
remembrance that I have of my first childish associations with his 
white grave-stone in the churchyard, and of the indefinable 
compassion I used to feel for it lying out alone there in the dark 
night, when our little parlour was warm and bright with fire and 
candle, and the doors of our house were - almost cruelly, it seemed 
to me sometimes - bolted and locked against it (4). 
 
That David Copperfield, Elder, should die before his son is ever born allows David-the-
protagonist/narrator a good deal of liberty in his own characterization of this death; since 
he never knew his father, it becomes easier for him to fantasize about who he was and, 
more importantly, how he becomes meaningful within the autobiographical framework 
that David the Younger is building.  Accordingly, this paragraph does not use David the 
Elder’s death to acquaint us with the man who died, but rather with the man who 
survived him.  David the Younger always remains the narrative’s focal point: he 
concentrates less on the fact that he never knew his father than he does on the “reflection 
that he never saw me.”  Similarly, adult-David’s reflective narration (heavily signaled 
here by references to “reflection,” “remembrance,” and “even now”) allows him to 
manipulate the death in order to characterize his boyhood self in a favorable light, using 
his bereavement to signal the “indefinable compassion” of which he is capable.  It is as if 
the conspicuous lack of David the Elder’s character within his son’s narrative actually 
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provides David the Younger with more room to evoke the intricacies of his own inner 
depth.   
It also becomes easier for readers to forget this death—or at least to forgive 
David’s hurried treatment of it—since we, like David, never “got to know” the dead 
character in question.  Although David refers to his father as “he without whom I had 
never been” (13), the protagonist of this development narrative must in fact be without 
his father so that he has an excuse to leave the comfort of the warm, bright little parlor in 
which this paragraph sees him ensconced.  Even David’s writing style seems to 
acknowledge this trade-off; the parallel structure of the sentence “My father’s eyes had 
closed upon the light of this world six months, when mine opened on it” presents the 
father’s death and the son’s birth as a causal chain in which one pair of eyes must close 
before another opens.  But if David’s narration explains away David the Elder’s death at 
many levels, the figurative violence behind this remembrance remains.  The protagonist’s 
treatment of his father’s death thus provides us with a characteristic example of the way 
in which development novels both rationalize and apologize for the sacrifice of character.  
Within a single paragraph, David takes advantage of his father’s loss as a springboard for 
self-characterization at the same time that his guilt over that loss (and its hasty depiction) 
emerges.  David, we learn, is constantly reminded that his father is dead, since the 
gravestone in the churchyard is located right outside his window; just as loss is never far 
from his mind, loss’s physical memorial forms part of David’s daily life at Blunderstone.  
David’s response to the gravestone is telling: he anthropomorphizes it to make it more 
like the human being who is buried under it, and, as we have seen, he proceeds to feel 
“cruelly” that he has shut it out from the scene of domestic bliss going on indoors.   
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  As arresting as it is, this suffering is only momentary in Dickens’s text; David 
quickly gets on with his life and its narrative, and the novel leaves behind its first 
sacrifice in order to introduce more characters whom the protagonist will love and lose on 
the way to his happy ending.  Indeed, the speed with which both Dickens’s and Brontë’s 
protagonists move forward after each narrated death reflects Girard’s ideas about what 
scapegoating is meant to accomplish.  “The process of finding a surrogate victim,” Girard 
writes, “constitutes a major means, perhaps the sole means, by which men expel from 
their consciousness the truth about their violent nature—that knowledge of past violence 
which, if not shifted to a single ‘guilty’ figure, would poison both the present and the 
future” (83).37  Though David does not render his father a “guilty figure,” he obliquely 
yokes the guilt of his narrative’s own violence to a death that bears directly on the 
“present and the future” of his development story.  By rapidly passing by this death—by 
fixing it as an event in his narrative past—he also glosses over its implication in the 
sacrificial structure that struggles to keep the protagonist on a steady course.  To focus for 
too long on any one death would be counterproductive to the development process 
whereby central characters must conspicuously survive in the apparently fatality-ridden 
narrative worlds they inhabit.  In narratological terms, Copperfield devotes little 
discourse time to his father’s narrated death.  A term first proposed by Seymour 
Chatman, “discourse time” indicates “the time it takes to peruse the discourse,” as 
opposed to the time the events supposedly take in the story (62).  So while David’s 
bereavement experience might have lasted a long time in the diegetic world, it only lasts 
a few pages in the novel.  Spending little discourse time on characters who die proves one 
of the Bildungsroman’s most effective strategies for diverting readerly attention away 
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from narrative sacrifices and toward the protagonist’s manner of processing death and 
using it as a springboard for narrative progression.38 
 That David’s mother—Clara Copperfield-Murdstone—dies on David’s birthday 
further cements the novel’s correlation between the elimination of secondary characters 
and the advancement of David’s life, narrative, and maturity.  Like Dora after her, 
David’s mother predicts her own death: “I never shall see my pretty darling again.  
Something tells me so, that tells the truth, I know” (125).  Clara’s acceptance of her own 
death before it even occurs allows Copperfield’s disposal of the narrator’s first protector 
to seem natural rather than formally conducive.  David’s infant brother can of course live 
only a few days longer; were he to remain alive, the protagonist would have a reason to 
remain anchored to his childhood home.  The more characters that survive the narrative, 
the more the narrator must take on the various responsibilities he owes them at the cost of 
his own independence and mobility.  And not only does this double-death prompt 
David’s move to London, but it offers him yet another occasion to use his loss as fodder 
for his own development narrative.  “The mother who lay in the grave,” he remarks, “was 
the mother of my infancy; the little creature in her arms, was myself, as I had once been, 
hushed forever on her bosom” (126).  Here, the narrator clearly equates the sacrifice of 
Mrs. Copperfield and her second son with the passage of an innocent stage in his life: 
David loses his childhood guilelessness by virtue of these two deaths.  Measuring out 
stages of growth through the mechanism of character sacrifice allows the Bildungsroman 
to further underscore the protagonist’s development through the loss of both formal 
characters (Clara and the baby) and moral characteristics (innocence).  But what is most 
shocking about the previous passage is how David, through this explanation of what these 
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deaths mean for him, effaces his baby brother’s identity altogether.  For the “creature” in 
his mother’s arms is neither a “creature” nor “himself,” but a represented human being 
who has died without ever being named.     
*** 
 Charlotte Brontë takes even less discourse time than Dickens to send her orphan 
protagonists’ parents offstage.  Unlike Copperfield, in which the title character uses his 
father’s death to illuminate his own depth, Brontë’s two most influential works come as 
close as they can to doing away with birth parents altogether.  We may get halfway 
through Villette without even registering that Lucy Snowe never mentions her parents at 
all, and Jane Eyre sums up the circumstances of her parents’ death in a single-sentence 
paragraph whose brevity under the circumstances provides an interesting counterpoint to 
the earlier paragraph from Copperfield:   
On that same occasion I learned, for the first time, from Miss 
Abbot’s communications to Bessie, that my father had been a poor 
clergyman; that my mother had married him against the wishes of 
her friends, who considered the match beneath her; that my 
grandfather Reed was so irritated at her disobedience, he cut her 
off without a shilling; that after my mother and father had been 
married a year, the latter caught the typhus fever while visiting 
among the poor of a large manufacturing town where his curacy 
was situated, and where that disease was then prevalent; that my 
mother took the infection from him, and both died within a month 
of each other (21). 
 
In contrast to the lengthy sections of dialogue that surround it, the previous 
account appears in indirect discourse, a mode of narration that lends itself well to 
economical summary.  The multiple clauses of the long sentence build up like a laundry 
list, as Jane ticks off the major events leading up to her orphanhood in a markedly 
unaffected tone.  Rather than present what is apparently a notable revelation through 
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direct dialogue—in which the reader could gauge Jane’s reactions in her own childhood 
idiom, and in which Jane herself could pose questions to Bessie about the circumstances 
of her orphanhood—Jane-the-narrator provides us with a bare minimum of factual detail 
(neither of her parents is given a proper name; both are knocked out in a single blow by 
the same infectious disease).  Moreover, that Jane should hear the story of her parents’ 
deaths third-hand (through what Miss Abbot has told Bessie) provides her with an excuse 
to say as little about those deaths as possible: she can only know herself what Bessie has 
told her.  
Though we might expect the pious Jane to find comfort in the fact that her father 
was a religious man who died helping the poor, or that her mother chose love over 
money, we are forced to either fill in these blanks for ourselves or to acknowledge that, 
for Jane, this particular moment of summary is less important than the circumstances that 
surround it.  For the “occasion” to which Jane refers is a visit from Mr. Lloyd, the 
apothecary who suggests that she leave Gateshead and go to school, a move that Jane 
weightily foresees as “an entrance into a new life” (20).  Placed as it is within the context 
of Jane’s movement forward, the truncated narrative of her parents’ death must not take 
up the amount of discourse time it seems to deserve.  Bessie’s disclosure (and the 
character sacrifice it enacts) therefore signals that the protagonist is definitively 
unencumbered by ties to her past.  Jane is a sole survivor, whose lonely position actually 
makes possible the education she will receive at Lowood school. 
Perhaps even more than David Copperfield, Jane Eyre is a novel of ostentatiously 
marked stages, as its movement from place to place (from Gateshead to Lowood, from 
Lowood to Thornfield, from Thornfield to Marsh End, and from Marsh End to Ferndean) 
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signals each step towards its culmination, at which Jane is self-consciously developed 
enough to narrate her own life.  But at the same time that Jane grows, both in age and in 
the “depth” of character that her narrative represents, these discrete stages necessitate that 
she leave other characters behind.  Brontë’s narrative thus illustrates a process of 
development whereby Jane must lose in order to gain: it is not simply the addition of 
relationships to Jane’s interpersonal repertoire that marks her development, but rather, 
her ultimate willingness to let those relationships go.  We need look no further than Jane 
herself to register the calculated risk behind these leave-takings; as she embarks on her 
journey toward Lowood, she remarks that “[t]hus was I severed from Bessie and 
Gateshead: thus whirled away to unknown, and, as I then deemed, remote and mysterious 
regions” (35).  Here, Jane cloaks her solitariness in an almost mythical quality, casting 
herself as the passive object of a providential “severance.” However at the same time, the 
parting from Gateshead—a parting that Jane desires, since it helps her escape from the 
detestable Reeds—figures the protagonist as an unusually intrepid explorer.  (She is, after 
all, only ten years old).  As we have seen in David Copperfield, the manifold losses that 
Jane sustains allow her to showcase a remarkable strength of character.   
It is fitting that Lowood—an asylum for orphan children—should be where Jane 
meets the novel’s two most prominent mother-figures: the young teacher, Miss Temple, 
and the consumptive fourteen-year-old, Helen Burns.  Jane’s orphanhood actually allows 
her to act out the fantasy of choosing her own parents, of actively constructing her own 
family.39   Between the two mother-figures, Miss Temple is a far more predictable 
choice, and Jane remarks as much when she reflects that her teacher “had stood me in the 
stead of mother, governess, and, latterly, companion” (71).  Brontë’s portrait of Miss 
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Temple clearly positions her as the school’s most compassionate employee, as one who 
nurtures her pupils with nighttime chats and contraband seedcake.  Helen Burns, 
however, is another matter: that a fourteen-year-old girl should serve as a mother-figure 
at all is unusual, but Helen seems ready-made for the job, armed as she is with a sizable 
arsenal of homilies and common-sense for Jane to soak up.  She is, as many modern 
readers have noted, a profoundly unrealistic character—more adult-like than most adults, 
and content to suffer abuse and illness in silence.  The most ostentatiously didactic of 
Helen’s lessons is what Jane calls her “doctrine of endurance”: “It is far better,” Helen 
reflects, “to endure patiently a smart which nobody feels but yourself, than to commit a 
hasty action whose evil consequences will extend to all connected with you; and besides, 
the Bible bids us return good for evil” (47).  Rather than railing against “Brocklehurst, 
Reed & Co.,” in other words, Helen urges Jane to take Christ as an example and to let go 
of her bitter impulses. 
That Jane has internalized Helen’s lesson becomes evident when Miss Temple asks 
her to “defend” herself against Brocklehurst’s claim that she is a liar and ungrateful to her 
benefactress, Mrs. Reed: 
I resolved, in the depth of my heart, that I would be most moderate--
most correct; and, having reflected a few minutes in order to arrange 
coherently what I had to say, I told her all the story of my sad 
childhood.  Exhausted by emotion, my language was more subdued 
than it generally was when it developed that sad theme; and mindful 
of Helen's warnings against the indulgence of resentment, I infused 
into the narrative far less of gall and wormwood than ordinary.  Thus 
restrained and simplified, it sounded more credible:  I felt as I went 
on that Miss Temple fully believed me (60). 
 
Here, Jane exploits Helen’s “warnings” in order to depict her own growth.  Notice how 
the protagonist’s successful self-defense requires that she reach into the “depth” of her 
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heart: the doctrine of endurance becomes productive of a more introspective life for she 
who submits to it.  And the lesson Helen teaches Jane is not only about Christian 
endurance, but about narrative itself, since Jane’s story is “developed” in concert with the 
character who tells it.  The passage—Jane’s story of her own growing ability to tell 
“credible” stories that are “coherently arranged”—provides a concise example of the 
development novel’s structural linkage between depth, development, and narrative: 
through self-narration, Jane becomes a deeper character.40 
 Yet while granting that Jane’s adherence to the doctrine of endurance contributes 
to her developing depth, we must also pay attention to the particular shape that this depth 
takes.  Jane’s credibility here rests, specifically, on techniques of limitation and self-
editing—on “moderation,” “simplification,” and “restraint.”  She must not, in other 
words, rely on the barrage of insults that she previously heaped on Mrs. Reed back at 
Gateshead; the novel requires that she sacrifice those elements of her personality which 
threaten to derail her journey from the character of impulsive child to that of circumspect 
wife and mother.  In an illustration of one of the Bildungsroman’s many contradictions, 
then, Jane’s character is said to grow deeper through the renunciation of those 
characteristics that make her such a fascinating heroine (and hers such a singular novel) 
in the first place.  For it is hardly a controversial move among Brontë’s contemporary 
readers to claim that Jane’s amply justified displays of “gall and wormwood” toward the 
Reeds and Mr. Brocklehurst are the stuff of both pleasurable reading and skillful 
characterization.  How many of us have smiled in the name of just retribution when, after 
Mrs. Reed tells Brocklehurst of Jane’s “bad character,” the protagonist threatens her aunt 
with a counter-narrative of her own: “‘If any one asks me how I liked you, and how you 
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treated me, I will say the very thought of you makes me sick, and that you treated me 
with miserable cruelty’” (30)?41  Though Jane, of course, never fully shakes off her 
passionate tendencies—by her own admission, she is “no Helen Burns” (55), and we 
probably wouldn’t relish a novel about her if she were—her story is one of 
characterological restraint, of the continual wearing-down of her character.42  By 
submitting herself to Helen’s mandate, Jane’s moral character becomes increasingly 
codified and predictable: she will not fly off the handle into an indulgent story of the 
abuses she suffered; she will instead present a watered-down version of the novel’s 
opening chapter so as to appear “believable.”  And through the act of holding back her 
bitterness, the formal properties that comprise the presentation of Jane’s moral character 
begin to change as well, as the novel’s numerous passages of interior reflection illustrate 
her increasing ethic of moderation through correspondingly moderate nuggets of indirect 
discourse like the one quoted above.  
The sacrifice of Helen Burns’s character—in one of the most memorable death 
scenes in Victorian literature—follows close on the heels of this incident.  After Jane 
crawls into bed with an ailing Helen, the latter dies a martyr’s death of consumption and 
the former emerges uninfected.  This death exemplifies character sacrifice at its most 
transparent, as Helen’s life itself is turned into a lesson for Jane, whose “mind made its 
first effort to comprehend what had been infused into it concerning heaven and hell” (67).  
It is as if Helen has only existed to tutor Jane, and her death marks the point at which she 
has no further information to convey.  The convenience of this premature death for the 
sake of Jane’s narrative is clear: it allows Jane to appreciate mortality at the same time it 
guarantees that the depiction of Helen will not encroach upon the central story of Jane’s 
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development.  (After Helen’s death, Jane only mentions her school friend once more, 
when she visits another dying character: Mrs. Reed).  Just as Jane must take in Helen’s 
lessons in order to augment her deepening character, so too must she leave Helen behind 
without seeming to do so.  And, always ready to help when she can, Helen herself seems 
to sanction her own death from the very moment she and Jane meet, since she continually 
expresses not just an acceptance of death, but a desire for it to happen as soon as possible.  
“By dying young,” Helen assures Jane, “I shall escape great sufferings.  I had not 
qualities or talents to make my way very well in the world; I should have been 
continually at fault” (69).  Through assurances like this, in which Helen acts joyful at the 
prospect of finally meeting her “mighty, universal Parent” (69), Jane Eyre shifts attention 
away from what amounts to a clearly functional death.  It becomes simpler for both Jane 
and her readers to swallow this character sacrifice when the sacrificed character herself 
provides eloquent arguments in favor of our doing just that. 
Though Miss Temple does not die in Jane’s narrative, her departure from Lowood 
eight years later provides Jane with all the impetus she needs to become “restless” with 
her own position as a schoolteacher in the span of one day.  Moreover, the loss of Miss 
Temple gives the protagonist an occasion to ruminate upon the “transforming process” 
she has undergone: 
From the day she left I was no longer the same:  with her was gone 
every settled feeling, every association that had made Lowood in 
some degree a home to me.  I had imbibed from her something of 
her nature and much of her habits:  more harmonious 
thoughts:  what seemed better regulated feelings had become the 
inmates of my mind.  I had given in allegiance to duty and order; I 
was quiet; I believed I was content:  to the eyes of others, usually 
even to my own, I appeared a disciplined and subdued character 
(71). 
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Here, Jane’s internal self-assessment resembles the instance years before when she 
managed to tell her Gateshead stories in a “restrained” manner to Helen and Miss 
Temple.  Again, Jane remarks that she has become more “disciplined and subdued” at the 
same time that this avowal permits her to reference the inner recesses of her mind.  That 
Jane should “imbibe” Miss Temple’s “nature” conjures up an image of physical and 
mental expansion: where David’s narrative used his mother’s death to carry off his 
innocent characteristics, Brontë’s protagonist identifies with and introjects useful 
elements of her mother-figure’s character.43  Jane Eyre is full of such moments, in which 
the protagonist asks us to see how she has grown.  The imminent death of Mrs. Reed later 
on in the novel, for instance, prompts Jane to remark that “I experienced firmer trust in 
myself and my own powers, and less withering dread of oppression” (194).  But most 
importantly, this transformative moment occurs as a direct result of Miss Temple’s 
disappearance from the development narrative.  The endpoint of the “second” stage of 
Jane Eyre—after which two figurative parents are sacrificed to Jane’s narrative—thus 
ensures that Jane is on her own again.  Indeed, many of the deaths (or, in this case, 
disappearances) in both Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels stimulate development by 
returning their protagonists to a state of orphanhood. 
 
Character Sacrifice and Romantic Coupling 
 Shortly after Jane alights at Thornfield, she asks Mrs. Fairfax in vain to describe 
Mr. Rochester: “What, in short, is his character?”.  When the housekeeper replies that “it 
is not easy to describe,” Jane testily informs her reader that “there are people who seem 
to have no notion of sketching a character” (89).  Such exchanges, in which the 
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communication of character through verbal description is figured as a personal aptitude, 
occur habitually throughout nineteenth-century novels.  And since so much of character 
development in the Bildungsroman involves the protagonist’s interaction with many other 
characters, the increasing ability to quickly and correctly “assess” those characters in 
moral terms—to be a “good judge of character”— comes to signal one’s own 
development.  That Jane and David should be both the protagonists and the narrators of 
their own stories accentuates this imperative even further, as deft characterization (that is, 
the linguistic depiction of a memorable character, of what Jane cannily calls “a more 
definite notion of [his] identity” [89]) is a skill many of us expect from nineteenth-
century narrators.  But there is, of course, a difference between Jane and David’s 
experience and its retelling in the form of the novel: namely, that the protagonists-as-
narrators “know” much more about their fellow characters than they ostensibly did during 
many of the incidents their narration depicts.  A retrospective narrative usually shows 
these two levels of represented consciousness working in tandem in various ways, as, for 
instance, when Copperfield couples David’s initial torrent of admiration for Steerforth in 
their school-days with the narrator’s ominous present-tense statement that “I look back on 
these trifles, now, with an aching heart” (89).  The reason David’s heart aches, of course, 
is that the Steerforth whose character the protagonist esteems in childhood turns out to be 
unworthy of such affection.  
 Both David and Jane fall in love with people whom they initially misjudge, the 
former with the beautiful but impractically childlike Dora Spenlow, and the latter with 
the charming but untrustworthy Edward Rochester.  As readers of Jane’s and David’s 
retrospective narratives, we know long before the protagonists do that something is amiss 
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in these relationships: David makes sure that Dora’s happy ignorance of adult 
responsibilities is less charming to us than it originally seems to him, while the fires, 
bloodshed, and mysterious laughter at Thornfield provide ample warning to Jane Eyre’s 
readers that Rochester has a guilty secret.  In fact, we can assume that David’s first 
marriage and Jane’s first marriage attempt will prove disastrous if only because these 
events occur midway through narratives that they ought, according to the logic of the 
mid-Victorian novel, happily to end.    
I am concerned less with the fact of Jane’s and David’s misreading of their love-
interests, however, than with the means by which Brontë’s and Dickens’s narratives free 
the two protagonists from the potentially depressing consequences of this misreading. 
Dora dies from a vaguely defined illness just as her childishness is becoming unbearable 
for David; Bertha Mason—the human hindrance to Jane’s legal marriage to Rochester—
notoriously commits suicide by throwing herself off the roof of Thornfield Hall.  While 
these deaths are discursively different in many ways (there are hardly two characters less 
similar than the babyish, frail Dora and the furious, vengeful Bertha), reading them side-
by-side highlights a significant formal parallel between Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels.  
Dora and Bertha, that is, are sacrificed to the development of the protagonist and to the 
eventual marriage that rewards it—in Jane Eyre’s case, to a newly widowed Rochester, 
and in Copperfield’s, to the doggedly devoted Agnes Wickfield.  And not only do the 
sacrifices of Dora and Bertha land David and Jane in happy marriages, but they also 
provide the protagonists with the experiential materials with which to become better 
judges of character than they were the first time around: the loss of a love interest allows 
the protagonists’ resultant development to make itself conspicuous.   
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 I will not spend a lot of time discussing the death of Bertha Mason, since it has 
already been rigorously analyzed in influential works of feminist and postcolonial literary 
criticism, many of which specifically refer to Bertha’s suicide as a “sacrifice” of various 
kinds.  Perhaps the most well-known of these accounts is Gayatri Spivak’s examination 
of Bertha as the colonial “Other,” the “woman from the colonies [who is] sacrificed like 
an insane animal for her sister’s consolidation” (251).  In Spivak’s view, Jane cannot be a 
true individual without killing off Bertha—the specter of imperialism that nonetheless 
forms part of the protagonist’s ostensibly coherent self.  Many more feminist critics, 
including Mary Poovey, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, Nancy Armstrong, and Elaine 
Showalter, see Bertha as a species of “double” for the protagonist who expresses the 
violent sexual emotions that Jane, as a proper Victorian governess, must keep constantly 
at bay.44  According to this logic, sacrificing the “monstrous” double at the end of 
Brontë’s narrative figuratively purges Jane of the elements of her personality that would 
threaten her ultimate domestic acculturation.  Finally, Jean Rhys famously wrote Wide 
Sargasso Sea (1966) in part because she admired Jane Eyre but saw Bertha Mason as a 
sort of “‘paper tiger’ lunatic” whose perspective Brontë’s novel utterly denied (Rhys, 
139).  Such work has valuably pointed out the manifold social inequalities that the 
Victorian novel takes pains to naturalize, and the purpose of this chapter is hardly to 
disagree with it or to ignore its eminence within the study of the novel. What I will add to 
these convincing arguments, however, is my own sense of surprise—not that so many 
critics have remarked upon the severity of what happens to Bertha Mason, but, rather, 
that the analysis of any character’s death as a functional strategy seems to begin and end 
with Brontë’s “madwoman.”  While it is certainly true that Jane Eyre’s quick disposal of 
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its protagonist’s rival is a site at which many strands of Victorian ideology (domestic, 
imperial, feminist, psychological) unsettlingly converge, it is also true that Bertha’s death 
is a particularly striking example of a much larger narrative trend in which, to borrow 
Woloch’s terminology, the violent loss of many characters comes to assist the 
development of one.45 
The death of Copperfield’s Dora Spenlow, for instance, is an equally compelling 
incarnation of this structural paradigm, yet few works in the vast annals of Dickens 
criticism examine it in detail.46  David emphasizes from the beginning that his love for 
his boss’s daughter is obsessive and instantaneous; after setting his eyes on Dora (who, it 
is worth noting, barely speaks at the time of this first meeting), the narrator gleefully 
admits that, “I was a captive and a slave.  I loved Dora Spenlow to distraction!” (360).  
Love of Dora causes David to take several masochistic turns; he wears tighter boots and 
revels in his own loss of appetite: “I lived principally on Dora and coffee…it would have 
been an act of perfidy towards Dora to have a natural relish for my dinner” (379).  The 
exaggerated humor of David’s masochistic exercises contributes to our sense that the 
narrator is making light of his love at the same time that he assures us of its magnitude.  
Painfully obvious, too, is the comparison David draws between Dora and her earlier 
incarnation, the late Clara Copperfield-Murdstone; neither woman knows anything about 
housekeeping, and David relentlessly likens both to playthings, cute but ultimately 
disposable trifles that his narrative, in turn, will be able to fool around with and discard.  
(While Clara is a wax-doll, Dora totes around Jip, her own overdeterminedly juvenile 
appendage, in the literal form of a “toy” dog.)  The narrator, in short, makes sure that the 
reader is able to identify David’s “blissful delirium” (363) as a lapse in judgment on the 
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part of his younger self.  Again, the fictional autobiography’s reflective narrative allows 
its hero to enact a suspension of the knowledge that he must necessarily possess at the 
time he is writing; while his feelings for Dora are unquestionably puerile, narrating-
David must tell this portion of his life story as if he doesn’t realize the immaturity of his 
attachment to a beautiful girl who will prove not to be his type. 
David’s and Dora’s marriage itself hinges on the sacrifice of a character: it could 
not take place without the swift death of Dora’s father around one page after the latter 
gentleman informs David that he opposes his daughter’s engagement. Mr. Spenlow’s 
death, then, is a doubly effective tactic: it allows the protagonist to marry Dora with 
impunity at the same time that it frees David from a job that hindered his novel writing.  
David’s dissolution of partnership with Spenlow establishes him as a free agent who now 
relies principally on his narrative talent for survival.  Typically for Dickens’s novel—in 
which, as Alexander Welsh has noted, the deaths are narrated “so surely” that they hardly 
register as deaths at all (148)—David spends very little discourse time mourning a death 
that is so clearly advantageous to his purposes.   Rather, he casts this fatality as a possible 
adversary: “in the innermost recesses of my heart, I had a lurking jealousy even of Death.  
How I felt as if its might would push me from my ground in Dora’s thoughts” (516). 
David’s purported jealousy of Death (here notably personified, as a character in itself) 
deflects the narrative away from any suggestion that David and Death are actually on 
good terms, since Death removed the obstacle of a disapproving father-in-law. 
Once Dora and David are married, the protagonist begins to express a gloomy 
emptiness where he thought Dora’s presence would provide fulfillment: “the happiness I 
had vaguely anticipated, once, was not the happiness I enjoyed, and there was always 
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something wanting” (646).  The marriage produces a generalized sense of lack in David’s 
narrative because what he imagined about Dora’s character—that she desired to assume 
the role of the dutiful housewife—turns out to have been inaccurate.  As Dora’s distaste 
for household maintenance begins to irritate her new husband, David resolves to “form” 
Dora’s mind—to make her, though readings of Shakespeare and lessons in domestic 
upkeep, develop into his proper, well-rounded counterpart.  However not only does 
David’s attempt to develop his wife’s character fail—“Dora’s mind,” he concludes, “was 
already formed” (645)—but the narrator also paints his fruitless effort at developmental 
tutelage in markedly violent language. At the mere mention of a cookbook, for example, 
David reflects that he “thought I had killed her” (503), and repeated attempts at prodding 
Dora into learning some element of housewivery prompt him to admit that “I had the 
conscience of an assassin, and was haunted by a vague sense of enormous wickedness” 
(592).  Trying to change Dora’s character, then, turns out to be destroying it altogether: 
David’s guilty language here prefigures the actual death that Dora will suffer in light of 
both his progress and the narrative progression that documents it.  As a last resort, the 
narrator chronicles a desperate misstep—the familiar eleventh-hour effort of the failing 
marriage.  He hopes, in other words, that “lighter hands than mine would help to mould 
her character, and that a baby-smile upon her breast might change my child-wife to a 
woman” (648).  But the couple loses their baby almost as soon as it is mentioned, with 
Dora and Jip following quick on its heels, and only David remains to make meaning out 
of this triple loss. 
Learning and losing again prove complementary processes, as reflective narration 
allows David to turn tragic loss to the advantage of his character.  Dora and Jip both die 
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at the end of Copperfield’s third “Retrospect” chapter, and anyone who has read 
Dickens’s novel can attest to the slowed tempo that these chapters effect within David’s 
otherwise speedily paced narrative.  The narrator accomplishes this more lugubrious pace 
most obviously through a shift in tense from past to present, a tonal movement that makes 
it seem as if David is experiencing what he tells at the same time that he tells it.  The 
slowing-down of the narrative additionally calls attention to this chapter as one 
particularly laden with meaning; it encourages both David and his reader to dwell on the 
events it depicts as important moments in the development narrative’s formative process.  
The events in question are three quasi-cinematic vignettes, each of which describes a 
poignant stage in Dora’s illness: here she sweetly arranges her hair on the pillow of her 
sick bed, there she asks David if he is lonely without her to sit next to him while he 
writes.  But what is most astounding about these ostentatiously weighty moments is the 
way in which Dora’s impending death allows her to assist in her husband’s development 
at the same time that she astutely lays bare the consequences of David’s ultimate 
happiness.  Here is an excerpt from Dora’s final conversation with the protagonist: 
“I was very happy, very.  But as years went on, my dear boy would 
have wearied of his child-wife.  She would have been less and less a 
companion for him.  He would have been more and more sensible of 
what was wanting in his home.  She wouldn’t have improved.  It is 
better as it is” (713). 
 
In the context of the present-tense “Retrospect,” David realizes that his wife “is 
speaking of herself as past” (713); readers will note that she also uses the distancing idiom 
of the third person to prematurely extract herself from a relationship she knows she will 
soon be leaving.  Dora’s easy acceptance of her fate recalls that of Helen Burns, whose 
conviction that she was better off dead took some of the responsibility for Helen’s sacrifice 
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away from Jane’s development story.  But Dora—ostensibly more childish as a grown 
woman than Helen is at fourteen—infuses her desire for death with the mature knowledge 
of a woman who understands that her marriage is not working.  In an examination of the 
real and figurative “divorces” in David Copperfield, Kelly Hager thoughtfully interprets 
this passage as an instance in which Dora’s desire for her own death is the closest she can 
come, in a Dickens novel, to “effect[ing] her own divorce.”  “Embracing death,” Hager 
writes, “allows [Dora] a way out of a marriage in which she is constantly made to feel like 
a failure” (1000).  Dora thus recoups some of the power she has lost through her marriage 
to David by forcing the responsibility for its breakdown (and, by extension, her death) back 
onto him; by articulating the necessity of her life’s sacrifice for David’s happiness, she 
proves not to be as foolish as her husband makes her out to be.47  Dora even brings Agnes 
to her sickbed during the last days of her illness, thus nudging David toward a second wife 
who will better suit his tastes. If David misjudges his first wife’s character by marrying her 
and expecting her to become an obedient helpmeet, he also underestimates her own insight 
into this misjudgment. 
While Dora’s death sets David free, then, it also forces him to meditate on its 
consequences in the self-consciously significant form of the “Retrospect” chapter. It is 
clear from David’s feeling that his “undisciplined heart is chastened heavily—heavily” that 
Dora’s death teaches David about the folly of his first marriage (714).  What David could 
not say outright to his readers—that he wished he never married her—becomes possible for 
him to acknowledge once Dora so obligingly bows out of the narrative.  In the admission 
that he is chastened by Dora’s lesson, David takes more responsibility than usual for the 
sacrifices his development incurs.  But, true to Copperfield’s furious push toward 
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“happiness,” the protagonist’s mourning period over Dora is very brief indeed.48  The third 
“Retrospect” ends abruptly with David’s insistence that “for a time, all things are blotted 
out of my remembrance” (714).  Where we might expect David to spend at least several 
subsequent chapters dealing with his grief, he tells us at the beginning of the next chapter 
(titled “Mr. Micawber’s Transactions,” less than a page after Dora dies) that “this is not the 
time at which I am to enter on the state of my mind beneath its load of sorrow” (715).  
Although the “Retrospect” seems like a shrine to David’s deepest memories, 
Nicholas Dames argues that the way it deals with Dora’s death actually enacts a forgetting 
that proves essential to the Victorian autobiographical novel’s production of the protagonist 
as a “comprehensible” self.  “The drama of remembrance that these texts enact,” Dames 
writes, “is precisely not the drama of dispersed, diffuse, detail-rich memory.  What these 
texts offer is the spectacle of a rigidly coherent memory that remembers only what it can 
turn to account” (127, emphasis in original).  Accordingly, David does not wallow in the 
“Retrospect” so much as he uses it to concentrate on the elements of his past that will prove 
essential to his future: the lesson he learns by misjudging Dora and the benevolent presence 
of Agnes Wickfield, his “better angel.”  Based on Victorian theories of associative memory 
in which those traumatic events that threaten to sidetrack the “causal chain” of a narrative 
memory do not survive, Dames’s model provides a useful corollary for thinking about the 
historical implications of the narrative strategy with which this chapter is concerned.  By 
avoiding any substantive narration of a potentially traumatized reaction to Dora’s sacrifice 
and instead focusing on what that death allows him to learn about himself, Copperfield 
figures David’s loss as a developmental profit and David himself as a model of the 
coherent self that associative psychology sought to achieve. 
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Yet even as Dickens’s novel uses Dora’s death to render David’s development as 
seamlessly as it can, the protagonist’s quick extraction from a situation that threatens to bog 
his narrative down comes at the cost of a kind of negative potential that Copperfield does 
not allow us to explore.  The sacrifice of Dora effectively prevents David—and his 
readers—from discovering what his life would have been like had he been forced for any 
length of time to deal with his own disappointment and bad choices.  Like Dora, we can 
only speculate about how this alternate David would develop, but the very fact that his life 
would necessitate constant compromise suggests that he could have turned out very 
differently from the single-mindedly optimistic David Copperfield who has been handed 
down to us.  Though he makes much of the lesson he learns from Dora’s passing, there is 
an equally compelling way in which David is actually less changed because he is allowed 
so quickly and easily to move on: why change at all if life provides you with no stumbling 
blocks that you cannot easily write your way out of?  Indeed, many of Copperfield’s critics 
seem frustrated that, despite the narrator’s insistence that he was developing all the time, 
David himself does not undergo a palpable change.49  While Dickens’s novel enjoys 
canonization as the Victorian exemplar of an ostensibly transformative genre, its dismissal 
of characters like Dora allow the narrator/protagonist to simultaneously welcome and evade 
transformation, and therefore to dramatize the friction between stasis and movement that 
produces literary character.   
As characters who sometimes seem not to change as much as they survive a journey 
through various narrative minefields, David and Jane open themselves up to charges that 
they aren’t even as interesting as the minor characters who are sacrificed in various ways 
throughout their stories.50  The following section deals with one of the strategies by which 
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Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels draw upon the rhetoric of self-sacrifice in order both to 
move readerly attention away from the violently sacrificed characters they contain and to 
characterize the protagonist less as an opportunist than as an individual who is capable of 
virtuous renunciation. 
 
The Self-Sacrificing Protagonist 
 In a recent article, Ilana Blumberg discusses the ubiquity of the idea of self-sacrifice 
in the Victorian period.  While we might be tempted to read Victorian self-sacrifice 
principally as a religious tenet, Blumberg argues, it was actually a wide-ranging ideal that 
permeated social discourses from aesthetics to economics.  Novels, which contained and 
represented a vast interconnection of such discourses, were thus an especially powerful 
means of figuring self-sacrifice as a universal, secularized value (Blumberg 510).  The 
most common way for the Victorians to think about sacrifice in more secular language was 
as an action whereby “one party suffers so that another party need not suffer” (507-508).   
Examples of this kind of behavior are legion in Victorian novels: Jane Eyre gives up three 
quarters of her inheritance, for instance, so that the Rivers siblings can be financially 
independent; David Copperfield shares Peggotty’s care packages with the other boys at 
Salem House.  Blumberg goes on, however, to reveal that sacrifice is less asymmetrically 
selfless than it makes itself out to be: “From ancient Christianity onward,” she writes, “the 
concept of sacrifice has been almost unintelligible without its balancing force of profit or 
gain toward some higher end…This logic, however much it might foil thoroughly self-
sacrificial impulses, is inescapable.  For Victorians sacrifices sustained the sort of 
ideological reward that merited, for instance, their recording in novels” (524).  While self-
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sacrifice may entail the loss of something material, then, this loss actually recoups itself in 
more abstract ways.  To pick up on the previous examples: Jane becomes the savior of the 
Rivers family when she parcels out her money, and David endears himself to Steerforth by 
providing him with his nurse’s oranges and cowslip wine.  Both protagonists, in addition, 
appear morally virtuous to their readers through the narration of those instances in which 
they willingly give of themselves.  What they lose in material possessions they therefore 
earn back in characterological terms. 
This structure of explicit physical loss and covert moral profit plays itself out more 
extensively in a pair of Copperfield and Eyre’s notably similar episodes.  Each narrative 
includes a sequence in which the protagonist decides to flee an undesirable situation by 
setting off alone on a journey that proves psychologically and physically perilous.  For 
David, this moment occurs in childhood, when he can no longer endure his work at 
Murdstone and Grinby’s bottling factory and resolves to travel to Dover in search of his 
Aunt Betsey.  Jane, even more intrepidly, leaves Thornfield with no set destination in mind 
after she discovers that Rochester has lied about his past and is in fact married to a woman 
he hides in his attic.  In both cases, the protagonist walks many miles of English 
countryside, loses what little money he or she possesses, and is forced to barter items of 
clothing in the hopes of gathering up enough food to stave off starvation.   Both 
protagonists, additionally, come in contact with strangers who either refuse to help them (as 
in the proprietress of the bakeshop who will not trade a cake of bread for Jane’s gloves) or 
who use them extremely ill (as in the long-legged young man who runs off with David’s 
money and belongings before he even sets foot outside of London).  Taken together, such 
episodes dramatize almost every kind of personal loss—of companions, of physical energy 
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and fleshly embodiment, of material possessions, and, after awhile, of the very hope with 
which the protagonists begin their journeys. 
 But by wresting Jane and David away from stagnant situations and plunging them 
instead into uncertainty and isolation, these solitary trials-by-fire allow the protagonists to 
dramatically build up the presentation of their own moral character.  For both characters, 
severing ties with a knowable situation amounts to a conscious sacrifice of what is certain 
for a situation that is only potentially more livable.  (Granted, David’s abandonment of his 
position as a child-laborer is doubtless much less of a sacrifice than Jane’s decision to leave 
the man she still loves, but that a young boy would forsake the known world altogether at 
such a young age suggests that David is drawing on a veritable wellspring of internal 
strength and determination).  Brontë’s protagonist repeatedly figures this sacrifice of 
security as a possible sacrifice of life itself, informing the reader, for instance, that “I had 
some fear—or hope—that I should die” (274).  In order to show their intrepid 
individualism, then, David and Jane display a willingness to risk sacrificing themselves, 
and therefore to join the ranks of the many characters who die throughout their narratives; 
this self-sanctioned incursion of loss positions them alongside heroines of self-sacrifice like 
Helen Burns and Dora Spenlow. 
Jane’s and David’s survival is of course inevitable, since both characters are telling 
their stories from a point far into the future.  And survival itself comes to be put to 
developmental purpose, as the narration of such ostentatious aloneness provides the 
protagonists with the perfect opportunity for the kind of introspective engagement that 
cultivates an impression of psychological depth.   Specifically, Jane and David reflect upon 
their orphanhood to both highlight their isolation and to provide a rationale for their 
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endurance of such treacherous situations.  At those points when he can almost walk no 
more, David keeps returning to a mental image of Clara: “I seemed to be sustained and led 
on,” he remarks, “by my fanciful picture of my mother in her youth, before I came into the 
world” (177).  Such a statement not only reminds us (as if we needed reminding) that 
David’s mother is dead, but it also figures this sacrificed character as productive of a 
survival tactic by which David is able to propel himself and his narrative forward toward 
Betsey Trotwood (another mother-figure).  Clara’s death thus permits the novel to use her 
as a key element in the representation of its protagonist’s consciousness; David’s mother 
seems to be of more help to her son once she has taken up posthumous residence inside his 
mind.   And like Jane’s “imbibing” of Miss Temple’s nature, David’s introjection of his 
dead mother’s character illustrates how the Bildungsroman uses the loss of characters to 
buttress the moral development of the individual protagonist. 
Jane’s evocation of her orphanhood during the journey from Thornfield to Marsh 
End is significantly more complex, since Brontë’s protagonist imagines mother-figures 
who both help her on her journey and who threaten to end it altogether.  Because Jane has 
never known or seen her actual mother, she is able instead to reconstruct her character in 
several different guises.  Sleeping alone on what she thought would have been her wedding 
night, Jane famously dreams of a “white human form” who addresses her as “My daughter” 
and instructs her to “flee temptation” at Thornfield (272).  This “mother,” then, effectively 
carries Jane’s narrative toward its next stage at the same time that its appearance in a 
“trance-like” dream illustrates how Jane’s consciousness seems to be constantly 
overflowing with emotional stimulation.  As Jane continues on her journey away from 
Thornfield, the image of the white human mother gives way to a broader conception of 
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motherhood; the protagonist reflects that “I have no relative but the universal mother, 
Nature” (275).  This second, abstracted mother proves far crueler than the first, as it is the 
allure of nature that prompts Jane’s desire to die, to “mingle in peace with the soil of this 
wilderness” (277).  Indeed, Margaret Homans has argued that in Brontë’s novel 
motherhood itself—so bound up with the idea of “mother nature”—is tantamount to death: 
“Jane discovers here on the moor…that to become part of nature is to die.  The solace 
nature offers is not just an illusion concealing death; that solace is itself death” (95).   
According to Homans, the feminization of nature in Jane Eyre prevents Jane from 
sacrificing her life to join her “mother,” since such a sacrifice also entails Jane’s “exclusion 
from what her culture defines as human”—i.e., Jane’s authorship (99).  Jane ostentatiously 
contemplates self-sacrifice, then, only to back off at the last minute because the price of 
communion with the dead mother would amount to the dissolution of the development 
narrative in progress.   
 So while Jane and David express a desire for the self-sacrifice that their walks 
through the wilderness require, they also manage to reap developmental benefit out of these 
journeys through pinpointed allusions to those dead maternal characters on whose sacrifice 
so much of the protagonists’ character depends.  But do the protagonists “grow” from these 
experiences as much as they simply live through them?  For fictional autobiographies such 
as these, living through trials long enough to retrospectively narrate them becomes 
indistinguishable from the novels’ construction of development.  Survived experience will 
also always be developmental experience if it is narrated from the survivor’s standpoint 
within the traditional Bildungsroman’s teleological framework. This convention, as we will 
see, stands in marked contrast to third-person development novels such as Flaubert’s and 
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Gissing’s, in which the protagonist’s survival is not a structural given and when a 
heterodiegetic narrator can add an element of distance to the otherwise intimate 
relationship between the “developing” protagonist and the reader.  For Copperfield and 
Eyre, survival betokens development simply because without it, the subject of the 
retrospective development narrative would no longer exist.   
 
Death and the Happy Ending 
 Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that Jane’s and David’s development stories push 
the protagonists toward “happy” endings that emphasize the completion of the novel and the 
culmination of Bildung .  At first, such a claim seems obvious: both protagonists vociferously 
insist on their happiness at many points during the final pages of their narratives.  Here is 
Jane: 
I have now been married ten years. I know what it is to live 
entirely for and with what I love best on earth. I hold myself 
supremely blest--blest beyond what language can express; because 
I am my husband's life as fully is he is mine. No woman was ever 
nearer to her mate than I am: ever more absolutely bone of his 
bone and flesh of his flesh…All my confidence is bestowed on 
him, all his confidence is devoted to me; we are precisely suited in 
character—perfect concord is the result (383-84).  
And David, upon his marriage to Agnes Wickfield: 
We were married within a fortnight…I held the source of every 
worthy aspiration I had ever had; the center of myself, the circle of 
my life, my own, my wife; my love of whom was founded on a 
rock! (808) 
But to argue that Copperfield and Eyre end happily requires clarification, since many 
of the most prominent critics of both novels insist that the protagonists’ ostensible happiness 
covers up a system of patriarchal, capitalist power relations inherent in the heterosexual 
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Victorian marriage.  In response to earlier feminist readings of Jane Eyre (notably those of 
Gilbert and Gubar and Showalter) that saw Jane’s happiness as a fulfillment of selfhood, 
more recent feminist critics challenge readers not to take Jane’s profession of happiness at 
face value.  Fraiman, for example, urges us to see how the novel’s ending illustrates “two 
opposing images of the mature heroine: the happy, rich, and conventionally respectable lady 
and the overworked, always potentially irate nurse.  While the story of gentrification and 
heterosexual romance ostensibly prevails, it is interrogated to the end by the subtler, 
homosocial story of Jane’s continuing service” (120).51  Jane is not Rochester’s “equal,” 
since her marriage to him in his blinded, disabled state requires her to continue to assume the 
governess’s position.  Though Copperfield’s ending has provoked less commentary than Jane 
Eyre’s, Poovey argues that its protagonist’s second marriage allows the novel to domesticate 
and ahistoricize what is actually a gender- and class-specific model of development (121).  If 
David is happy, in other words, then his narrative marginalizes the many others who 
underwrite his happiness. 
Such arguments are difficult to ignore: it is tough as a twenty-first-century woman to 
swallow Jane’s avowal of happiness with a man who systematically deceives her.  And while 
it is easy to see why David himself is happy to be married to Agnes, it is less evident why 
Agnes would decide that David is the only man who can make her happy.  However, we 
must at least temporarily take Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels at their word in order to 
understand the narrative system on which novelistic character development relies.  For 
although development in the novel is made to resemble actual human development, it is 
profoundly different from human development in the sense that it must always submit to 
narrative closure.  These critics resist the endings of Jane Eyre and David Copperfield, I 
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would argue, because they are novelistic endings; that is to say, they end totally, as if the last 
word on the subject has been definitively spoken.  Novels will frequently seem less messily 
complex—and therefore more naïve—than whatever “real life” development the reader has 
experienced if only because the novel has to end.  In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
consider the critical anxiety around Copperfield and Eyre’s endings by shifting the point of 
emphasis onto a discussion of the narrative maneuvers that, I believe, help to produce this 
anxiety.  I am interested less in disputing whether or not Jane and David can really be 
“happy” than in demonstrating how these novels both construct these happy endings and 
construe them as developmental evidence.   
As Poovey and Fraiman suggest, a stifling of possibility often accompanies depictions 
of “happiness” like those we find in novels like Copperfield and Eyre.  The act of getting 
married at the end of one’s development novel illustrates how thoroughly acculturated the 
protagonists have become, since David and Jane have overcome the very conflicts—both 
inner and external—that have made their stories such consuming material.  Though Jane’s 
and David’s development stories have ceaselessly endeavored to prove that their narrator-
protagonists are complexly deep enough to merit entire novels, the “successful” ending 
insists, by contrast, that they have become just like everybody else.  Indeed, the critical 
resistance to the neatness with which Jane and David surrender their desire for further 
development reflects how such a surrender itself resists critical interpretation.  Where the 
unhappy endings of numerous development novels—say, the drowning of Tom and Maggie 
Tulliver in The Mill on the Floss or the execution of Julien Sorel in The Red and the Black—
seem to be points of departure for readerly discussion, the happy endings of Copperfield and 
Eyre leave some of us wanting to go back to these novels’ beginnings.  What many have 
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experienced as the end of readerly pleasure in Jane Eyre and David Copperfield—when the 
Jane and David we know fade from view—thus occurs when the title characters themselves 
claim to experience the most pleasure.   
But although we tend to remember the protagonists’ excessive avowals of delight at 
the end of their stories, we may forget the bulk of what these final chapters actually contain. 
However much Jane and David may dilate upon their happiness, they spend far more time in 
their conclusions stepping out of themselves and attending to those other characters who 
remain.  Jane’s conclusion informs us of the fates of the Rivers sisters (both married) and of 
little Adèle (sent to a succession of boarding schools), while David focuses his “Last 
Retrospect” on the current status of an even more impressive cast of characters, including 
Aunt Betsey, Peggotty, Sophy and Traddles, Julia Mills, Rosa Dartle and Mrs. Steerforth, 
Mr. Dick, Jack Maldon, and of course, his own children (two of whom are named after 
Betsey Trotwood and Dora Spenlow).  This narrative technique—of rounding up various 
characters and providing a mini-ending for each one—is common enough in Victorian 
fiction, but its effect is more curious when we consider that the fates of these characters seem 
to overtake the portrait of development toward which the novels that contain them have been 
heading all along.  At the moment of ostensible “fulfillment,” Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels 
actually deemphasize and diminish the character of the protagonist, as David and Jane turn 
interior self-reflection outward toward the narration of other lives and thereby retreat from 
center stage.  The portrayal of happiness and development figures the developed character as 
less substantial the more she develops, thereby solidifying the relationship that these novels 
have established between developmental gain and characterological loss. 
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This contradictory portrait of development-as-loss is extraordinarily sustained not 
only in the final chapters of Jane’s and David’s narratives, but also in their parting lines.  
Where “happily ever after” might seem an appropriate capstone to two novels whose 
fairytale qualities critics have regularly noticed, Copperfield and Eyre leave their readers in 
darker territory.  Both novels, that is, conclude with the explicit imagery of death.  Jane saves 
the fate of St. John Rivers until the very end of her list: 
St. John is unmarried: he never will marry now. Himself has 
hitherto sufficed to the toil, and the toil draws near its close: his 
glorious sun hastens to its setting. The last letter I received from 
him drew from my eves human tears, and yet filled my heart with 
divine joy: he anticipated his sure reward, his incorruptible crown. 
I know that a stranger's hand will write to me next, to say that the 
good and faithful servant has been called at length into the joy of 
his Lord. And why weep for this? No fear of death will darken St. 
John's last hour: his mind will be unclouded, his heart will be 
undaunted, his hope will be sure, his faith steadfast. His own words 
are a pledge of this -  
"My Master," he says, "has forewarned me. Daily He announces 
more distinctly,--'Surely I come quickly!' and hourly I more 
eagerly respond,--'Amen; even so come, Lord Jesus!'" (385). 
Why should Jane choose to end her story this way?    On the one hand, such an 
ending affirms her choice to marry Rochester and her earlier assertion that following St. John 
to India as his wife would be “almost equivalent to committing suicide” (352).  Had she gone 
with St. John, Jane would have risked being obliterated by her own self-sacrifice and thereby 
becoming a character as functional as those her narrative depicts.  (The statement that St. 
John “prizes me as a soldier would a good weapon” [345] clearly illustrates Jane’s distaste at 
being rendered a mere instrument in her cousin’s missionary scheme).  On the other hand, 
this conclusion allows Jane to put a final spin on her relationship with St. John, lest her 
readers believe that she acted uncharitably toward the man who took her in at her most 
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vulnerable moment.  For by making St. John’s death the final episode in her own narrative, 
Brontë’s protagonist implicitly acknowledges all of the deaths upon whom this development 
story has depended.  In death, Jane is able to give St. John the credit that she could never 
afford him in life: she can raise him to the level of sainthood that his name always suggested 
he would one day deserve.  Girard notes just such a strategy in his own model of sacrifice, in 
which the society who kills the scapegoated victim lionizes him as a “redeemer” after his 
sacrificial death has restored order to the community (87).  We can read Jane’s assurance that 
St. John gets and deserves his “incorruptible crown” as her way of paying off a debt of 
gratitude: she literally lets St. John have the last word in a story that does not belong to him. 
Like so many of Jane’s sacrificial gestures, this final one hides the protagonist’s self-
interest behind a veil of apparent generosity; while she appears to yield the floor to St. John, 
her manipulation of his fate contributes directly to the happiness—the “divine joy”—with 
which she closes her narrative.  In a powerful reading of the novel’s ending, Derwin points 
out the ambiguity surrounding Jane’s narration of her cousin’s demise.  If we read closely, 
we can see that Brontë’s novel does not end with St. John’s death so much as it ends with its 
protagonist’s conviction that this death will happen in the near future.  Jane “is now actively 
engaged,” Derwin writes, “in anticipating the death of someone who, to her knowledge, is 
still alive” (101, emphasis in original).  More than any of the other deaths in Jane Eyre, this 
final one implicates Jane’s agency in the process of sacrificing characters, an agency fostered 
by the first person point-of view-through which we read the novel.  For in a first-person 
narrative, the line between fact and desire is notoriously difficult to distinguish: do we have 
faith in Jane’s guarantee that St. John “will never marry now,” or do we read it as something 
the protagonist says in the hope that it will turn out to be true?  If we close the novel 
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mistakenly believing that St. John dies in its final pages, we do so at least in part because we 
have confused Jane’s desire for St. John’s future death for her response to a death that has 
already occurred. Moreover, Jane’s admonishment to her readers, lest we unduly mourn St. 
John’s loss—“Why weep for this?”—lets us know that she wants us to take this death-ending 
as a happy occurrence.  (St. John, after all, awaits his place in heaven).  The novel’s final 
moments thus highlight Jane Eyre’s sacrificial strategies at the same time that they use 
character sacrifice to further cement the happiness that indicates both the protagonist’s 
development and the narrative’s closure.  It is hardly surprising, given the elision Jane makes 
between her own joy and the future death of a loved one, that the ending of Brontë’s novel 
continues to sit uneasily with many of its readers and critics.                   
David Copperfield ends in a rapturous apostrophe which resembles the final lines 
of Jane Eyre in many respects: 
And now, as I close my task, subduing my desire to linger yet, 
these faces fade away. But one face, shining on me like a Heavenly 
light by which I see all other objects, is above them and beyond 
them all. And that remains. 
I turn my head, and see it, in its beautiful serenity, beside me. My 
lamp burns low, and I have written far into the night; but the dear 
presence, without which I were nothing, bears me company.  
O Agnes, O my soul, so may thy face be by me when I close my 
life indeed; so may I, when realities are melting from me, like the 
shadows which I now dismiss, still find thee near me, pointing 
upward! (821). 
Again, the Bildungsroman closes by joyously awaiting a future death, although this time 
it is the protagonist’s own; again, the protagonist seems to fade from view, to “melt” 
away and “subdue” his desire as he insists upon the significance of another character 
within the novel we are about to finish. But for David to insist that Agnes is the only one 
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who “remains” in the end is itself deceptive, since the protagonist’s second wife has been 
figuratively dead ever since she entered Copperfield’s narrative.  No matter that Agnes 
never literally dies: her very name connotes her status both as sacrificial “lamb” and 
virgin martyr (Agnes is the patron saint of chastity).  Marrying Agnes is the next best 
thing to marrying nobody, and David’s oft-touted veneration for Agnes is indeed often 
figured as a veneration of himself: Agnes is “my soul,” and “without her I was not” 
(760).52  Like Jane, David seems to award the responsibility for his own happiness to 
another character even as this acknowledgement of the other’s help deflects the character 
sacrifice that it enacts. The connection David makes between death and Agnes Wickfield 
throughout the novel (she reminds him of church windows; she is always pointing 
upward) proves crucial enough to sustain him all the way to the conclusion of his 
narrated life: if David’s development is “founded” on Agnes, it is also founded on the 
sacrificial loss that her character represents.     
By understanding how these popular Victorian novels use sacrifice as an 
organizing principle of characterization, we can better appreciate the moral and 
psychological implications of a culturally pervasive narrative genre.  Though Copperfield 
and Eyre work hard to depict their protagonists’ ultimate happiness within a domestic 
community that provides joyful marriages, bouncing babies, and plenty of money, they 
cannot completely erase the violently individual model of character development that 
they construct.  Sacrifice—both as a narratological mechanism for removing characters 
and characteristics, and as a thematic indicator of developing morality—serves 
particularly well to foster the mutually constitutive advancement of the novelistic 
protagonist and her plot.  But this advancement, as we have seen, relies on a formal 
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system whose configuration of moral character—and the well-rounded consciousness that 
supposedly accompanies it—is considerably more ambiguous than Brontë’s and 
Dickens’s happy endings suggest.  Through narrative strategies that alternately dramatize 
and conceal sacrifice, Copperfield and Eyre depict the development of a kind of character 
that, paradoxically, becomes deeper the more that it loses: even as it betokens fulfillment, 
the effect of psychological depth we glean from Jane’s and David’s narratives reveals 
emptiness at its core.  In the following chapter, I turn to two novels whose methods of 
characterization reject the elision between developing character and increasing interior 
depth that we find in Copperfield and Eyre, suggesting instead that the most virtuous 
protagonists may be those who operate according to a single, unvarying principle.










“Roots Deeper Than All Change”:  
Constancy as Character Development in The Mill on the Floss and Corinne 
 
“Et faut-il qu’un seul sentiment dépouille ainsi toute la vie?” 
 
[“Must a single feeling so despoil an entire life?”] 
    -Germaine de Staël, Corinne, XVII.VII 
 
  
 Both Jane Eyre and David Copperfield, as we have seen, conclude with the 
protagonist’s affirmation of his or her own immense happiness and good fortune.  This 
happy ending, I would argue, forms part of the basic formal tradition through which the 
narrative structure of other development novels will be refracted: in the conventional 
Bildungsroman, character development and the socialization that signals it are difficult 
but eventually gratifying processes.  We can find similar variants on the “struggle toward 
happiness” scenario in Wilhelm Meister, in which the protagonist is finally “initiated” 
into the Society of the Tower and marries his newly-discovered soul-mate, or in Balzac’s 
Le Père Goriot (1835), as Rastignac, standing at the highest point of the Père-Lachaise, 
confidently proclaims his intention to conquer Paris.  The protagonists’ extensive 
fulfillment at the end of these Bildungsromane seems directly proportionate to the 
hardships they have endured throughout the beginning and the middle.     
But as soon as we remark that nineteenth-century Bildungsromane figure 
character development as a movement toward happiness, we have also to bear in mind 
the considerable number of influential, disastrously-ending development novels 
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published during the same century.  There is little happiness, for example, surrounding 
the fates of Hardy’s Tess Derbyfield and Jude Fawley, or of Balzac’s Lucien de 
Rubempré, and the qualified success of characters like Stendhal’s Julien Sorel and 
Fabrice del Dongo remains tinged with ambiguity and disappointment.  This chapter will 
explore two novels—Madame de Staël’s Corinne (1807) and George Eliot’s The Mill on 
the Floss (1860)—that culminate in the tragic death of the protagonists whose growth 
they endeavor to represent.  Though more than fifty years separates the publication of 
these novels, and though each emerges out of a different national literary tradition, their 
narrative structures illustrate remarkably similar models of character development. 53 
Where Copperfield and Eyre predicate successful Bildung on the protagonist’s ability to 
experience and narrate the death (or “sacrifice”) of other characters as an enriching 
developmental experience, Eliot’s and Staël’s novels present central characters who 
refuse to distance themselves from the kinds of relationships that threaten their 
individuation.  Far fewer characters actually die in these novels than in Copperfield and 
Eyre, but more crucial than this relative dearth of sacrificed characters is the tenacity with 
which protagonists Corinne and Maggie Tulliver cling to precisely those characters who 
cause them the most psychological suffering.  Maggie systematically privileges her 
relationship with her older brother, Tom, despite the latter’s increasing coldness toward 
her, and Corinne (born to a British father and an Italian mother) forsakes a life of artistic 
fulfillment and celebrity in Italy so that she can futilely pursue Oswald Nelvil, a Scottish 
lord who is duty-bound to marry a quiet, deferential Englishwoman named Lucile. Both 
protagonists, as I have mentioned, die in the novels’ final pages: Maggie notoriously 
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drowns in a flood after trying unsuccessfully to save her brother’s life, while Corinne 
slowly dies of heartbreak after she learns of Nelvil’s marriage.54   
Juxtaposing Eyre and Copperfield on the one hand and Corinne and The Mill on 
the Floss on the other permits a comparison of two radically different kinds of character 
development: the kind that sacrifices anything but the protagonist’s self (including other 
characters) in order for that self to become fully realized, and the kind that sacrifices the 
self to the exclusion of anything else, even to the point of death.  What remains constant 
throughout each of these ostensibly opposed developmental models—the happily and the 
catastrophically ending alike—is that they demonstrate a correlation between 
characterological growth and different forms of loss (including death itself).  While no 
theory of character development insists that the process is unproblematic, acknowledging 
the manifold ways in which many Bildungsromane actually seem to depend on narrated 
loss helps us discern how “developed character”—the Bildungsroman’s ostensible goal—
is often only attainable through a series of tragic events.  This symbiotic relationship 
between Bildung and tragedy, in turn, dampens the overwhelmingly positive connotations 
that surrounded the idea of character development in the nineteenth century and that 
continue to surround it.55  Think, for instance, about the implication of progress behind 
the words growth and development in the twenty-first century, not only in reference to an 
individual’s moral character and physical body (“She’s really grown up”), but also to 
investment opportunities (“a growing stock”/ “grow your portfolio”), computer programs 
(“developing technology”), or exciting new “developments” in medical research. 56  
A self-conscious engagement with tragic forms is apparent both in Eliot’s and 
Staël’s novels themselves and in the long tradition of literary criticism that considers them.  
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Victorian critic E.S. Dallas, for example, wrote in an 1860 review of The Mill that “[t]he 
riddle of life as it is here expounded is more like a Greek tragedy than a modern novel” 
(135).  And in the twentieth century, both Barbara Hardy’s The Novels of George Eliot and 
Felicia Bonaparte’s Will and Destiny each made sustained arguments about Eliot’s desire to 
elevate common experience to a tragic pitch.  Corinne’s intimate acquaintance with the 
literature of tragedy is even more personal than Maggie’s: not only does Staël’s heroine 
converse at length with Oswald upon the comparative merits of Italian, French, and Greek 
tragedies, but she goes on actually to perform her own translation of Romeo and Juliet.  
Moreover, her talent for improvisation and her position as a poetess aligns her with both 
Sibyl (whose costume Corinne wears when she is famously crowned at the Capitol) and 
Sappho.57   
Taking the well-documented tragic cast of Eliot’s and Staël’s novels as a starting 
point, this chapter will consider the part that formal techniques of characterization play in the 
depiction of Maggie’s and Corinne’s developmental tragedies.  Specifically, I will argue that 
The Mill, like Corinne, locates the tragedy of its self-sacrificing heroine in what it takes to be 
the dominating elements of her character: Eliot’s narrator tells us near the beginning of the 
novel that Maggie is governed by “the need of being loved, the strongest need in poor 
Maggie’s nature” (Mill 37).  This remark illustrates a characterological strategy that 
nineteenth-century Bildungsromane continually employ: “the sense that,” as Woloch 
explains, “human character can be neatly analyzed, categorized, divided” (54).58  What 
Eliot’s narrator generally describes here as the protagonist’s “need of being loved,” for 
instance, fights it out “in” the protagonist’s character, an abstract area where her desire for 
affection is said to coexist with and subdue other, less prominent traits (prudence, for 
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example, or avarice).  This “need,” as we will see, manifests itself in the multiple self-
sacrifices that have garnered Maggie so much literary-critical attention over the years.  In 
Corinne’s case, the penchant for self-sacrifice that stems from a dominant characteristic is 
even more pronounced, as the protagonist’s oft-touted imagination, or esprit (also frequently 
described as her innate “genius,” or génie) figures as both the source of her artistic power and 
the driving force of her hopeless attachment to Oswald Nelvil.   
The ascription of character traits to individuals helps make the stubbornly elusive 
subject of moral character more manageable; it offers a kind of conceptual shorthand for 
defining human interiority that finds corollaries in nineteenth-century cultural practices such 
as the carving up of phrenological skulls into distinct, visually delineated faculties, or the 
organization of self-help books (such as Samuel Smiles’s 1871 Character) into chapters that 
divide the subject into its isolated component parts (“Work,” “Courage,” “Self-Control,” 
etc.).  That both Corinne and The Mill on the Floss should link the protagonists’ dominant 
characteristic so closely with her tragedy suggests the novels’ evocation of a “tragic flaw”—a 
concept that, I would argue, Eliot and Staël at least loosely associate with classical poetics.59  
However, the novels complicate conventional depictions of the tragic flaw as a kind of static, 
internal weakness by at once endorsing the persistence of Maggie’s and Corinne’s dominant 
traits on moral grounds and suggesting that it is nonetheless precisely this “unbalanced” 
characterological growth that dictates their deaths.  My emphasis on the novels’ connection 
between tragedy and development will therefore provide an occasion to reconsider the 
tradition of feminist criticism that has strained, since the 1970’s, to read Maggie’s and 
Corinne’s stories as fables of female empowerment.  Trying to redeem these protagonists’ 
fates, I argue, denatures the paradoxical developmental model that Eliot and Staël construct, 
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a model in which the persistence of moral character necessitates the death of the protagonists 
as forms.  And while dramatic tragedies frequently stage a formal compatibility between self-
knowledge and loss—think of Hamlet and Oedipus60—the grafting of this tragic structure 
onto the conventionally progressive narrative of the Bildungsroman throws the goal of its 
entire developmental enterprise into question. 
By singling out Maggie’s and Corinne’s dominant characteristics, I do not mean to 
imply that other developing protagonists, like Jane Eyre and David Copperfield, possess no 
distinguishing traits—indeed a character must have some baseline of consistency in order to 
register as a character at all.  Rather, I contend that the characteristics of Dickens’s and 
Brontë’s central characters seem at once more various and more pliable than Maggie’s or 
Corinne’s.61  As we saw in the previous chapter, one of the techniques through which 
Bildungsromane illustrate their protagonists’ growth is by “sacrificing” a minor character 
whose death often splits or carries off those character traits that endanger the plot’s teleology 
toward success and happiness.  But such a fantasy structure of development is not possible 
for Maggie and Corinne, whose determination to hold onto Tom and Oswald despite the self-
sacrifice and suffering these relationships cause only increases the growth of those passions 
that have always dominated the protagonists’ characters.  Eliot’s and Staël’s novels therefore 
depict a model of development that is based less on the transformation of the protagonist than 
on the way in which her character remains the same despite the passage of chronological 
time.  As Marianne Hirsch notes, “structures of repetition rather than structures of 
progression come to dominate the plot”: where previous protagonists move “forward,” 
Maggie returns again and again to her childhood “origins” (Voyage In, 26).62  The 
development that does occur in The Mill and Corinne is not the streamlined growth of a 
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“whole,” well-rounded individual, but the comparatively disproportionate ascendancy of one 
part of the protagonist’s character.     
Conceptualizing the development of Maggie’s and Corinne’s character(s) as the 
unequal development of parts helps us to continue to reevaluate the relationship between the 
Bildungsroman’s protagonist and the nineteenth-century novel’s construction of 
psychological depth.  While these novels—like most Bildungsromane—work hard to evoke 
what Woloch and others call the protagonist’s “heterogeneous” consciousness, their parallel 
focus on a single aspect of the protagonists’ character actually resembles a kind of 
psychological caricature.  And literary critics have long associated caricature with the type of 
descriptive flatness that the nineteenth-century novel’s famously “round” protagonists seem 
to formally oppose.  The arrangement of Corinne’s and Maggie’s characters around one 
exaggerated characteristic thus demonstrates that these central literary figures actually come 
into being through techniques of minorness.  I will conclude this chapter with a discussion 
about how the operation of dominant character traits in Corinne and The Mill on the Floss 
can help us reconsider the opposition between flatness and depth (or minorness and 
majorness) that continues to endure in critical discussions about character.  For if Corinne 
and Maggie can be read as psychologically complex, this complexity becomes manifest 
through a simplifying structure that neatly summarizes the protagonists’ “nature” through 
repeated references to dominant characteristics. 
Further, understanding Eliot’s and Staël’s deployment of the “dominant 
characteristic” will reorient our understanding of the Bildungsroman as a novelistic genre and 
of character development as a narrative phenomenon, while also contributing a critical tool to 
the emerging field within novel and narrative theory that investigates how literary character 
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works as constitutive element of fictional narratives.  Though numerous critics have read 
Corinne and The Mill on the Floss as development novels, surprisingly few have noted the 
way Eliot and Staël challenge the genre’s implicit proposition that modifying one’s character 
leads to moral maturity. 63  This preoccupation with dominant characteristics actually signals 
a positive valuation of changelessness—of not reforming the configuration of one’s 
character—that implicitly questions the conventional Bildungsroman’s valorization of 
change.  Maggie and Corinne develop by tenaciously denying change, even as material losses 
inevitably overshadow their characterological gains in the novels’ tragic conclusions.  The 
novels’ formal characterization therefore proves indissociable from their moral vision—a 
claim that holds true not just for Eliot’s or Staël’s fiction, but for the vast number of novels 
that attempt to impose a legible structure on the nebulous process of human development. 
 
Dominant Characteristics 
 If the attribution of characteristics to characters offers nineteenth-century novels 
an economical way to perform moral assessments, a similar process of examining 
characters as collections of traits has proven productive for theorists interested in the 
formal structure of character.  Perhaps the most well-known of such figures is Roland 
Barthes, who famously likens the elements of characterization to the constituent parts of 
the sentence.  “Character,” he writes, “is an adjective, an attribute, a predicate (for 
example: unnatural, shadowy, star, composite, excessive, impious, etc.)” (190).  Novels 
pull together these adjectives, (or “semes”) around a proper name (“Maggie,” say), thus 
inducing their readers to transform linguistic signifiers into the mental representation of a 
person.64  
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More recent narrative theorists tend to categorize Barthes’s remarks as overly 
restrictive.  Woloch, for example, has analyzed the famous “collection of semes” passage 
as an indication of Barthes’s avoidance of the dynamic ways in which many characters do 
not begin as adjectives but become them through the process of narrative progression (106).  
Like Woloch, narratologist Uri Margolin prefers to understand characterization as the 
construction of plausible individuals.  Particularly pertinent to our exploration of the 
character “trait” is Margolin’s enumeration of five “essential properties of literary 
characters as existents in a narrated domain” (“Introducing,” 110).65  Two of these five 
properties deal specifically with traits.  First, Margolin defines what he calls the “[i]dentity 
or intensional dimension” of character, that is, the direct or indirect (contextual) ascription 
of characteristics to characters (113, emphasis in original).  But more important than the 
seemingly common-sense notion that all characters are ascribed characteristics is a 
subsequent condition which Margolin calls the character’s “[p]aradigmatic unity of 
features.”  Many narrative texts, he argues, configure “the inventory of features” 
surrounding each character through formal strategies including “rank ordering or 
hierarchization, into central and peripheral, dominant and subordinate, core and marginal, 
essential and accidental” traits (116).  This short description emphasizes that the narrative 
organization—not just the existence—of character traits is a crucial component of literary 
character.  If The Mill’s Mrs. Glegg, for example, espouses the Dodson family’s traditional 
values once in the course of a narrative, it does not automatically follow that the narrative 
marks her as “provincial.”  However, because Mrs. Glegg consistently touts the pillars of 
the Dodson way (extreme thrift, cleanliness, proper observation of mourning) throughout 
the novel, and because the third-person narrator amply chronicles this bygone 
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conventionality whenever Mrs. Glegg appears, we can be reasonably sure that being 
traditional is, as Margolin writes, an “essential” rather than an “accidental” part of who she 
is.   
Margolin then complicates the idea of “essential” character traits by indicating that 
literary narratives also form hierarchical structures in which certain traits come to dominate 
others: Mrs. Glegg’s traditionality, might, for instance, take precedence over coexisting, 
weaker desires.66  This narrative trend—a kind of dominance hierarchy of characteristics—
informs the storyline of many novelistic narratives, as Emma Woodhouse’s overweening 
confidence in her own judgment, for example, directly affects the actions and represented 
thoughts of Mr Elton and Harriet Smith, or as the indecisiveness of Flaubert’s Frédéric 
Moreau throws Sentimental Education into a holding-pattern of interior monologue.   
Corinne and The Mill on the Floss are ideal narrative models through which to 
examine and expand upon the idea of the dominant trait to which Margolin so briefly 
alludes.  As Hirsch points out, “Maggie’s inner life rests on one dominant feeling, her 
strong attachment to her brother Tom, an attachment she never transcends” (Voyage In, 
34).67  Though it begins and ends as an almost incestuous desire for Tom, this “need of 
being loved,” which the narrator first identifies in her descriptions of Maggie’s childhood, 
marks nearly all of the protagonist’s relationships with male characters (such as her father, 
Philip Wakem, and Stephen Guest). Maggie’s desire for love wields immense explanatory 
power within the novel’s plot, as both the narrator and the protagonist herself repeatedly 
cite it as evidence for Maggie’s actions and behaviors.  Moreover, those actions which have 
the most immediate effect on Maggie’s developmental trajectory—including her decision 
to break off her relationship with Philip, her (abandoned) elopement with Stephen, and her 
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failed attempt to save Tom from drowning—require the protagonist to sacrifice herself in 
various ways so that she can hang onto the love that she craves.  
Corinne’s dominant characteristic—her overabundant imagination—lands her in a 
comparable situation. “Of all my gifts,” Corinne warns Oswald, “the most powerful is the 
gift for suffering” (75).68  Fully subscribing to a romantic myth about the artist, Staël’s 
novel suggests that, for all its aesthetic productivity, the ingenious imagination carries with 
it the burden of susceptibility to mental anguish.  In Corinne, the protagonist regularly 
exercises her gift for suffering throughout her relationship to Nelvil, a man for whose love 
she is prepared to sacrifice both her artistic identity and her spiritual homeland: “[S]he was 
proud,” the narrator remarks, “to sacrifice herself so that Oswald might be at peace with his 
country, with his family, with himself” (357).69  Paradoxically, it is the dominating quality 
of Corinne’s imagination that ultimately stunts her artistic productivity and even her sanity 
in the later chapters of Staël’s novel.  The narrator ruminates, 
If we can imagine how a person becomes mad, it is surely when a 
single thought takes hold of the mind, no longer permitting a series 
of objects to lend variety to thought.  Moreover, Corinne was 
endowed with such a lively imagination that it ate itself up when 
there was no more nourishment for its faculties from outside 
(332).70 
 
The singular authority of Corinne’s imagination—an imagination, as we have seen, that is 
prone to suffering through its very strength—thus rockets her into a state of near-insanity. 
Unswervingly focused on Oswald’s relationship with Lucile, Corinne’s imagination 
destroys itself for lack of variety, its very dominance becoming more and more intensified 
as it metaphorically gobbles itself up and leaves the possibility of other “objects” behind.  
The image of Corinne’s mind eating itself from within in fact provides a micro-example of 
the way in which the protagonist’s character develops through loss: although suffering 
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makes Corinne’s dominant trait more prominent, this prominence is figured through the 
physical absence that results from a devouring force.   
  Just as Corinne presents its protagonist’s character as a collection of traits that are 
drowned out by the torturous promptings of genius, Oswald Nelvil himself is equally 
directed by a persistent injunction to duty. As Linda Lewis remarks, “Duty is in fact 
Nelvil’s watchword in all things—duty being a patriot’s relationship to his nation, a 
Christian’s obligation to his God, a son’s sacred trust to his father” (34).  All three of these 
aspects of Oswald’s dutifulness—that is, the male duties of patriotism, religion, and filial 
bonds—directly hinder his potential relationship with Corinne: Nelvil, who is traveling in 
Italy when he meets Corinne, will not live anywhere but England, the nation from which 
Corinne fled when she felt that its customs would stifle her genius.  In addition, Nelvil is a 
Catholic while Corinne is Protestant, and, most importantly, a letter from Nelvil’s dead 
father reveals (in a coincidence worthy of Dickens) that not only does Nelvil, Sr. want his 
son to marry Lucile Edgermond, but he specifically disapproves of a match between Nelvil 
and his original betrothed: Corinne herself, who turns out to be Lucile’s half-sister.  
Though Oswald loves Corinne fanatically, “What he dreaded most for her,” the narrator 
observes, “was England’s disapproval” (109).71  Yet for Oswald to dread England’s 
disapproval of Corinne—in contrast to his own ostensible approval—is a questionable 
opposition, since “England” comes to stand in metonymically for the traditional values 
upon which Oswald’s own character is built.  (After returning to England later in the novel, 
for instance, Oswald feels that “he was himself again” [315]).   The very act of worrying 
about whether or not the English will disapprove of Corinne is another indication of 
Oswald’s “Englishness” insofar as nearly all of the English characters in Staël’s novel 
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share a strong desire for social approval.  And the self-imposed cultivation of this kind of 
approval, which values convention and uniformity above creativity and difference, is 
precisely the reason why Corinne originally feels that living in England for too long will 
stifle her character.  When discussing with Oswald her decision to return to Italy despite 
her English relatives’ condemnation of the idea, Corinne complains that, “To hear them, 
you would think that duty meant sacrificing one’s superior abilities, and that having a mind 
is a fault to be expiated by leading exactly the same life as people do who have none” 
(255).72  The sacrifice of “superior abilities” is of course what happens when Corinne 
returns to England and finds Oswald courting the thoroughly meek and traditional Lucile 
Edgermond: her mind becomes fixated on its own suffering, to the exclusion of those 
creative impulses that made the protagonist seem so un-English in the first place.   
Much of Corinne’s narrative simply reiterates the clash between Corinne and 
Nelvil’s dominant traits: Corinne’s imagination cannot thrive in the oppressive 
environment to which Oswald feels bound, and Oswald’s love for Corinne flies in the face 
of his sense of duty.  Staël’s preoccupation with opposing characteristics here recalls her 
earlier novel, Delphine (1802), whose free-spirited Protestant heroine finds herself in a 
similarly tragic bind with a Catholic soldier named Léonce who values public opinion 
above romantic love.  It is partially due to this deadlock resulting from the opposing 
characteristics of the two leading characters that both novels can be tedious to read: almost 
every important scene seems tailor-made to amplify and repeat, rather than modify, this 
central dynamic.  Numerous critics specifically cite the middle of Corinne, a capacious 
travelogue in which the protagonist escorts Oswald around Italy, lecturing him in detail on 
various aspects of Italian art and culture, as less interesting than the more story-driven 
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beginning and ending portions of the novel.73  I would argue that one reason the 
travelogues seem like the slowest part of Corinne is that many of the conversations that 
ensue en route serve as pretexts to illustrate the impassable conflict between Corinne’s 
imagination (coded as eminently Italian—hence the novel’s full title, Corinne, or Italy) and 
Oswald’s duty (coded as quintessentially British).  As unnecessary as this repetition might 
seem to contemporary readers, its insistence works to establish Corinne’s conception of 
character traits so strong that their existence can override even the exigencies of a varied 
storyline.  Staël herself, in the Preface to Delphine, presents an argument in favor of the 
kind of relentlessly characterization-centered narrative she has written, declaring that 
“[e]vents in novels must be simply the occasion to display the passions of the human heart” 
(4).74  Note, in this statement, how it is not even characters per se with which Staël 
concerns herself, but rather with the abstract “passions” that come to define characters and, 
hence, influence the direction (or lack thereof) in which their actions will lead the novel’s 
plot. 
Though The Mill on the Floss has a considerably more complex plot and cast of 
characters than Staël’s novel, its depiction of the relationship between Tom and Maggie 
Tulliver bears more than a passing formal resemblance to that between Nelvil and Corinne. 
Tom and Maggie share a fierce, protective love for one another in the novel’s beginning, 
but this love becomes more and more distant on Tom’s end as the two siblings grow older.  
The Mill specifically links Tom’s increasing alienation from his sister to a Manichean sense 
of right and wrong that colors all of his actions and beliefs.  “Tom,” the narrator tells us, 
“was particularly clear and positive on one point—namely, that he would punish everybody 
who deserved it: why, he wouldn’t have minded being punished himself, if he deserved it; 
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but then, he never did deserve it” (38).  As Tom grows up and experiences the double loss 
of his father and the family’s ownership of Dorlcote Mill, this stubbornness becomes more 
exaggerated and dominant, rather than becoming tempered—as it might in a novel like 
David Copperfield—by the wisdom of age.  In the end of Eliot’s novel, Tom’s renunciation 
of Maggie when she most desperately desires his support occasions the narrator to remark 
again on how little Tom has changed: he “was imprisoned within the limits of his own 
nature, and his education had simply glided over him, leaving a slight deposit of polish” 
(500).  Education—the very stock-in-trade of the traditional Bildungsroman, which Mr. 
Tulliver had hoped would turn his son into the intellectual equal of “the little wench”—
proves ineffectual when faced with a moral character, such as Tom’s, that is defined by its 
“superstitious repugnance to everything exceptional” (340).  
In certain instances, however, Tom’s characteristic sense of justice can be heroic, as 
in the scene in which he demands support from his mother’s relatives (the Dodsons) 
because his father’s financial straits have become crippling.  Though The Mill (and its 
critics) make much more of Maggie’s self-sacrifices, the novel also illustrates how Tom’s 
desire to go into business and right his family’s wrongs depends on “present abstinence and 
self-denial” (310).  Tom “shunned comradeship” not because he does not desire it but 
because it might lead to spending money (309), and later, the narrator hints that a similar 
concern keeps Tom from pursuing a romantic interest in Lucy Deane.  But even as this 
tenacity for what he believes to be fair-dealing works in the service of Tom’s family, it 
works against any feelings of solidarity through which hardship might unite him with his 
loving sister: 
[I]t was a significant indication of Tom’s character, that though he 
thought his aunts ought to do something more for his mother, he 
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felt nothing like Maggie’s violent resentment against them for 
showing no eager tenderness and generosity…Tom saw some 
justice in severity; and all the more, because he had confidence in 
himself that he should never deserve that just severity (224-25). 
 
Here, The Mill’s narrator presents the relationship between brother and sister as one of 
characters that remain at odds even when they are ostensibly concerned with the same goal 
(help for the increasingly destitute Tulliver family).  Tom’s character (“significantly 
indicated” through the form of narratorial summation) is borne out through its dissimilarity 
to Maggie’s, for to desire more “eagerness and generosity” on the part of his relatives 
would be to demand less severity than his own sense of justice could permit. Moreover, 
Tom’s confidence that he “should never deserve” the severity he metes out to others 
repeats in a different context his belief that “he never did deserve” the kind of punishments 
that Maggie routinely suffers.   
The Mill’s use of events to repeatedly signal character’s resistance to change over 
time here echoes Staël’s methods of characterization in both its repetitious quality and its 
manipulation of contrast as a means of delineating the kinds of characters that embody 
dominant characteristics.  Barbara Hardy has identified such methods of contrast as Eliot’s 
“most conspicuous” formal strategy for the “moral classification” of character (80).  The 
Mill on the Floss, I would add, uses the contrast between characters not only as a means of 
defining moral character, but also as an integral element of the process of novelistic 
character development.  Though we tend to think of the novel as Maggie’s story, it actually 
focuses on the growth of two protagonists: Maggie and Tom.  The Mill is thus a double, or, 
as Jerome H. Buckley eloquently puts it, a “contrapuntal Bildungsroman” (97).75  The 
same, of course, goes for Corinne, whose title disguises the considerable investment of 
discourse time it spends illustrating the development that Oswald Nelvil undergoes as a 
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result of his relationship with the title character.  Both Eliot’s and Staël’s novels, in fact, 
begin with these male characters: we first meet the Tullivers as they are discussing plans 
for Tom’s education, and the opening chapter of Corinne is titled, simply, “Oswald.”  It is 
only after Oswald sees Corinne crowned at the Capitol in Rome that Staël’s narrator begins 
to penetrate the heroine’s consciousness as well.   
The development process, for each pair of characters, happens as a result of the 
dominant characteristics that become more pronounced through the “contrapuntal” 
structure.  And this double structure reinscribes itself in the narrator’s continual use of 
contrast in passages of direct characterization, such as the observation that “Maggie was 
strangely old for her years in everything except in her entire want of that prudence and self-
command which were the qualities that made Tom manly in the midst of his intellectual 
boyishness” (276).  Here, the form of the sentence makes it seem like these contrasts 
between characters actually engender one another: Maggie is unlike Tom because he is 
prudent, but Tom’s prudence contrasts with his lack of the intellect that Maggie, in turn, 
enjoys.  Though both characters exhibit what the narrator takes to be “mature” traits, each 
lacks the trait that the other possesses in spades.  This type of characterization, in which the 
narrator not only enumerates various hierarchies of traits within each character, but 
comments upon which traits each character needs, implies that maturity—full 
development—exists as a kind of balanced mixture of various characteristics (including, in 
this instance, “prudence” as well as intellect).  It is as if the hypothetical combination of 
Maggie’s and Tom’s mature traits would be able to produce one supremely developed 
character: the embodiment of that “unity” after which so many critics have argued that 
Eliot’s novel is seeking.76  In development novels with happier conclusions, characters do 
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in fact learn to streamline the dangerous characteristics (such as David Copperfield’s 
romantic naïveté or Jane Eyre’s quick temper) that threaten to spoil this kind of harmonious 
internal mix.  But if the structure of characterization in Corinne and The Mill implies the 
existence of such harmony, it is only as an impossible ideal against which individual 
characters, with their own peculiar hierarchies of characteristics, will always fall short.  
Instead of presenting protagonists who learn from each other and thereby become more 
“balanced” (a scenario that the double-protagonist structure might well be used to support), 
Eliot’s and Staël’s novels use doubleness and its resultant contrast to illustrate the steadily 
increasing hold that dominant characteristics take over the characters to whom they belong.  
That the development of Maggie’s and Corinne’s dominant characteristics should 
stimulate these two heroines to commit greater and greater acts of self-sacrifice reveals 
another function that the double-protagonist narrative serves: the organization of the novels 
themselves cannot “sacrifice” Tom and Nelvil, no matter how much less interesting they 
might seem than their female counterparts.  Though these development narratives might 
belong principally to Maggie and Corinne, their investment of time on Tom and Nelvil 
actually mimics the female protagonists’ affective investment in the relationships they hold 
most dear.  The Mill and Corinne cannot move Tom and Nelvil too far into the background 
because the development of the two female characters—and hence of their narratives –
depends upon their own refusal to experience Tom and Nelvil as background.  Corinne and 
Maggie keep Nelvil and Tom at the forefront of their minds, quite literally until the day(s) 
that they die.  “To have no cloud between herself and Tom,” The Mill’s narrator remarks of 
Maggie near the novel’s end, “was still a perpetual yearning in her, that had its root deeper 
than all change” (454). 
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Character Development as Paradox and Tragedy 
 The idea that Maggie’s dominant characteristic somehow preexists “all change” 
poses a particular problem for the Bildungsroman, a genre often assumed to take 
transformation as its central concern.  In a discussion of how literary narratives structurally 
represent changes in character, Margolin specifically cites the Bildungsroman for its wide 
application of what he calls “singular progressive or processural change” (emphasis in 
original).  According to Margolin, the type of change we see most often in the 
Bildungsroman necessitates that 
at least some of the essential properties of the agent in the initial 
and terminal states of the narrative display a marked difference and 
cannot be accommodated as mere varieties of a single paradigm of 
traits…This change occurs only once in the course of the narrative 
sequence, hence “singular,” and its various stages point 
unexceptionally in the same direction…the sequence as a whole 
can be encompassed by one continuous path leading from initial to 
terminal state (118).   
 
In other words, the character (“agent”) who undergoes “singular progressive” change 
possesses a different mix of characteristics in the end of the narrative than she did in the 
beginning: she progresses through a series of stages that gradually and irrevocably alter her 
character as a whole.  For all the narrative techniques that The Mill uses to align itself with 
the Bildungsroman (its focus on the protagonist’s youth, its deliberate delineation of 
“stages” in her life, and its foregrounding of her conflicted relationship with family and 
social norms), Maggie’s development narrative—in which her essential trait is repetitively 
broadcasted throughout—hardly fits the structure of gradual, transformative change that 
Margolin describes.  Even if we bracket off the generic characteristics that align Eliot’s 
novel with a tradition of Bildungsromane, the possibility of a character’s change over time 
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is crucial to any novel insofar as novelistic narrative is a temporally unfolding process, one 
that changes from moment to moment.  To base a novel, as both Eliot and Staël do, on 
protagonists who seem “change proof” can therefore come to seem like a self-defeating 
enterprise.   
But even as The Mill and Corinne continually declaim the dominant characteristics 
that ostensibly mark their protagonists’ essential identities, they also suggest that character 
can never be fully essentialized.  More than most Victorian novelists of her stature, Eliot 
proves keenly aware of this paradox, even allowing The Mill’s narrator to pause the story 
and signal it in one of many asides to the reader: 
But you have known Maggie a long while, and need to be told, not 
her characteristics, but her history, which is a thing hardly to be 
predicted even from the completest knowledge of characteristics. 
For the tragedy of our lives is not created entirely from within. 
“Character,” says Novalis, in one of his questionable aphorisms–
“character is destiny.” But not the whole of our destiny. Hamlet, 
Prince of Denmark, was speculative and irresolute, and we have a 
great tragedy in consequence. But if his father had lived to a good 
old age, and his uncle had died an early death, we can conceive 
Hamlet’s having married Ophelia, and got through life with a 
reputation of sanity (401-402). 
  
No matter what Maggie’s “characteristics” happen to be, they do not exist in a vacuum; 
they are, rather, capable of the influence of history—i.e., of narrated events.  These events, 
as the narrator’s alternate version of Hamlet suggests, can affect the way we perceive 
character: had his father but lived, Hamlet would doubtless have been less tormented.  It is 
only the father’s death—and the series of events it occasions—that elevates the Prince’s 
dominant characteristics (speculation, irresoluteness) to tragic proportions.  This example, 
further, links Hamlet’s (and, by extension, Maggie’s) inability to change with the formal 
structure of tragedy: without the indecisiveness that comes to define his character, the 
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narrator implies that Hamlet’s “great tragedy” would also never have existed.  But what 
Eliot’s narrator neglects to mention here is that Hamlet’s status as a tragic literary character 
(not a human being, like the readers being addressed), necessitates those events that bring 
his dominant characteristic to the fore.  Literary characters, unlike the humans who read 
about them, come into being through the narratives in which they are contained—they are 
elements of a larger formal, linguistic structure whose very definition as a tragedy requires 
them to undergo dramatic events like the death of a loved one.  So while Eliot’s narrator 
can suggest that character is not destiny, her novel’s self-definition as tragedy must always 
prove that it is.  The Mill’s plot, in other words, cannot afford to actually decrease the 
prominence of Maggie’s need for love and concomitant drive toward self-sacrifice.  
Though scores of the novel’s critics echo Harold Bloom’s assertion that “[t]here is no 
tragic necessity in Maggie’s drowning” (5), few of them go on to offer suggestions about 
what a more “appropriate” ending might look like.  Death, in fact, is the final stage of 
development toward which Maggie’s and Tom’s dominant traits have been pulling them all 
along; its inevitability becomes manifest not only through overt instances of foreshadowing 
such as Mrs. Tulliver’s ominous prediction that her children will “be brought in dead and 
drownded some day” (103), but through the novel’s constant repetition of scenes in which 
the central characters act according to a preordained characterological imperative.    
The conception of character that emerges from both Madame de Staël’s novels and 
her philosophical essays is perhaps more ambitious than Eliot’s insofar as it seeks to 
identify and explain individuals (and individual artworks) in terms of the national 
characteristics that Staël believes they embody.  We see this concern reflected in the 
novel’s equation of Corinne with the artistic tradition of Italy and of Oswald with a 
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purportedly “British” reverence for duty and tradition.  In Literature Considered in Its 
Relation to Social Institutions (1800), Staël specifically puts forth a conception of character 
that echoes the valuation of dominant characteristics evident in Corinne and The Mill on 
the Floss: “In a nation, as in a man,” she writes, “we need to find only the characteristic 
trait; all the others are the result of a thousand different accidents, but that one alone 
constitutes its being” (193).77  But such essentialist categorizations, implying a nation’s 
innate, intractable identity, ultimately clash with the importance Staël places on what she 
feels, in unabashedly positivistic terms, is “the universal progress of enlightenment 
resulting simply from the succession of eras” (152).78  If political institutions improve 
throughout time, how can we speak of the “national character” that those institutions 
influence with any degree of finality?   We arrive back, then, at the impasse between 
character and history that The Mill’s narrator acknowledges with references to Novalis and 
Shakespeare.  And, like Maggie’s ultimate self-sacrifice at the end of Eliot’s novel, 
Corinne’s death indicates that her overflowing imagination—so insistently and repetitively 
presented within Staël’s novel as the hallmark of her moral character—overrides the power 
of circumstances to diminish it. 
That Corinne’s degeneration presents such a clear instance of the perils of female 
self-sacrifice might lead us to expect debates among feminist critics seeking to 
interrogate the novel’s alignment of the protagonist’s character development with 
suffering and death.  However, a number of Corinne’s readers tend downplay the wasting 
away of Corinne’s artistic talent (and with it, her life) in favor of recuperating her status 
as a politically and aesthetically iconoclastic figure.  Susan Tennenbaum and Gayle Levy, 
for example, cite Corinne’s multinational wisdom (which combines not only her British 
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and Italian upbringing(s) but also her vast knowledge of French, German, and classical 
Greek artistic forms) as evidence of what Tenenbaum calls a new kind of “mutual 
understanding through cross-cultural study and exchange”; that is, as a political 
philosophy that is more empathetic because it is more accepting of cultural diversity 
(161).79  Levy goes even further than Tenenbaum, claiming that the novel’s ending is not 
tragic at all: “[a]lthough the end of Corinne might seem quite tragic, it actually affirms a 
new world to come…[a world] in which the individual enjoys a life of republicanism and 
equality and in which the true genius can create in a way that goes beyond the constraints 
that gender and culture generally incite” (252).  Such readings—in which Corinne 
emerges as what Linda Lewis calls “the poet (the artist) [as] legislator of the world” (21) 
dovetails with the sentiments of some of Corinne’s most enthusiastic Victorian admirers: 
a veritable Who’s-Who of Victorian women writers, including Felicia Hemans, Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning, Geraldine Jewsbury, and Laetitia Landon (who actually translated the 
novel to English) claimed Staël’s heroine as an artistic role-model.80  In fact, the amount 
of much-desired encouragement that Corinne provided these writers seems to have 
blotted out any misgivings they may have had about the way in which Staël’s heroine 
ultimately sacrifices the very talent that made her so appealing an influence. 
Readers of The Mill on the Floss, however, are far less likely to deemphasize the 
famous double-death scene that occurs in the novel’s penultimate chapter.  Instead, Tom 
and Maggie’s drowning in the Floss has proven a literary-critical fetish.  It fascinates 
feminist critics in particular for obvious reasons, since the novel at once creates in Maggie 
a stunningly intellectual and (to many readers) empathetic female figure only to kill her off 
just at the beginning of her adulthood.  As Fraiman notes in her analysis of the novel’s 
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reception, many feminist critics of the 1970’s “stressed Maggie’s systematic 
disempowerment and resignation to her plight” (137).  The most representative of such 
accounts comes from Elizabeth Ermarth, who argues that Maggie’s need for love 
“overthrows her integrity,” rendering her pitiably dependent upon male acceptance 
(Ermarth 594).   Fraiman goes on to chronicle a second set of critics, including Hirsch and 
Patricia Meyer Spacks, who attempt to map out Maggie’s “compensatory path of spiritual 
success” in response to those who see her untimely death as a symptom of weakness (137).  
In other words, these readings tend to focus on the ways The Mill’s ending—so manifestly 
bleak and discouraging—can be read as productive and affirmative.  Though Fraiman does 
not specifically include Mary Jacobus in the latter camp, Jacobus in fact produced one of 
the most widely cited of the “compensatory” arguments:81 
[K]illing off this small apparatus of shallow quickness may have 
been the necessary sacrifice in order for Eliot herself to become an 
interpreter of the exotic possibilities contained in mysterious 
sentences.  Maggie—unassimilable, incomprehensible, “fallen”—
is her text, a “dead” language which thereby gives all the greater 
scope to authorial imaginings, making it possible for the writer to 
come into being (216). 
 
According to this reading, then, Maggie’s “sacrifice”—by which, I believe, Jacobus 
indicates both the self-sacrifices Maggie makes throughout the novel and her ultimate 
“sacrifice” at the hands of George Eliot’s pen—is not in vain.   Rather, it both frees 
Maggie from the realm of patriarchal “maxims” in which she has been imprisoned and 
allows Eliot to pursue a more fluid, metaphorical kind of writing in the final pages of her 
novel, a writing that, for Jacobus, has affinities with Irigaray’s emancipatory écriture 
feminine insofar as it creates a place for the “thematics of female desire” to become 
manifest (75).  In a similar but less elliptical vain, Hirsch concludes that because Maggie 
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cannot survive in a world in which her “outer and inner life” (i.e., her actions and her 
desires) do not correspond, her death is actually “a renunciation in a limited sense only: 
in another, it emerges as a different kind of affirmation” (Voyage In, 28).  By writing 
Maggie’s death, Eliot allows her heroine to return to the state of “pre-Oedipal fusion” 
with Tom, her parents, and her childhood home that has proven so elusive all along (37).  
Hirsch further supports this case by citing the curiously “positive” atmosphere that Eliot’s 
narrator creates around this final reunion of brother and sister—a reunion in which 
Maggie and Tom, for one moment, relive “the days when they had clasped their little 
hands in love, and roamed the daisied fields together” (Mill 521).82 
Hirsch’s argument helps illustrate how Maggie’s early death (what she calls a 
“moral Bildung based on self-sacrifice and renunciation” [35] ) does not render her 
development null and void; in fact, it points to a version of character development that only 
comes into being through self-sacrifice which will also figure prominently in Corinne.  But 
while such concentration on the positive aspects of The Mill’s ending help tease out the 
novel’s disagreement with the systems of gender inequality it depicts, it also risks 
obscuring the fairly obvious ways in which Maggie’s death is a tragedy: it precipitously 
banishes the protagonist’s formal character from the story in the very moment at which her 
moral character is at its most heroic.  To read the loss of Maggie’s life as a kind of 
reward—as Nancy Armstrong has more recently done with her remark that Eliot’s heroine 
is “better off dead” (96)—is to resist what I suspect is a prevailing reaction among the 
novel’s readers: that Maggie deserved better than what she got, and that her momentary 
reconciliation with Tom, however joyful, is not enough to efface the tragedy of her death.83   
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In contradistinction to the previous studies, then, I want to suggest that the 
protagonists’ deaths in The Mill and the Floss and Corinne—deaths precipitated by 
Maggie’s and Corinne’s dominant characteristics—both complicate and extend the more 
general relationship between character development and loss that becomes manifest in so 
many nineteenth-century development novels.  The very strength of character that results 
from the repetition and enlargement of Maggie’s dominant trait must, through its 
imperviousness to change, lead to her death.   Claiming Maggie’s story as a “successful” 
one, as Hirsch and Jacobus suggest that we can, recreates the very progress narrative that 
The Mill deems unachievable. 
 
Changelessness: The Value of Tenacity 
   While the inevitability of the tragic ending (especially within the tradition of the 
romance) provides one reason that dominant characteristics prove so resilient in Eliot’s and 
Staël’s novels, these authors also recast their protagonists’ unwillingness to change in 
moral terms.  In Character and the Novel, W.J. Harvey notes that for Eliot, “moral 
responsibility depends on a survival of personal identity.”  One need not buy Harvey’s 
liberal-humanist ethics wholesale in order to appreciate his sharp formal readings of Eliot’s 
characterization.  He continues, 
[T]his is not to say that George Eliot—or any great classical 
novelist—denies the facts of change and development.  But change 
is still reconciled to the idea of a stable ego; one’s identity lies 
precisely in the unique pattern of past changes which constitutes 
one’s individuality.  And this pattern also involves the future to the 
extent that it allows for some possibilities of development and 
excludes others (120). 
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Harvey’s argument about the morality of the “stable ego” in Eliot’s work has 
particularly interesting implications for The Mill on the Floss as a development novel. 
Bildungsromane, as we have seen, often seem to take change as an undisputed moral good: 
protagonists from Austen’s Elizabeth Bennet to Thackeray’s Arthur Pendennis receive 
more narratorial sympathy when they learn to become different from the way they 
originally were.  But by imagining that changing one’s character is always a step in the 
right moral direction, such novels also implicitly devalue the kind of “stable ego” that 
Harvey rightly cites as an indicator of moral compass in Eliot’s work.  In Brontë’s and 
Dickens’s Bildungsromane, the stable ego actually hinders development insofar as its very 
stability keeps protagonists from overcoming or balancing out their character traits.  But 
the formal presentation of Corinne’s and Maggie’s character(s) is stubborn, repeatedly 
referring the protagonists’ actions back to the characteristic that defines them.  In Maggie 
and Corinne, Eliot and Staël focus on developing moral characters for which, to use 
Harvey’s formulation, certain “possibilities” (Maggie choosing to save herself rather than 
her brother; Corinne deciding that her artistic career is more important than her love life) 
are simply impossible.  Indeed, George Levine has remarked that “[o]ne of George Eliot’s 
primary insights, dramatized in the curious passivity of her characters at their moments of 
choice, is that ‘character’ as it has been formed over a lifetime finally determines how one 
will behave in a crisis” (406).  And while other novels, like Flaubert’s Sentimental 
Education, might see the protagonist’s predictability as ironic or limiting when read 
according to the Bildungsroman’s more familiar course of developmental changes, The 
Mill on the Floss and Corinne both suggest that it is precisely the immutability of that 
which is dominant in their protagonists that makes them worthy subjects of their own 
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development narratives.  This resistance to creating a developing protagonist whose 
character is open to a vast field of possibilities and modulations—to taking the world as her 
oyster—questions the critical assumption that aligns character development with 
transformation in the Bildungsroman. Writing within a novelistic genre whose protagonists 
often change for the better, both Eliot and Staël demonstrate the morality of staying the 
same. 
Corinne’s fascination with its heroine’s immutable character comes through clearly 
in Book XIV, “Corinne’s Story” (Histoire de Corinne).  Here, an embedded first-person 
narrative, in the form of a letter from Corinne to Oswald, momentarily moves the novel’s 
third-person narrator to the background.  “Corinne’s Story” is an especially pivotal section 
of Staël’s novel, not only because it allows the protagonist to speak for a prolonged period 
in her own voice, but because it promises to reveal the personal history that both Corinne 
and the narrator have persistently withheld from both Oswald and the reader.  It purports, in 
other words, to act as a mini-Bildungsroman, explaining how Corinne spent the early years 
of her life and how she became an Italian celebrity.  And indeed, Book XIV offers many of 
the development novel’s structural trappings, including the early onset of the developing 
character’s orphanhood and her acute sense of alienation from the environment in which 
she grows up.  Specifically, the death of the protagonist’s Italian mother precipitates 
Corinne’s voyage to Northumberland, where her father, Lord Edgermond, lives with his 
new wife and daughter, Lucile.  Corinne unwittingly falls under the care of Lady 
Edgermond, who attempts to tone down her stepdaughter’s spontaneous, loquacious 
qualities by encouraging her only to take part in those domestic practices (preparing tea, 
playing whist) that she believes ought to comprise a young Englishwoman’s education: 
    
 112
“[E]verything about me surprised her,” Corinne writes, and “she planned to make changes 
if she could” (252).84  But what begins as a fairly straightforward coming-of-age story that 
might, in another novel, depict the heroine’s eventual, if conditional, acceptance of her new 
surroundings (as, for instance, happens to the heroine of Barrett Browning’s 
Bildungsroman-poem Aurora Leigh [1856]), instead ends up as a story of the ideological 
impasse between Corinne and the world that her stepmother represents.   
In fact, Corinne’s assertion that “[m]y talents, my tastes, my character itself were 
formed by the time my father sent for me” (251) precludes the possibility of developmental 
change that the scenario of being orphaned and moving to a foreign country seems to 
offer.85  This preformed character, as we have seen, thrives on the exercise of the 
imagination, through activities such as acting and poetry that are anathema to Lady 
Edgermond and her circle: “it was always the pleasures of the mind,” she tells Oswald, 
“that got sacrificed” (258).  The novel’s immensely unsympathetic portrait of Lady 
Edgermond, and indeed of English life in general, leaves little doubt that we are meant to 
take Corinne’s period of English acculturation as both artificial (insofar as the protagonist 
internally rejects it) and detrimental to her natural, imaginative character.  Though Corinne 
rather lamely tries to mitigate its protagonist’s moral polarization between a free-thinking, 
emotionally vigorous Italy and a staid, creatively desiccated Britain through Oswald’s 
defense of English duty as the highest moral imperative, England still comes off, to quote 
Naomi Schor, as “the evil empire of patriarchy” (120).   
For Corinne, to “change” according to Lady Edgermond’s wishes—to become more 
accustomed to what she calls “the parching breath of malicious mediocrity” (265) in rural 
England—is tantamount to death itself.86  Shortly after her own father dies, Corinne hears 
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Italian musicians playing under her window.  The experience of even this little taste of the 
country she left behind is enough to precipitate her decision to return to Italy despite Lady 
Edgermond’s categorical disapproval of such a plan.  Corinne writes: 
In a kind of ecstasy, I felt for Italy everything that love inspires—
desire, enthusiasm, longing.  I was no longer in control: everything 
in me was swept off toward my native land…Were life offered to 
the dead in their graves, they would not lift off their tombstones 
with greater impatience than I felt to cast off my shrouds, and 
repossess nature, my imagination, and my genius! (268).87 
 
It is the stirring of Corinne’s dominant characteristic—her imagination—that brings her 
long-stifled character back to life.  This passage linguistically performs the imagination’s 
dominance, as the abstract trait takes “control” of the protagonist’s psyche and effectively 
dictates her subsequent behavior.  More than that, Corinne’s elaborate metaphor of the 
shrouds and tombstones signals the reawakening of that verbal talent which years of 
English living have beaten into submission.  The language in this passage is typical of 
Corinne’s improvisational bravado: where one word might do (say, “desire”), she piles up 
three somewhat synonymous words (“desire, enthusiasm, longing”).  (Similarly, we see 
here how Corinne’s imagination becomes interchangeable, in her own mind, with the 
concepts of her “genius” and “nature.”).   If the time she spends in England causes Corinne 
to develop, it is a kind of development that forsakes change for its own sake; Lady 
Edgermond’s attempt to instill Corinne with “traditional” English values has ultimately 
intensified that element of the protagonist’s character (génie) that opposes those values.  
What Corinne calls the “shrouds” of submission to her stepmother’s will have not altered 
Corinne’s character so much as they have kept it under cover.  Corinne’s departure for Italy 
thus causes not only a geographic, but also a characterological return.   
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Eliot’s valorization of characterological persistence is more marked in The Mill on 
the Floss than it is elsewhere in her novels, which famously depict the moderate, “organic” 
process of change that protagonists undergo as they gradually struggle with issues such as 
negotiating an unfamiliar community (Tertius Lydgate), late-blooming, unforeseen love 
(Adam Bede) or personal and professional aimlessness (Daniel Deronda).  In her work on 
Eliot’s organicism, Sally Shuttleworth has argued that the novel’s privileging of the 
“unconscious” realm of Tom’s and Maggie’s childhood indicates an alternative, “cyclical” 
view of history that throws organicism’s ostensibly positivistic interpretations of social 
development into question (60-77).   And The Mill’s departure from the model of slow but 
sure social change that Eliot often espouses attends its simultaneous resistance to the 
“linear progression” of individual development we find in traditional Bildungsromane 
(66).88  Because Bildungsromane frequently represent both the possibility and the 
desirability of transformative growth, Eliot’s struggle against these values informs a kind of 
backlash response in which Maggie’s unwillingness to change (rather than her submission 
to the “realistic” pace of organic change) shows itself to unexpected and unusual moral 
advantage.     
Essays published both near the beginning and the end of Eliot’s artistic career help 
to explain her admiration, however elegiac, for persistence of character in the face of 
pressure to change.  “The Natural History of German Life” (1856), for example, respects 
the adherence to custom that Wilhelm Riehl sees as the “most predominant characteristic” 
of the German peasantry (Essays, 120).  The peasant’s wariness toward modernization, 
Eliot argues, is not mere pigheadedness but rather a passionate “tenacity” (115) or 
“unreasoning persistency, which has its important function in the development of the race” 
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(118).  And in “The Modern Hep! Hep! Hep!” (1879), Eliot resurrects her defense of the 
tenacity that defines a particular national character as she describes the Jews’ “sublime type 
of steadfastness” in the face of widespread English anti-Semitism.  In fact, Eliot contends 
that the “forcible character—i.e. of strongly marked characteristics” of the Jews actually 
resembles the characteristic adamancy (the “exceptional” nature) of the English themselves 
(Theophrastus, 148-50).89  In both of these essays, the author takes a defensive position 
against those individuals (whether industrialists in the first case or anti-Semites in the 
second) who insist that the group in question (whether German peasants or Jews) requires a 
kind of characterological overhaul.  The author’s valorization of changelessness becomes 
more pronounced to the degree that transformation is demanded of her subject(s): like 
Eliot’s wariness of change in the face of the Bildungsroman, these essays most fervently 
emphasize the value of persistence when its merit as a character trait comes under attack.  
Maggie’s resistance to the changes we might expect from a Bildungsroman’s protagonist 
thus situates her within a pantheon of tenacious, real-world individuals for whom Eliot 
movingly advocates. 
To demonstrate the way in which Staël’s and Eliot’s novels question the 
relationship between character development and change, however, is not to claim that 
either work simply equates morality with changelessness.  Certainly both novelists have 
created many characters (Featherstone, Grandcourt, d’Erfeuil, and even Tom Tulliver and 
Oswald Nelvil) whose lack of palpable change does not automatically mark them as 
possessors “of good character.”  Rather, I want to suggest that The Mill and Corinne 
illustrate how the developing protagonist’s resistance to change—and hence, seemingly, to 
the very change-oriented narrative in which she stars—sets in motion a different kind of 
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development that derives its value from its unwillingness to submit to the demands that the 
Bildungsroman traditionally makes on its central character(s). Such demands, as we have 
seen, include forgetting one’s past (and the characters who populated it) in order to finally 
arrive at one’s new-and-improved self.  Though Staël’s novel of course chronologically 
precedes “classic” nineteenth-century English Bildungsromane by authors like Austen, 
Charlotte Brontë, and Dickens, it presents an alternative course of character development 
that Eliot quite pointedly chooses to adopt, both by drawing on the narrative structure of 
the romance in general and by referencing Corinne in particular.  The attention that The 
Mill pays to the persistence (and, indeed, ascendancy) of Maggie’s dominant characteristic 
implicitly questions the equation of successful character development with the kind of 
reorganization and addition of characteristics that we see in earlier Bildungsromane.  If 
Maggie dies, as Elizabeth Abel et al. remind us in their work on the female development 
novel, her death is not a failure, but rather a “[refusal] to accept an adulthood that denies 
profound convictions and desires (Voyage In, 11).  The Mill’s tragedy, I would add, is also 
an indictment of the model of development that sees self-preservation as a goal to be 
achieved at any cost, whether it is the sacrificial loss of minor characters or the 
streamlining of the protagonist’s threateningly disproportionate character traits.  Maggie’s 
virtue stems from the way in which the inflexibility of her character renders these 
traditional markers of Bildung unworkable. 
Eliot’s refiguring of the techniques of characterization we find in conventional 
Bildungsromane shows up starkly in The Mill’s fourth and fifth Books.  Book IV is titled 
“The Valley of Humiliation,” a reference to the section of The Pilgrim’s Progress in which 
the lead character, Christian, successfully negotiates a dangerous encounter with the 
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Satanic figure Apollyon in order to continue on his journey toward the Celestial City.  At 
this point in Eliot’s novel, Maggie is becoming increasingly despondent about her family’s 
financial hardship and her once-ebullient father’s continual state of melancholy.  Adopting 
a vocabulary beloved to the traditional Bildungsroman’s structure of forward-moving life 
“stages,” the narrator specifically marks this as a moment of crisis: “[t]his time of utmost 
need was come to Maggie, with her short span of thirteen years” (276).  Tulliver himself 
begins to display a desire to pay off his debts that the narrator codes as a monomaniacal 
submission to “this all-compelling demand of his nature” (278).  Likewise, Tom—who, as 
we have seen, already acts according to a black-and-white sense of justice—takes on his 
father’s monomania along with his own, his “interest in life…concentrating itself into the 
one channel of ambitious resistance to misfortune” (276).  Like the tragic events that bring 
out Hamlet’s prevailing characteristics, the Tulliver family’s loss of money and self-respect 
creates an atmosphere especially conducive to the expansion of those characteristic 
tendencies that the narrator has already begun to establish. 
In one sense, Book IV’s allusive title sets the reader up for Maggie to make her own 
kind of progress: it is here, in an exceedingly difficult time, that her resolve will be tested 
and that she, like Christian, will make it on to the next “stage” of the development 
narrative.  And indeed, it is in “The Valley of Humiliation” that Maggie stumbles upon a 
copy of Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ in a bundle of books that Bob Jakin brings 
her on one especially lonely day.  Taking the devotional’s self-sacrificing message to heart, 
Maggie memorably decides to purge herself of the “inordinate love” (i.e. self-love or 
earthly love) that Thomas à Kempis sees as the cause of great suffering (290).  The 
protagonist approaches this moment with all the gravity due to revelation: 
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Maggie drew a long breath and pushed her heavy hair back, as if to 
see a sudden vision more clearly.  Here, then, was a secret of life 
that would enable her to renounce all other secrets…It flashed 
through her like the suddenly apprehended solution of a problem, 
that all the miseries of her young life had come from fixing her 
heart on her own pleasure, as if that were the central necessity of 
the universe; and for the first time she saw the possibility of 
shifting the position from which she looked at the gratification of 
her own desires–of taking her stand out of herself, and looking at 
her own life as an insignificant part of a divinely-guided whole 
(290). 
 
 On the surface, this passage resembles similar moments of clarity that feature prominently 
in earlier development novels: think, for example, of Jane Eyre’s breathless decision to 
undertake “a new servitude” or young David’s decision to walk from London to Dover in 
search of his long-lost Aunt Betsey.  But at the same time that Eliot’s narrator dramatizes 
both the educational and the narrative value of the moment’s “suddenly apprehended 
solution,” she also uses free indirect discourse (“Here, then…”) to gently distance herself 
from Maggie’s conviction that she has fortuitously stumbled upon “the secret of life.”  For 
the protagonist’s hyperbolically rendered revelation is that she must reverse precisely that 
characteristic—“fixing her heart on her own pleasure”—that has guided her since 
childhood.  It is not enough that Maggie incorporate The Imitation’s lesson into the way 
she already thinks and behaves; in order to develop according to these newfound tenets, 
Maggie must drastically alter her character by trading in one monomania (the desire to be 
loved) for another (the renunciation of worldly love).  And although the Imitation of Christ 
preaches self-sacrifice—an ethic with which Maggie is already familiar—it is an ascetic 
variety of sacrifice from which she can receive no human love in return.  
Throughout the remainder of Book IV, the narrator plays up the way in which 
Maggie’s revelation seems like it has altered the make-up of her character.  The protagonist 
    
 119
forsakes her volumes of “Virgil, Euclid, and Aldrich” in order to take up plain sewing and 
help pay the family’s mounting expenses.  Even Mrs. Tulliver—by far the least insightful 
character in the novel—“felt the change in her with a sort of puzzled wonder that Maggie 
should be ‘growing up so good’” (294).  But this conversion is fleeting, as Eliot compresses 
the four years it supposedly spans into a paltry three pages. Book V, in which Maggie 
begins to have secret meetings with her admirer Philip Wakem, quickly occasions “the 
rising again of her innate delight in admiration and love” (301).  Maggie’s dominant 
characteristic has not been changed so much as it has been imperfectly and 
opportunistically repressed, and not even the admonitions of Thomas à Kempis can keep 
her from borrowing the romantic novels, and feeding off the tender sentiments, that Philip 
so eagerly proffers.  The period of asceticism that Maggie passes through does not lead to 
an even further or more marked change of character, but rather to a reappearance of what 
Philip calls the “real self” that has remained hidden all along (335).     
As the novel progresses, the degree to which Maggie’s desire to be loved and her 
penchant for renunciation actually attend each other becomes evident.  When Tom 
discovers that Maggie has been seeing Philip, he compels her to either swear on the Bible 
that she will end the relationship, or to endure the fallout that would unquestionably occur 
if Tom were to tell Mr. Tulliver that Maggie is romantically involved with the son of his 
nemesis.  Threatened with the loss of her father and Tom—“the two idols of her life” 
(280)—Maggie grudgingly agrees to sacrifice her relationship with Philip even as she 
resents Tom’s implication that she cares more about herself than about the Tulliver 
family’s good name.  But this sacrifice is categorically different than those we saw in 
Copperfield and Eyre, since it does not move Maggie conveniently “forward” toward 
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happiness and socialization, but rather thrusts her back toward the state of loneliness and 
isolation to which she had previously been accustomed.  Like Corinne’s movement from 
England back to Italy, Maggie’s ascetic conversion actually prompts a reversion—a change 
back—which frustrates the model of “unidirectional” character development that Margolin 
ascribes to the Bildungsroman (118).   
As we might expect, Tom and Maggie’s disagreement over Philip instantiates another 
clash between the moral qualities (love and duty) that The Mill’s sister and brother embody; 
it allows Maggie to repeat, and in repeating, intensify, the central characterological conflict 
between the novel’s two principal characters:     
If you were in fault ever—if you had done anything very wrong, I 
should be sorry for the pain it brought you; I should not want 
punishment to be heaped on you.  But you have always enjoyed 
punishing me—you have always been hard and cruel to me: even 
when I was a little girl, and always loved you better than any one 
else in the world (347).  
 
Maggie’s “character” of her brother employs those structures of repetition and contrast of 
which we have seen that The Mill’s narrator is particularly fond.  Volleying back and forth 
repetitively between the subjects “you,” “I,” and “me,” the protagonist defines Tom’s 
disciplinary fervor against her own desire that he should never feel pain, even if he has 
been “in fault.”  But what is different about this confrontation of characters is Maggie’s 
realization and verbalization of the inflexible nature of this divide, as her repetitive 
language testifies: Tom has “always been hard and cruel” and “always enjoyed punishing” 
while she has “always” loved him best.  (Despite her suggestion to the contrary, Maggie’s 
continuing preference for Tom is amply illustrated by her obedience to his will even in this 
instance, when she is convinced that he is, again, “in fault”).  Maggie specifically brings 
the discussion back to childhood, thus signaling the considerable lapse of time over which 
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both she and her brother have been driven by the same contrasting imperatives.  The stakes, 
however, are higher than they used to be, since brother and sister now bring the same 
fundamental conflict to bear on issues of family duty and sexual desire as they once did on 
pet rabbits and fresh-baked jam puffs.   
The protagonist’s reversion back to her old self, then, is accompanied by a hard-
won self awareness.  Once the fight with Tom is over, Maggie returns to her room to 
reflect: “She used to think in that time that she had made great conquests, and won a lasting 
stand on serene heights above worldly temptations and conflict.  And here she was down 
again in the thick of a hot strife with her own and others’ passions” (348).  Paradoxically, 
the “development” that occurs in this scene is Maggie’s realization of the inauthenticity of 
the traditional development narrative: if a change happens here, it is a change that pushes 
the immutability of Maggie’s dominant characteristic even further to the fore.  Recognizing 
the impossibility of transformation (such as that she had hoped to accomplish through 
asceticism) is a kind of development that retains rather than renovates what the novel calls 
Maggie’s “nature.”  The protagonist’s quiet self-realization, unlike the “suddenly 
apprehended solution” offered by à Kempis, is her true revelation, since it is born not out of 
a moment’s desperation but culled from a lifetime of similar, recurring experiences in 
which the “hot strife” of her passions has taken precedent. 
While passages like those I have just cited highlight Maggie’s increasing 
recognition of her own tenacity, the novel everywhere emphasizes the losses that underpin 
even the most modest manifestations of development.  Ironically, Maggie’s capitulation to 
her brother’s demand that she sacrifice Philip’s love actually alienates her even more from 
Tom as well, since her stark depiction of Tom’s character convinces him that “you need 
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say no more to show me what a wide distance there is between us.  Let us remember that in 
the future and be silent” (348).  Maggie’s need for love actually damages those 
relationships that she most desires to protect, thus supporting Christopher Lane’s claim that 
George Eliot’s famous injunctions to sympathy and fellowship disguise a coexisting current 
of skepticism about the “psychic cost” of putting such values into practice (112).  “Eliot,” 
he writes, “presents aspects of social conflict as insoluble and participation in communities 
as sometimes irreparably damaging to individuals” (116).  I would extend Lane’s argument 
(which, while analyzing The Mill, does not focus primarily on Maggie) by noting that the 
problems character development poses for protagonists of the Bildungsroman often stem 
from the interpersonal relationships demanded by the vastly populated social panoramas we 
find throughout Victorian fiction.  Though The Mill indicates that Maggie’s refusal to 
sacrifice her relationship with Tom (and hence to temper her dominant characteristic) is the 
same impulse that drives her development, the cost of this development is not only 
“psychic,” but ultimately bodily—that is, the cost of her physical life.   
This, of course, is where the tragedy implicit in The Mill’s model of character 
development comes into play: if continuous suffering (here, in the form of self-sacrifice) 
enhances the protagonist’s moral character, then it seems to follow that the finest moral 
characters will also be those whose development, through self-sacrifice, carries them to the 
point of death.  Maggie dies because, not in spite, of the constancy of what I have called 
her “dominant characteristic,” a constancy which Eliot’s novel has after all taken pains to 
defend.  So while the novel in many ways positions itself in tonic opposition to the more 
far-fetched, fantasylike models of novelistic character development we see in Copperfield 
and Eyre, its death-ending recalls the multiple fatalities that occur within them.  Indeed, 
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Gillian Beer has argued that part of the ending’s jarring quality results from the way its 
narrative seems to abandon the realm of realistic “social critique,” of “social mores which 
are capable of being changed” in favor of an ending that unrealistically removes the 
possibility of social change, and of Maggie’s personal choice, from the equation (100, 
emphasis in original).  But I would argue that The Mill’s ending is less a bait-and-switch 
than a continued challenge of the readerly expectations we bring to the development 
narrative.  That Maggie should die in the midst of a benevolent act in which her 
unwavering character becomes spectacularly manifest exemplifies The Mill’s rejection of 
traditional narrative models that yoke moral character development to success, happiness 
and longevity.  Maggie’s death may not seem realistic, but the message behind it is grimly 
so: that tenacity itself, however morally superior to transformative development in Eliot’s 
account, offers no special dispensation for those characters who possess it.  Where Brontë 
and Dickens depict character development as an enviable achievement, Eliot insists that it 
is often an unbearable one.  
We can, further, read both The Mill’s and Corinne’s tragic finales are as a 
consequence of the dominant trait’s poetics.  As we have seen, Maggie’s need to be loved 
takes on increasing importance within her development story as she begins to acknowledge 
and feed it; indeed, it is the acceptance of this trait’s persistence that marks her moral 
maturity.  But for Maggie to remain heroic, The Mill must end with a precipitous tragedy 
because it cannot finally sustain the growth of Maggie’s dominant trait, a growth that 
shows no sign of slowing down:  The very dominion of one trait over all others threatens to 
render Eliot’s protagonist into a caricature.  This movement from heroism toward 
caricature is precisely what occurs in the end of Corinne, as the protagonist’s 
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monomaniacal focus on Oswald—a monomania the novel attributes to her active 
imagination—saps her of all her former creativity before ultimately killing her.  In the final 
section of this chapter, I will tease out the affinities between the technique of 
characterization I have been describing in Corinne and The Mill—whereby one 
characteristic becomes dominant—and the ostensibly “flattening” medium of caricature.  
This discussion will re-evaluate the prevailing assumption (evident not only among literary 
critics but explicitly stated within the novels themselves) that Corinne and Maggie 
exemplify the phenomenon of characterological depth.  Moreover, it will continue my first 
chapter’s project of revising our general understanding of how depth is formally 
constructed in those nineteenth-century novels which are so well-known for developing it.  
 
Caricature and Depth 
Corinne’s ending is tragic not only because the protagonist dies, but also because 
she becomes so artistically vitiated in the period leading up to her death.  After she learns 
of Oswald’s attachment to Lucile, Corinne flees Rome (the city that saw her greatest 
success) and goes into seclusion in Florence, where her former friends and admirers cannot 
bear witness to her reduced state.  The novel spends many pages documenting this creative 
decline, citing Corinne’s inability to engage in the kind of improvisations that made her 
famous; the very intractability of Corinne’s attachment to Oswald stands in ironic conflict 
with the spontaneity and adaptability that characterize the improvisatrice.  Corinne is now 
only able to pen fragmented thoughts, among which she concedes that “the source of 
everything is dried up” (369).90     
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But while Corinne’s lost talent might suggest the retreat of her characteristic genius, 
the novel insists, instead, that it is the particular force of this genius that marks her for 
death.  The protagonist remarks that “my genius, if it still survives, can be sensed only 
through the strength of my sorrow” (416).91  She repeatedly argues, in other words, that the 
magnification of her suffering is the inevitable flipside of her magnified imagination: “I am 
an exception to the universal order of things…[t]here is happiness for everyone, and the 
dreadful power to suffer that kills me is a way of feeling peculiar to me alone” (364).92  
Though Corinne is more articulate about her own situation than Maggie, both novels 
illustrate a similar Catch-22: that characteristic which supports the protagonist’s 
development can also kill her if it goes unchecked. 
Rather than trying to overcome her love for Oswald—a love she perfectly 
understands to be destructive and futile—Corinne throws the same kind of vigor into her 
sorrow as she previously channeled into her improvisations.  Most strikingly (and most 
creepily for many readers), Corinne attempts at the end of her life to teach Lucile (her 
ostensible rival) and Oswald’s daughter, Juliette, how to become more like herself.  These 
lessons in Corrinean character, which include practicing the art of conversation and 
learning Scottish airs on the harp, are apparently devised for Oswald’s benefit: Corinne 
informs Lucile that “[y]ou will have to be you and me at the same time” because “my only 
personal desire is that Oswald find some traces of my influence in you and your daughter, 
and that at least he can never enjoy feeling without remembering Corinne” (413).93  Despite 
the fact that Corinne believes Oswald has ruined her life, she continues to commit herself 
to the line of self-sacrifice which she has been following throughout Staël’s entire novel.   
    
 126
The change that Corinne goes through as the novel catalogs her physical and mental 
downfall occurs, paradoxically, because the protagonist’s characterological makeup 
remains relatively static: her dominant characteristic becomes more and more exaggerated 
through repetition, and its dominion over her actions (or inability to act) gradually 
increases as well.  That every aspect of Corinne’s life must be filtered through her once-
sublime genius eventually morphs her into a kind of grotesque, verbal caricature of her 
former self.  Though we might not initially recognize the affinities between caricature 
(known foremost as pictorial and a comic medium) and Staël’s or Eliot’s resolutely tragic 
literary projects, caricature’s focus on, and inflation of, an individual’s single physical 
feature (a gigantic chin, say) repeats, in corporeal terms, the poetics of the dominant 
characteristic that we see in Corinne and The Mill’s developing characters.  As Michèle 
Hannoosh has explained in her work on nineteenth-century French and British caricature, 
“the deformations” of pictorial caricature typically “locate the subject’s characteristic 
traits” (76); and in the act of “location,” caricaturists also define their subjects according to 
those traits, or characteristics, that their portraiture renders prominent.  In caricature, a nose 
is never just a nose: it also makes some kind of statement about the moral character of its 
bearer.  Moreover, this disproportionate attention to one characteristic implies the same 
kind of hierarchy of moral characteristics that operates not only in Staël’s and Eliot’s 
novels, but throughout the countless verbal depictions of character—both fictional and non-
fictional—throughout nineteenth-century texts.  Just as the protrusion of a gigantic chin 
threatens to obscure the coexistence of a more streamlined nose and mouth, so too does 
Corinne’s prominent imagination, for example, manifest its prominence to the exclusion or 
diminution of other character traits.  
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Along with Hannoosh, Deidre Lynch has meticulously analyzed the ways in which 
eighteenth-and nineteenth-century audiences thought about caricature in relationship to the 
more streamlined media of “character” drawing and neoclassical portraiture.  Despite—and 
also because—of caricature’s appeal to a wide reading public, many visual artists (most 
notably those connected with the Royal Academy and the teachings of Joshua Reynolds) 
attempted to deride caricature as an inferior or lower-class enterprise: “High art set about 
defining itself in contradistinction to popular and amateur art by identifying itself with an 
ideal of ‘pictorial abstemiousness’ and identifying others with excess” (Lynch 59).  This 
dichotomy between the “high art” of portraiture (which represented “character”) and the 
popular activity of caricature was reinforced in works such as William Hogarth’s engraving 
“Characters and Caricaturas” (1743) and Francis Grose’s Rules for Drawing Caricaturas 
(1788).  Each of these works sees caricature as the exaggeration of the more moderately 
rendered character, which displays natural and recognizable “types” (Lynch 61; Hannoosh 
80-81).  An underlying assumption of such accounts is that caricature illustrates the 
unnatural or disproportionately deviant traits of human subjects, thereby rendering those 
subjects more monstrous (and less human) than their counterparts in the realm of character.   
Theories of novelistic character have frequently drawn upon the language of 
caricature to make distinctions between the structural configuration of major and minor 
characters.  The most famous of these theories, as we have seen, is E.M. Forster’s 
delineation of “flat” and “round” characters, in which the author specifically likens flat 
characters to “caricatures” and asserts that the mark of a flat characters is that they are 
“constructed round a single idea or quality” and do not change over time (67-69).  And 
though Forster admits the humorous, “comforting quality” of flat characters, he clearly 
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subordinates the latter group to “round” characters (like Lucy Snowe and Becky Sharpe) 
who are defined according to their ability to surprise the reader—that is, their changeability 
(78).  In a contemporary account Woloch describes what he calls “compression,” a 
technique for rendering minor characters which bears an especially strong similarity to the 
visual strategies of caricature that Hannoosh and Lynch discuss.  Woloch writes: 
We can think of these minor or flat characters as synecdoches, as 
their outstanding quality is substituted for their entire personality, 
part for whole...[but] Between the minor character and the 
synecdoche into which she is absorbed is a narrative process that I 
will term compression.  Compression underlies the distortion 
behind both ‘flatness’ and the ‘synecdoche’: just as the whole gets 
filtered through the essential part, so the full person is squeezed 
into the flat character, a flatness motivated and sustained by the 
characteristic that gets derived from the individual only to 
subsume her (69). 
 
Like pictorial caricatures, Woloch’s “compressed” minor characters are defined according 
to a single, exceptional “quality” or “characteristic.”  Where the defining characteristics 
contained in visual caricatures are rendered spatially (as in the big nose threatening to 
swallow the face of its possessor), Woloch argues that the caricature born of novelistic 
“compression” occurs not only through the depiction of a character who is subsumed by a 
characteristic, but through the repetition over time of a single gesture that signals this 
subsuming process.  (Woloch here cites Pride and Prejudice’s Mary Bennet, whom Austen 
comically reduces to a mouthpiece of banal homilies).  Echoing and extending Forster’s 
division between flat and round, this model of compression assumes that the compressed 
character will be positioned “in functional relationship to the protagonist’s depth” (71).  
Mary’s caricatured quality, for example, serves to highlight the comparatively 
unpredictable and psychologically complex portrait of her sister Elizabeth. 
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 While both Forster’s and Woloch’s work ties together minor character and 
caricature, however, I want to argue that Eliot’s and Staël’s novels complicate these models 
insofar as they create protagonists through the use of those narrative techniques that 
literary critics tend to associate with flatness.  As I have shown throughout this chapter, 
both novels construct the character of the protagonist around a single dominant 
characteristic whose importance within Maggie’s and Corinne’s characterological 
hierarchies is repetitively announced and implied.  This characteristic does not slowly 
recede with maturity (as it might in the more portrait-style protagonists of Copperfield and 
Eyre), but grows more prominent until, like a caricatured physical feature, it consumes its 
subject altogether.  Moreover, the incessant and ultimately predictable manifestations of 
Maggie’s and Corinne’s dominant traits illustrate how poorly these characters fit into a 
model of roundness, like Forster’s, that depends on a character’s ability to surprise.  
Structurally, Maggie and Corinne turn out to resemble Mary Bennet and Mrs. Micawber 
more than any of us might have supposed.   
To claim the formal affinity between these two famous protagonists and the minor 
characters from whom they are often assumed to categorically differ is also to qualify the 
critical orthodoxy regarding both Maggie and Corinne in particular and the nineteenth-
century protagonist more generally.  Many of The Mill’s most eminent critics, for example, 
focus on Maggie’s internal heterogeneity—that is, on the conflict between her different 
character traits.  Along with Woloch (whose investment in the protagonist’s depth I have 
already cited), John Kucich writes that Maggie embodies a larger trend of “mixedness” or 
internal self-division that marks many of Eliot’s major characters: “Eliot’s characters,” he 
argues, “often come to display an inner confusion that appears to be innate” (Repression, 
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125).  The insistence upon Maggie’s internal mixture—and the depth that results from it—
appears more recently in Armstrong’s assertion that Maggie combines the characteristics of 
“femaleness” and “femininity” which previous novels tended to split between two different 
characters altogether (Bertha Mason and Jane Eyre, for example).  In this argument, 
Maggie illustrates the “internal struggle between self-expression and self-discipline within 
a consequently complex and layered individual” (How Novels Think, 92).  Critical readings 
of Corinne, too, tend to highlight its protagonist’s internal multiplicity.  In an essay 
claiming that Corinne’s heterogeneity “emblematizes” the possible achievements of the 
republican state, Levy contends that “Corinne unites elements that are not customarily 
combined, traits that are not necessarily gendered but that are composed of oppositional 
elements” (243-44).  Each of these discussions, then, not only foregrounds the depth of 
Eliot’s or Staël’s protagonists, but also affirms depth’s productive qualities for a variety of 
literary-critical paradigms.   
To be sure, there is much in both Corinne and The Mill on the Floss to support such 
readings.  Eliot’s narrator does often refer to Maggie’s interiority as a kind of psychological 
jumble; her “thoughts” amounting to “the oddest mixture of clear-eyed acumen and blind 
dreams” (112).  Corinne, too, whom Oswald remarks “combines charms of many different 
countries” (96) and whom Staël’s narrator warns is “gifted in too many directions” (125) 
can be convincingly read as heterogeneous.  By emphasizing the way in which a single 
character trait comes to dominate these ostensibly diverse consciousnesses, then, I do not 
mean to suggest that the previous critics have got it “wrong” when it comes to Eliot’s and 
Staël’s methods of characterization.  Rather, I want to call attention to the duality inherent 
in these methods: Eliot’s and Staël’s protagonists come into being not simply through 
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markers of heterogeneity, but through the coexistence of these markers with those that posit 
the protagonists’ characters as illustrative of a single, dominant trait.  Corinne and The 
Mill, that is, toggle back-and-forth between narrative illustrations of diversity (which posit 
that the protagonist possesses a vast, almost infinite multiplicity of internal character traits) 
and those of singularity (which define her, like a flat character or caricature, according to 
an overdetermined characteristic).   
Though this continual volley between diversity and singularity occurs in broad 
strokes across The Mill, it shows up more succinctly in Corinne, whose character is at once 
assumed to incorporate the virtues of multiple nationalities (English, Italian, German, 
French) at the same time that it represents the particular qualities of one country alone 
(evidenced by the title’s contention that Corinne is Italy).  In a statement about Mme de 
Staël that might apply just as well to Corinne, C.A. Sainte-Beuve provides a clear 
elaboration of this kind of characterization, in which diversity and singularity play off of 
one another: 
The predominant characteristic of Mme. de Staël, the main unity of 
all the contrasts of her character, the swift, keen spirit which 
circulated through every member of that vast assemblage, and 
vivified the whole, was, beyond a doubt, a genius for conversation, 
for sudden improvisation, springing, all divine, from the unfailing 
fountain of her soul (155).94   
 
Here, Sainte-Beuve singles out Staël’s improvisational talent as that “predominant 
characteristic” which seems to rise above the multifarious “assemblage” of her 
characteristics.  He presents Staël’s character as a product of the dual presence, the 
juxtaposition, of these expansive and restrictive techniques.  The very designation of Staël 
(and indeed, of Corinne) as an improvisatrice contains within it this same duality: Staël is 
defined “predominantly” by a single characteristic—the ability to improvise—which itself 
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refers to its possessor’s spontaneity, to her facility to escape easy definition.  Hence Sainte-
Beuve’s seemingly paradoxical statement that Staël’s unpredictable qualities are part of a 
character that is eminently predictable—“beyond a doubt.”  Staël’s complexity, or depth, is 
built upon the simplicity of a direct characterological label.  
Further, the duality of simple and complex tendencies within Staël’s and Eliot’s 
protagonists can help clarify the broader narrative construction of literary character in the 
nineteenth-century.  For “character”—as I have argued explicitly in the Introduction and 
contend throughout this dissertation—relies upon a tension between excess and precision, 
mutability and permanence.  Because formal character’s existence throughout time, as a 
complexly “humanlike” construct within the reader’s mind, renders it stubbornly fugitive, 
nineteenth-century novels frequently use succinct moral epithets to suspend it at various 
moments throughout their narratives. This larger tension plays itself out through particular 
strategies such those we have seen in Corinne and The Mill, in which the seeming 
infinitude of the protagonists’ heterogeneous characteristics is countered by a narrative’s 
concomitant assertion that the protagonist can be contained in a trait whose dominance 
renders it (and, by extension, her) easily identifiable.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
coexistence of stasis and movement thus figured proves especially stark in the genre of the 
Bildungsroman, which, as these novels illustrate, concerns itself as much with the 
repetition of fixed characterological categories as it does with the transformation of 
character throughout time.  Where Forster and Woloch both see the dynamics of character 
depth becoming manifest through what Forster calls the “collision” between major and 
minor characters (71), I wish finally to suggest that techniques of majorness and minorness 
work together within nineteenth-century protagonists as well.  Corinne and The Mill show 
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us how character functions less an either/or proposition—a choice between depth and 
surface—than it does as a continual evocation of both.   
My next chapter will begin to explore how third-person narratorial strategy 
intersects with and influences the processes of character construction that I have discussed 
in Chapters One and Two.  To this end, I move away from well-loved Bildungsromane 
toward Anthony Trollope’s Palliser novels, whose developing characters often face charges 
of repetitious tediousness—rather than accolades of lifelike depth—from Trollope’s readers 
and critics.  This comparatively tepid reception of Trollope’s characters, as we will see, 
relates directly to the third-person narrator’s role as both mediator and representative of the 
Palliser characters’ represented thoughts.  










Represented Thought and the Character of Indecision in Trollope’s Palliser Series 
 
“Everything valuable in the novel is centered in its portrayal of character: character 
gives the novelist his pleasure and the reader his instruction; character elicits 
sympathy and recognition, which are the distinctive effects of the novel as a genre.” 
    -Walter M. Kendrick, Trollope: The Novel Machine (27) 
 
“The essence of [Trollope’s] love of reality was his extreme interest in character.” 
    -Henry James, Partial Portraits (104) 
 
 
Even in a literary-critical climate as intent on deflating clichés as the present one, 
Anthony Trollope’s preference for character over plot is seldom disputed.  The 
categorical fervor of pronouncements like James’s and Kendrick’s seems to brook any 
argument to the contrary, especially for those of us who have followed Trollope and his 
characters through one or more series of imposing volumes.  But even if we assume that 
the relative consensus about what Nicholas Dames has called Trollope’s “well-known 
aesthetic priority” (“Career,” 259) is an accurate one, its status as a consensus threatens 
to foreclose on discussions about what an allegiance to character actually entails.  What 
does it mean to value character over plot, anyway?  How does such an authorial valuation 
look and feel to Trollope’s readers? 
One way to begin to answer these questions is by noting that while Trollope’s 
novels are notoriously long, they are hardly potboilers.  The six Palliser novels do not 
gradually reveal, for example, that Alice Vavasor bore an illegitimate child, or that 
Plantagenet Palliser harbors a secret love for Madame Max Goesler.  Instead of focusing 
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on dramatic outcomes or physical action, Trollope’s novels invariably present us with a 
lot of people sitting around thinking: Trollope lavishes a vast amount of time representing 
the thought of characters who cannot make up their minds, and many of the most 
important events he depicts are, therefore, mental ones.  Indeed, numerous critics tout 
Trollope’s meticulous illustration of his characters’ interior lives as his greatest strength.  
W.J. Overton, for instance, writes that the author’s “specialty is to recreate mental 
rhythms” (489), and Stephen Wall praises Trollope’s “extraordinarily secure command of 
psychological process,” claiming that “[o]ne reads Trollope not to find out simply what 
happened in the end, but to understand the stages by which it came to happen and was 
bound to happen, given the individual personalities involved” (245).  Such readings 
assume that the apparent complexity of Trollope’s characters functions as a kind of 
aesthetic compensation for the novels’ lack of suspenseful plotting. And to say that 
Trollope excels at representing the “psychological process” is another way of saying that 
he excels at creating “deep” characters whose fictionalized interiorities seem almost 
lifelike in their contradictions and convolutions.  Trollope’s celebrated preference for 
character, then, amounts to his heightened attentiveness to characters’ thought—in 
particular, to a variety of thought continually plagued by vacillation and uncertainty. This 
attention to characters’ mental processes over and above their actions in turn contributes 
to the larger solicitation of reader sympathy that the author once called “the great and 
only aim of my work” (ED 356), as well as to a commitment to realism that remains even 
less contested than his reverence for character.  Which of us, Trollope incessantly asks, 
has not had trouble making decisions? 
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 But despite the consistency with which Trollope relies on represented thought to 
create fictional characters who register both as sympathetic and psychologically complex, 
plenty of readers have suggested that he fails on both counts.   Many of those critics who 
readily admit the author’s privileging of “character” are less eager to concede that this 
privileging automatically results in a showcase of interior profundity.  Kendrick, for 
example, writes that “Trollope’s novels, because they describe the workings of the mind, 
might be called psychological.  But though they are very much concerned with mental 
processes, they give no attention to the structure of the mind as such.  Nor do they 
recognize any fundamental difference between internal thought processes and external 
events” (86).  Trollope’s characters may think a lot, in other words, but their thinking 
does not have a particular quality that distinguishes itself from the rest of the discourse; 
the result, Kendrick implies, is a fairly lackluster rendition of the cognitive process.  D.A. 
Miller similarly acknowledges a certain complexity of character in Trollope’s novels 
insofar as their author pushes his characters’ internal conflicts to the forefront (“the 
heterogeneity of the subject invariably triumphs over every effort to purify it” [Novel, 
126]), but he quickly retreats from this reading, suggesting instead that the omnipresence 
of Trollope’s narrator actually detracts from the novels’ ostensible depiction of 
characterological depth. “Whatever diversity appears in the characters’ lives,” he writes, 
“never exceeds the ordinating power of the far more consistent perspective from which 
they are viewed” (137).  For Miller—who admits that it is “all [he] can do not to be 
bored” when reading Trollope (145)—this monolithic narratorial perspective arouses a 
stifling sense of dullness which seems to preclude any sympathetic engagement with the 
characters who populate Trollope’s world.   
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In fact, we hardly need to rely on twentieth-century literary criticism for 
suggestions that many of Trollope’s characters seem less complex than the author’s 
preoccupation with represented thought might indicate.  A similar sentiment can be found 
in an unsigned review of Phineas Finn (1869) from the 20 March, 1869 edition of The 
Spectator: 
What we do think Mr. Trollope sometimes fails in, is in perceiving 
that there is, for most men at least, a depth of private character 
which barely gets to the surface of society at all, and which Mr. 
Trollope rarely ever indicates.  Here, for instance, is Phineas Finn, 
who is an ambitious man and a warm politician, who is always in 
love with some lady or other, though the reader is always a little in 
doubt as to which…Yet we never see for a moment either the roots 
of his ambition, or the roots of his passions and affections, or the 
roots of his faith.  We never see him as he would see himself even 
for a chapter…He does what is wrong and what is right alike 
without giving us any idea that such a thing as deep moral struggle 
can go on in the heart of man (qtd. in Smalley, 310-11). 
 
This review clearly takes “depth” as an interior quality—it is “private” and “in the heart,” 
revealing the “moral struggle” that ensues inside the fictional minds of novelistic 
characters.  In this formulation as in so many others, represented depth emerges as both a 
formal, narrative condition and a moral good; depth’s structural presence “indicates” a 
character’s contemplation of “what is wrong and what is right.”  But despite the fact that 
Phineas Finn offers many scenes in which its hero vacillates over problems romantic and 
political, Phineas’s depth is, apparently, nowhere in evidence.  The numerous, repetitive 
instances of “moral struggle” that Phineas encounters (including, for instance, his 
indecision about whether to abandon an ill-chosen fiancé for a more desirable match, or 
over voting against his political party and in favor of his personal opinions) do not come 
off as such, and Trollope’s focus on thought rather than story fails to create the 
impression of internal intricacy on which this reviewer’s conception of depth appears to 
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be based.  Further, Phineas’s apparent lack of depth here amounts to a concomitant deficit 
of reader sympathy: Trollope’s Irish Member does not exhibit the kind of private torment 
to which the reviewer believes “most men” are prone, nor does the reviewer feel that 
Trollope makes the “roots” behind Phineas’s motives sufficiently clear.95  
 In this chapter, I suggest why not only Phineas, but Trollope’s characters more 
generally, often seem deficient in the very psychological complexity that the author’s 
extensive attention to interiority ostensibly promises. Specifically, I use the Palliser 
novels to explore what recent scholarship on the representation of thought in narrative 
reveals about the intersections between reader sympathy, character depth, and the form of 
the novel series.  Discovering which types of represented thought are most likely to 
register as “deep” to readers will continue this dissertation’s broader examination of the 
effect(s) of different structures of interiority on the construction of character.  And while 
the series form indeed differs starkly from that of the Bildungsroman—dividing its focus 
between multiple volumes, storylines, and characters rather than concentrating on a 
single subject—both genres prioritize the representation of character as it develops over 
time.  The series can therefore be read both as a diametric opposition to the single-
volume Bildungsroman and as a supreme extension of its concerns, since its plurality of 
focus demonstrates how character works in general rather than how it comes to life in 
specific incarnations.  This commitment to character as a general concept, I will argue, 
infuses the form of Trollopian thought, unwittingly creating particular characters who do 
not seem particularly deep. 
Drawing principally on the work of narratologist Alan Palmer in his recent book, 
Fictional Minds (2004), and expanding the implications of this work for the study of 
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“character” in nineteenth-century fiction, my reexamination of interiority in the Palliser 
novels suggests that readers and critics often respond unfavorably to Trollope’s particular 
brand of heavily narratorial thought representation in part because of a deep-seated 
preference for what Palmer calls “subjective first” interiority (most often narrativized 
through techniques of “inner speech”).  This preference, as Palmer argues, dominates in 
contemporary narrative studies, and I contend that it also reaches at least as far back as 
the nineteenth century, many of whose most enduring novels (by writers such as Austen, 
Charlotte Brontë, and James) are Bildungsromane that depict the development of 
ostentatiously introspective protagonists through the manipulation of inner speech.  Such 
novels, as we will see, frequently imply that the introspective process—depicted in the 
kind of subjective first language that reveals the developing character’s eloquent inner 
voice—will dramatically increase one’s self-knowledge and thereby perfect one’s moral 
character.  
In contrast, the Palliser novels present a less immediately flattering portrait of 
fictional cognition insofar as many of the series’s characters, as I have suggested, practice 
a kind of indecisive thinking that leads one in circles rather than promising new 
revelations about the self.  That Trollope compounds his characters’ sense of internal 
traction by using the technique of thought report—which allows the third-person narrator 
to interweave his own and others’ thinking into passages of a given character’s 
represented thought—further destabilizes the traditional Bildungsroman’s construction of 
thinking as an isolated activity best suited to a single, intellectual young protagonist. 
Trollope’s famous preference for character over plot therefore involves a concomitant 
valuation of thinking over knowing, since vacillating characters, by definition, have 
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trouble turning aimless thought into the kind of focused resolutions that drive the 
comparatively fast-paced storylines of Bildungsromane like Jane Eyre or The Red and 
the Black.  But while the Palliser novels’ lengthy depiction of inner conflict—the 
ostensible hallmark of psychological depth—might appear to facilitate their readers’ 
impression of sympathetically deep characters, I argue that both Trollope’s preoccupation 
with vacillation (rather than its ends) and his refusal to privilege subjective first 
introspection as a vehicle for represented thought help explain the halfhearted sympathies 
of so many of his critics.   
In the following sections, I begin by clarifying several ways in which the 
Bildungsroman tradition tends to represent thought before placing this tradition in 
dialogue with the technique of thought report that brings so many of Trollope’s 
indecisive characters into being.   My analysis of Trollopian indecision will subsequently 
inform a discussion of the novel series as a narrative genre by illustrating how the series 
reshapes the concept of character development to comply with its particular demands.  
The refusal to decide that is reiterated over and over in the Palliser series, across 
characters and novels alike, has obvious affinities with the refusal to embrace 
characterological change that we observed in the previous chapter with the protagonists 
of Corinne and The Mill on the Floss.  In all these cases, the novels present development 
styles based not on forward progress or gradual transformation, but on a non-movement 
that highlights the difficulty of progressive character development.  But Trollope’s focus 
on the interior suspension that results from endlessly repetitive thinking finds an 
especially congenial home in the novel series, whose extensive scope resists the kind of 
quick decision-making that would prematurely conclude it.  The series renders character 
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development coterminous with the extensive temporal development that its multiple 
volumes represent, its massive length allowing less for “deeper” characters than for 
increasingly older ones. 
 
Varieties of Interiority: Introspection, Thought Report, Indecision 
 Drawing his terminology from the field of cognitive science, Palmer differentiates 
between “subjective first” and “intersubjective first” theories of mind.  The former 
approach takes the mind as a discrete entity that interacts with other self-governing minds 
in social contexts.  The latter—which Palmer himself favors in Fictional Minds—sees the 
mind as an infinitely more amorphous quantity which both shapes and is shaped by its 
interpenetration with other minds (5).96  While proponents of the subjective first attitude 
are more likely to see the individual mind as distinct from the environment in which it 
moves, those who see cognition as “intersubjective first” believe that the environment is 
inseparable from consciousness: the two are, in fact, embedded (131).  Fictional Minds 
argues that the subjective first theory has informally infused contemporary narratological 
discourse for a long time, but that, with the notable exception of Dorrit Cohn’s 
Transparent Minds (1978), narrative theorists have paid little systematic attention to 
fictional mental processing.   
 Narratologists like Cohn endorse the subjective first approach to consciousness, 
Palmer contends, by equating fictional thought presentation with the kind of “private and 
heavily introspective thinking” we associate with “highly verbalized, self-conscious” 
characters like Emma Woodhouse and Isabel Archer (9).97  This equation, in turn, results 
in “[t]he privileging of some novels over others, and some scenes in novels over others” 
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(58, emphasis in original).  Take, for example, the following two passages, each of which 
comes from one of the nineteenth century’s most critically “privileged” novels and 
depicts the cognition of a legendarily deep protagonist: 
Emma's eyes were instantly withdrawn; and she sat silently 
meditating, in a fixed attitude, for a few minutes. A few minutes 
were sufficient for making her acquainted with her own heart. A 
mind like hers, once opening to suspicion, made rapid progress. 
She touched-- she admitted--she acknowledged the whole truth. 
Why was it so much worse that Harriet should be in love with Mr. 
Knightley, than with Frank Churchill? Why was the evil so 
dreadfully increased by Harriet's having some hope of a return? It 
darted through her, with the speed of an arrow, that Mr. Knightley 
must marry no one but herself! (Jane Austen, Emma, 335). 
 
 
It often seemed to her [Isabel] that she thought too much about 
herself; you could have made her blush, any day in the year, by 
telling her that she was selfish. She was always planning out her 
own development, desiring her own perfection, observing her own 
progress. Her nature had for her own imagination a certain garden-
like quality, a suggestion of perfume and murmuring boughs, of 
shady bowers and lengthening vistas, which made her feel that 
introspection was, after all, an exercise in the open air, and that a 
visit to the recesses of one’s mind was harmless when one returned 
from it with a lapful of roses (Henry James, The Portrait of a Lady, 
44). 
 
These excerpts exemplify subjective first interiority, in part because of the way in which each 
characterizes the heroine’s thought process as a kind of mental cocooning: Emma literally 
“withdraws” her eyes and “silently meditates,” while Isabel makes a figurative “visit” to the 
“recesses” of her mind.  Both passages therefore perform a retreat from outside contexts in 
order to depict the protagonist’s elevated level of psychological depth.  Both passages, in 
addition, paint these protagonists (not just the narrators) as verbally articulate: Austen’s 
famous use of free indirect discourse gives us the flavor of Emma’s particular diction, and 
The Portrait’s elaborate metaphor—figuring Isabel’s imagination as an expansive, fecund 
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garden—seems to be created and focalized through the same eloquent consciousness it 
portrays. Finally, each extract depicts the thinking subject’s introspection as a means of 
discovering a truth about the self; Emma and Isabel do not engage in introspection simply to 
work out particular problems.  Rather, Austen’s and James’s protagonists repeatedly engage 
in such interior self-searching in order to cultivate their own moral characters.  Hence, for 
example, the novels’ apparent alignment of introspection with “progress”: the process of 
solitary thinking promises the security of knowing, since what begins as unmoored 
speculation yields a valuable epistemological end once subjected to inward scrutiny. 98  Here, 
Emma discovers the “whole truth” by becoming “acquainted with her own heart,” and Isabel 
need only contemplate “her nature” to garner “a lapful of roses.”  The precision of Austen’s 
represented thought, along with the spectacular imagery that suffuses James’s, make it easy 
to understand why critics might favor these novels in discussions about literary “thinking.”  
Emma and The Portrait of a Lady transform introspection into a gorgeous verbal art while at 
the same time suggesting that frequent self-examination is less an antisocial indulgence than 
a moral imperative.   
 Palmer argues, however, that one of the problems with limiting the category of 
represented thought to instances of private introspection is that such a move favors narrative 
presentations of “inner speech”—most notably direct and free indirect discourse—which 
assume a strong correlation between speech and thought (13).99  Palmer’s work attempts to 
redress this undue emphasis on inner speech by highlighting the critically neglected yet 
textually omnipresent mode of thought report, which the author defines as “the equivalent of 
indirect speech, in which narrators present characters’ thoughts in the narrative” (54) (as in 
the statement, “Jane thought she would like to take a walk”).  This type of fictionally 
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represented consciousness has appeared less interesting to narrative theorists insofar as it is 
supposedly less mimetic than direct discourse (“Jane thought, ‘I would like to take a walk’”) 
or free indirect discourse (“Jane would take a walk”).  In contradistinction to these primarily 
speech-centric modes of thought presentation, thought report has seemed dull to the degree 
that it is the novel’s most ubiquitous form of fictional cognition, and it has seemed overly 
mediated insofar as its structure invites the third-person narrator to take on an explicit moral 
stance toward the narrative’s characters (77).   
 But to see thought report as so much narratological filler, Palmer maintains, is to 
deny its “positive linking role in presenting characters’ social engaged mental functioning” 
(16).  Though thought report may not boast the verbal precision or the sense of intimacy 
between reader and character that direct or free indirect discourse provide, it facilitates the 
presentation of innumerable “states of mind [such] as emotions, sensations, dispositions, 
beliefs, attitudes, intentions, motives, and reasons for action” (13).  Thought report, in other 
words, can portray a broad spectrum of fictional characters’ nonverbal mental functions, 
covering statements as diverse as “Barbara was craving a martini;” “Larry meant to take the 
laundry to the cleaners;” and “David bought Maria a necklace to show that he was sorry.”  In 
addition to its ability to depict those mental states that diverge from strictly verbal 
“thinking,” thought report foregrounds the intersubjective nature of consciousness through its 
seemingly effortless depiction of multiple minds—including the narrator’s—functioning 
together (“Claire thought Mary felt as if Bob had been cheating on her”).100 
 Though direct and free indirect discourse do play significant roles in Trollope’s 
novels, it is thought report—with its clear narratorial presence and summative dexterity—
that dominates the presentation of consciousness in the Palliser series.  In order to begin 
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to pinpoint how the novels’ use of thought report embodies many of the principal 
functions Palmer ascribes to the technique, I offer the following pair of passages.  The 
first occurs midway through Phineas Finn, and relates Phineas’s decision to tell Lady 
Laura Kennedy (whom he used to love) that he is now in love with her friend Violet 
Effingham; the second comes from the beginning of The Duke’s Children (1880), in 
which the narrator describes Plantagenet Palliser’s reaction to his wife’s recent death.  
Note that the represented thought we find here immediately differs from Emma’s insofar 
as it is delivered through a folksy narratorial voice which deemphasizes the particular 
verbal cadence of the thinking character: 
At last he resolved that he would tell Lady Laura the whole truth,--
not the truth about the duel, but the truth about Violet Effingham, 
and ask for her assistance.  When making this resolution, I think 
that he must have forgotten much that he had learned of his 
friend’s character; and by making it, I think that he showed also 
that he had not learned as much as his opportunities might have 
taught him.  He knew Lady Laura’s obstinacy of purpose, he knew 
her devotion to her brother, and he knew also how desirous she had 
been that her brother should win Violet Effingham for himself.  
This knowledge should, I think, have sufficed to show him how 
improbable it was that Lady Laura should assist him in his 
enterprise (PF II.10).101 
 
For it may be said of this man that, though throughout his life he 
had had many Honourable and Right Honourable friends, and that 
though he had entertained guests by the score, and though he had 
achieved for himself the respect of all good men and the thorough 
admiration of some few who knew him, he had hardly made for 
himself a single intimate friend—except that one who had now 
passed away from him. To her he had been able to say what he 
thought, even though she would occasionally ridicule him while he 
was declaring his feelings. But there had been no other human soul 
to whom he could open himself. There were one or two whom he 
loved, and perhaps liked; but his loving and his liking had been 
exclusively political. He had so habituated himself to devote his 
mind and his heart to the service of his country, that he had almost 
risen above or sunk below humanity. But she, who had been 
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essentially human, had been a link between him and the world 
(TDC 3). 
 
If Trollope does not render either Phineas’s or Palliser’s language as mimetically as 
Austen does Emma’s, neither does he describe his characters’ interiority by invoking the 
kind of virtuosic metaphors James devotes to Isabel’s introspection.  But if we grant that 
Phineas and Palliser appear less articulate and imaginative than Emma and Isabel, what else 
might Trollope’s narrative stand to gain in exchange for the relative suspension of his 
characters’ inner speech?  First, these passages demonstrate thought report’s unique 
capacity to adapt represented time for the narrative’s own purposes: thought report can be 
used to condense time, as in Trollope’s paragraph-long précis of Plantagenet and 
Glencora’s relationship, and it can pause the narration of the story in order for the narrator 
to register his own reaction (here, to Phineas’s ignorance of Laura’s character).  While 
direct discourse might permit Palliser’s thoughts to seem less mediated and more “in the 
moment,” thought report allows for the economical summary of years of events.102  This 
synoptic function proves especially useful in the novel series, whose extensive sequence of 
events Trollope often uses thought report to recapitulate for the benefit of newer or more 
forgetful readers.  In the passage from Phineas Finn, for instance, the narrator’s multiple 
suppositions that Phineas’s past experiences with Laura “should have sufficed” to predict 
her reaction to his new suit provide both a interpretation of the protagonist’s thoughts and a 
reminder of what the protagonist—and the reader—ought to “know” about Lady Laura’s 
character by this point in the narrative.103   
Further, these passages highlight thought report’s deftness at portraying the 
intersection of multiple fictional minds: Phineas’s and Palliser’s represented thoughts 
spring from projections and recollections about Lady Laura and Lady Glencora’s mental 
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states.  We therefore find ample evidence here of what Overton identifies as Trollope’s 
commitment to illustrating “the individual mind…bathed in the vision of the community” 
(“Interior View,” 497).  Not only does Trollope show us what Phineas or Palliser thinks, 
but he also characterizes their thinking processes as inseparable from whatever thoughts or 
feelings other characters (Glencora or Laura, society at large, the narrator’s “I”) might have 
in reference to them.  The second passage’s allusion to “the respect of all good men” points 
up this collective aspect of thought report by evoking what Palmer calls an “[e]xpression of 
consensus” operating within Palliser’s social circles, at the same time that the narrator’s “it 
may be said” confers an additional layer of judgment on Palliser’s character (83). 
Insofar as the illustration of fictional minds through thought report is inherently 
multiple, it seems to follow that those novels, like Trollope’s, which foreground thought 
report ought to create a distinctly heterogeneous and multi-vocal depth-effect.  But the 
lukewarm critical reception to Trollope’s formal achievement suggests, instead, that those 
novels which foreground a “social” conception of thinking by relying heavily on the 
reported thought of many characters often register as thinner or more trivial than those 
which privilege the “subjective first” interiority of a single, verbally sophisticated 
character.  As I discussed in the Introduction, Deidre Lynch has shown how fictional 
attention to the inner self (rather than the visible, public self) became the hallmark not 
only of deep characters, but also of the deep human beings who read about them 
(Economy, 142).  One result of this shift in readerly focus, therefore, is the canonization 
of those novels that enshrine the contemplative character: in particular, subjective first 
presentation of consciousness remains a common element among many canonical 
nineteenth-century development novels (Emma, The Portrait of a Lady, The Mill on the 
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Floss, The Red and the Black, and so on), since Bildungsromane tend to orient 
themselves around individual, “intellectual” protagonists.  While contemporary readers 
and literary critics have by no means neglected Trollope, very few, it appears, would 
claim for his novels the classic status that is regularly conferred upon the latter works.104   
 The relative intensification of social thinking throughout the Palliser novels 
underpins the common designation of Trollope as a respectable but nonetheless second-
tier Victorian novelist at the same time that it helps explain the lack of reader sympathy 
we find in reference to some of the series’s most prominent characters.  We are now in an 
even better position to observe how the The Spectator’s sympathy for Phineas is 
contingent upon the “depth” that springs from a kind of individual, “private,” and 
subjective first introspection that Phineas’s represented thought conspicuously lacks, and 
we can also see how Trollope’s reliance upon thought report contributes to Miller’s 
suspicion of the “ordinating” narrator whose conspicuousness seems to sap the novels’ 
characters of their interior “diversity.”  But while many such readers—both Victorian and 
contemporary—form sympathetic associations with subjective first interiority and 
thereby construe free indirect discourse or inner speech as the highest and “deepest” 
aesthetic representations of consciousness, it is less evident that Trollope’s work 
illustrates such a bias.  Instead, Trollope’s recurrent failure to get sympathy for his 
characters is due in part to his novels’ formal and moral devaluing of this dominant, 
individually restricted, and verbally articulate type of fictional thought.   
While I do not mean to suggest that Trollope’s work portrays some kind of one-
to-one correspondence between subjective first interiority and moral turpitude, I do want 
to draw attention to how the Palliser series presents thought report less as an inferior 
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version of introspection than as a narrative alternative to private self-consciousness which 
yields its own unexpected benefits.  In particular, thought report provides Trollope with a 
formal vehicle through which to express the interior indecision that befalls so many of his 
characters.  In the Palliser series alone, Phineas struggles for hundreds of pages both over 
deciding which of his female admirers (Lady Laura Standish, Violet Effingham, Madame 
Max Goesler or Mary Flood Jones) would best suit his nuptial purposes, and over 
whether or not he should side with his party or his individual conscience in Parliamentary 
debates.  Madame Goesler herself undergoes a drawn-out period of indecision after the 
aging Duke of Omnium proposes marriage, and, in The Eustace Diamonds (1873), Frank 
Greystock dithers for the length of the entire novel about whether to stick to his 
engagement to Lucy Morris or to throw his fiancé over for Lizzie Eustace and her riches.  
While it would certainly be possible to depict these vacillations through subjective first 
renderings of isolated self-searching, the illustration of indecision through thought report 
helps distinguish the intersubjectivity underlying Trollope’s represented thought.  In 
Trollope’s novels, interior indecision arises when one character’s thoughts become 
entangled with the thoughts of another, whether that “other” is the abstracted mentality of 
society, the heterodiegetic narrator, one or more particular, intradiegetic characters, or all 
of these mental “thinkers” operating at once.  Thought report’s capacity for embedding 
multiple thinkers and multiple lines of thought offers an ideal formal channel through 
which to narrate the push and pull of numerous, divergent mental forces.     
Indecision (or any of its companion expressions: vacillation, irresolution, 
suspension) is far from just a convenient plot template Trollope imposes upon his 
characters.  Rather, we can construe indecision as a broad discursive practice that 
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permeates the behavioral norm of many individual characters, the form and content of the 
narrator’s rhetoric, and the unfolding of storylines throughout the Palliser novels.  Most 
importantly, indecision offers Trollope a mode of narratively presenting the process of 
thinking which diverges not only from the typical form of subjective first introspection, 
but also from the moral luster it acquires in “deeper” novels like Austen’s or James’s.  
Stephen Wall discusses the phenomenon of Trollope’s “vacillating” characters in detail, 
arguing that “[d]oubt, hesitation and changeableness seemed to Trollope so fundamental 
to human nature” (282) that his characters’ indecision “often seems to function as the 
guarantee of their authenticity” (147).105  It follows, I contend, that Trollope’s novels 
construe the interior certainty that other, more critically acclaimed novels hold out as the 
goal of introspection as less realistic than the comparatively messy, protracted, and 
uncertain process of indecision.  Though thought report—the form Trollopian indecision 
most often takes—might initially seem less “authentic” than introspection because it 
emanates from the mediating voice of a third-person narrator rather than from the 
character’s “own words,” its authenticity lies in its suggestion that all mental functions 
are, in fact, socially mediated.  The reality of socially mediated thought, in turn, promises 
that few, if any, solitary epiphanies (like Emma’s discovery of “the whole truth” about 
her love for Mr. Knightley) can ever occur, since lasting epiphanies about one’s own 
character become difficult when the thoughts and feelings of others immediately qualify 
and conflict with whatever conclusions one draws. Trollope’s attention to indecision 
therefore demonstrates a kind of mental functioning that is based less on knowing and 
mastery and more on speculation and guessing, on a process of thinking that, while 
persistent, does not always offer the means toward a desired end.  Further, Trollope’s 
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suspicion of conclusive “knowing” finds support in the unhappy fates of precipitously 
decisive characters such as Emily Lopez and Laura Kennedy, whose determination to 
wed questionable suitors winds up landing them in disastrous marriages.  Trollope’s most 
blatant portrayal of “knowing” gone awry occurs outside the Palliser series, when, in He 
Knew He Was Right (1869) Louis Trevelyan’s unwavering—and unfounded—conviction 
that his wife is cheating amplifies the irony of the novel’s title.106  In the latter case, 
Trollope suggests that a little less self-assurance may have ended up preserving 
Trevelyan’s sanity, as well as his life. 
On the other side of the coin, the most supremely indecisive character in 
Trollope’s oeuvre is Alice Vavasor, to whose romantic hesitation and false starts Trollope 
devotes the principal storyline as well as the titular plea of Can You Forgive Her? (1865). 
The following section will illustrate how Trollope’s poetics of narrative indecision 
frustrates the novel’s vigorous evocation of sympathy for its characteristically uncertain 
protagonist.  And, as we will see, Trollope’s focus on thinking over knowing does not 
spare the narrator himself, who frequently proves just as indecisive as the characters he 
depicts.  Exploring the particular style of thought report that dominates Can You Forgive 
Her? will therefore continue to offer a portrait of Trollope that challenges his reputation 
for sympathetic characterization, a reputation that Trollope himself helped to create.  But 
while Trollopian indecision compromises the author’s avowed sympathetic aims, it 
nevertheless wields an immensely productive force within the larger formal context of the 
long novel series that Can You Forgive Her? begins. 
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Can You Forgive Her?: Indecision and the Sympathy Plea 
 “Poor Alice!” cries the narrator of Can You Forgive Her?, “I hope that she may 
be forgiven.  It was her special fault, that when at Rome she longed for Tibur, and when 
at Tibur she regretted Rome” (I.149).  The Tibur and Rome in question are two suitors: 
John Grey, an older, established gentleman from Cambridgeshire, and George Vavasor, a 
selfish, roué cousin with whom Alice had previously carried on a youthful romance.  At 
the time the novel opens, Alice is engaged to Grey, much to the satisfaction of everyone 
in her family but George himself and his sister, Kate.  After taking a trip abroad with the 
aforementioned cousins, the protagonist breaks off the engagement entirely and, soon 
after that, she becomes engaged to George.  But, as George gradually shows himself to be 
even more of a “wild man” than she had imagined, Alice jilts him in turn and her feelings 
for Grey begin to blossom again.  At the very end of the novel, after eight hundred or so 
pages of hemming and hawing, Alice finally marries the gentleman from 
Cambridgeshire, for whom she had been intended since the very beginning.  In addition, 
the narrative of Alice’s indecision is flanked by subplots about other women—Arabella 
Greenow and Lady Glencora Palliser—who, like Alice, are each engaged in a painstaking 
negotiation between the appeals of two different suitors. 
 The narrator of Can You Forgive Her? is exceptionally opinionated, even within 
the already vociferous pantheon of Trollopian narrators.  The novel’s title gives a good 
indication of the legalistic appeals that will follow throughout its pages: Alice Vavasor 
has done an “offence against the world,” (I.1) which the narrator attempts over and over 
to redress.  This first Palliser installment does not simply ask the reader to forgive the 
impertinence or supposed immorality with which Alice jilts John Grey and George 
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Vavasor by turns, but, more importantly, begs forgiveness for her profuse and often 
inscrutable indecision itself.  The following entreaty, one of many such, is representative 
of the narrator’s defensive strategy: 
But can you forgive her, delicate reader? Or am I asking the 
question too early in my story?  For myself, I have forgiven her.  
The story of the struggle has been present to my mind for many 
years,--and I have learned to think that even this offence against 
womanhood may, with deep repentance, be forgiven.  And you 
also must forgive her before we close the book, or else my story 
will have been told amiss. (I.384). 
 
The narrator goes after sympathy in this passage by creating a relationship with the reader 
through direct address: one effect of this tactic is to position reader, narrator, and 
character on equal footing—“we’re all people here”—and to thereby gain the same 
forgiveness for Alice that we might grant to ourselves or one of our friends.  Where 
novels with less ostentatious narrators might pretend to leave the question of sympathy 
up to us, it becomes more difficult here, as a reader, to refuse sympathy when the issue is 
pushed so ceremoniously to the fore.  But even within a few lines, the tenor of the 
reader/narrator relationship changes, as the narrator alternately morphs from a flattering 
supplicant (“delicate reader”) into an anxious dictator (“you must also forgive her”): we 
are asked if we can forgive Alice, then told that we have to.107  Lest we arrive too 
precipitously at our judgment of Alice, however, the narrator assures us that forgiveness, 
in the current case, takes ample time.  Indeed, he himself has struggled “many years” 
before coming to his own conclusion, and our own sympathy will only be demanded after 
we spend the amount it of time it takes to read Trollope’s novel (considerable indeed) 
considering Alice’s predicament.  The novel draws a structural parallel between the 
reader and the protagonist, since both are granted a lengthy period of indecisiveness.  Can 
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You Forgive Her? therefore guarantees the proliferation of several different levels of 
thinking: its narrator concludes, after much thinking, that his reader will have to think 
extensively about Alice’s own extensive thinking in order feel the sympathy for the ways 
in which thinking has gotten Alice into trouble.  Compare this Byzantine configuration of 
internal vacillation—structurally underwritten by thought report’s quality of cognitive 
multiplicity—to the solitary, introspective thinking we found in Emma, whose 
protagonist needs but “a few minutes” for the decision she must make to “[dart] through 
her, with the speed of an arrow.”  Can You Forgive Her? does not claim that we owe 
Alice sympathy because she finally finds the “correct” solution to her problems, but 
rather, suggests that vacillating along with Alice will teach us to realize the difficulty—
and even the undesirability—of reaching tidy conclusions.   
 Despite the substantial efforts to evoke sympathy in Can You Forgive Her?—
efforts that this small passage can only begin to suggest—there is abundant evidence that 
many of the novel’s readers, throughout both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
could not bring themselves to forgive Alice Vavasor.  In a famously catty review of the 
novel, Henry James quips, “Can we forgive Miss Vavasor?  Of course we can, and forget 
her, too, for that matter” (qtd. in Smalley, 249).  And even later, in what is ostensibly a 
memorial portrait of Trollope’s writerly achievements, James singles out the novel’s 
protagonist for derision: where characters from The Warden (1855) such as Septimus 
Harding and Archdeacon Grantly are “admirable” (112), “Alice Vavasor,” he writes, 
“does not command herself particularly to our affections” (128).  Mary Hamer echoes 
this sentiment nearly a hundred years later, writing that when it comes to Alice, “our 
sympathy is baffled” (121).  Interestingly, Hamer attributes her indifference to Alice’s 
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plight to the one-sidedness of the narrator’s sympathy pleas; we might be more willing to 
identify with Alice if Trollope “had been able to present her difficulties in such a way 
that more ambivalence of response was encouraged” (121).  But, Hamer suggests, the 
overwhelming demand for our forgiveness—and consequent refusal to seriously entertain 
the possibility that forgiveness might not be granted—ends up leaving modern readers 
cold. 
 No one, perhaps, was harder on Alice Vavasor than Trollope himself.  The 
Eustace Diamonds, published nearly a decade after Can You Forgive Her?, contains a 
scene in which Lizzie Eustace, Lucinda Roanoke, and Mrs. Carbuncle attend a play 
called The Noble Jilt at the Haymarket.  As many of Trollope’s original readers might 
have known, The Noble Jilt was the title of an unsuccessful play that Trollope himself 
had written in 1850.  While its characters’ names were different (the heroine was called 
Margaret, not Alice) and its action was set in the 1790’s, The Noble Jilt would later 
provide the storyline upon which Can You Forgive Her? was based.  Far from name-
dropping his own work to get free publicity, however, Trollope references The Noble Jilt 
only to deride it, in what seems like an apology for his characters.  The narrator remarks: 
“The play, as a play, was a failure…On their way home Mrs. Carbuncle declared that 
Minnie Talbot had done her very best with such a part as Margaret, but that the character 
afforded no scope for sympathy” (ED 504).  Years later, Trollope’s implication that the 
failure of The Noble Jilt was tied to the less-than-agreeable character of its protagonist 
reappears, albeit softened, in reference to his characterization of Alice Vavasor.  While 
the author claimed that Can You Forgive Her? was one of his finest works overall, he 
regretted in his Autobiography (1883) that “[t]he character of the girl is carried through 
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with considerable strength, but is not attractive” (110).  More telling even than this 
admission, however, is the lack of prominence that Trollope affords to Alice within his 
comments on the novel.  He focuses instead on his love for the characters of Plantagenet 
and Glencora Palliser, hardly referring to the novel’s central character except as “the 
girl.”   
 Trollope never exactly explains why Alice is “not attractive” to him, though 
perhaps he ultimately favored Mrs. Carbuncle’s position that “[t]he delicacy of the 
female character should not admit of hesitation between two men” (ED 506).  Focusing 
less on the expectations placed on female character in the Victorian period (which, as 
Kate Flint has suggested, are unlikely to deter the sympathy of the novel’s current 
readers),108 or on James’s contrasting assertion that Alice is forgettable because she has 
committed no crime at all, I propose that we think of the failure of Trollope’s sympathy 
pleas as the result of the overall discursive preoccupation with indecision that informs 
Can You Forgive Her? at the level of character (Alice, Glencora, Mrs. Greenow) and of 
third-person narration.  Where Trollope’s more recent critics have yet to hypothesize any 
sort of link between indecision and sympathy—two of the author’s most ubiquitous 
topics—we can find the germ of such a connection in the following unfavorable 
evaluation of Can You Forgive Her?, published anonymously in The Saturday Review on 
August 19, 1865: 
If some of the pains which the author bestows on writing out 
endless little items and details were given to the careful conception 
of a plot and a story, his novels would have more pretension to art, 
and would therefore be more likely to live.  Even if nothing were 
sacrificed for it, this infinite particularity of description is 
sometimes carried to a tedious extreme.  Alice’s vacillations, and 
the way in which she argued out all sorts of little points in her own 
mind, and the way in which John Grey and George Vavasor argued 
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out little points in their own minds, are treated with a minuteness 
which at times becomes downright tedious (qtd. in Smalley, 242). 
 
The well-worn critical complaint about the relative plotlessness of Trollope’s novels here 
becomes more incisive than usual insofar as its author does not seek to counterbalance 
this negative point about plot with a positive one about character.  The Saturday Review’s 
critic argues instead that the very “endless little items and details” which ostensibly 
contribute to Trollope’s characterological realism are a “tedious” detriment to the 
author’s art.  Internal “vacillation” in particular, on Alice’s part as well as the part of 
more minor characters, grates on the reviewer’s nerves enough to bear the brunt of his 
irony: the dilatory internal process that Trollope uses to reveal the sympathetic 
motivations behind character actually ends up estranging those readers it is meant to draw 
in.  One assumption behind The Saturday Review’s critique, therefore, is that the 
sympathetic effect which represented thought produces is proportional not simply to the 
novel’s focus or preoccupation with characters’ mental states, but to the particular formal 
quality of its presentation.  Trollopian interiority is “tedious” because, despite its nearly 
unparalleled proliferation, it hardly goes anywhere: represented thought is not deployed 
to propel a decision that would advance the plot (as it often does in classic Victorian 
development novels like David Copperfield and Jane Eyre), but to ostentatiously defer 
one.109  Characterological indecision thus contributes to this reviewer’s sense of tedium 
because it doesn’t seem to be working toward anything other than its own repetition.  
 The following passage of thought report from Can You Forgive Her?, in which 
Alice argues “all sorts of little points in her own mind,” showcases several specific ways 
in which indecision renders aimless both the protagonist and her story: 
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She was not quite pleased with herself in having accepted John 
Grey,—or rather perhaps was not satisfied with herself in having 
loved him. In her many thoughts on the subject, she always 
admitted to herself that she had accepted him simply because she 
loved him;—that she had given her quick assent to his quick 
proposal simply because he had won her heart. But she was 
sometimes almost angry with herself that she had permitted her 
heart to be thus easily taken from her, and had rebuked herself for 
her girlish facility. But the marriage would be at any rate 
respectable (I.13-14). 
 
Like the characteristic excerpt of Trollope’s third-person narration I cited previously, this 
selection from Can You Forgive Her? is illustrative of Alice’s represented thought 
insofar as it can be found, with predictable variation as to names and contexts, throughout 
the entire text.  Trollope depicts Alice’s vacillation even at the level of syntax, inserting 
hyphens in order to mimic the pauses that precede her multiple reconsiderations and 
requalifications of her own feelings.  Though she loves Grey, Alice is “not quite pleased” 
with her behavior, and though the marriage will be “respectable,” she admits to herself, in 
a typically hesitant formulation, that she is “sometimes almost angry” when she thinks 
about her betrothal.  Just as Alice’s train of thought seems to be moving in one direction, 
it abruptly heads in another, as the clumsy “But” that begins final two sentences attests.   
 While such a demonstration of Alice’s questionable decision-making skills 
provides ample evidence for The Saturday Review’s charge of descriptive monotony, it 
nonetheless emphasizes the value which both the protagonist as a character and 
Trollope’s narrative discourse more generally accord to the expenditure of time through 
dilatory thinking.  Alice here chides herself less for accepting Grey than for accepting 
him too precipitously, her “quick assent” acting as a testament to her “girlish facility.”  
Prefiguring the modern-day proponents of romantic “Rules” who advise marriageable 
women not to seem overeager in the face of male desire, she wonders whether she 
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shouldn’t have spent a little longer playing hard to get.  That Alice’s initially prompt 
acquiescence to Grey’s proposal should indicate her immaturity—her girlishness—
further accentuates one of the many ways in which Can You Forgive Her? equates 
maturity with the suspension of choice.  It is not action, but the long passage of waiting 
time in which vacillation makes action impossible, that marks the development of the 
central character. 
 But however much Alice’s inability to make up her mind might “mature” her 
within Trollope’s novel, it also discourages Trollope’s readers from making up their 
mind(s) about her.  Because Alice constantly volleys between one choice and another, the 
sympathetic connection between reader and character that the novel insists is crucial to its 
own success becomes difficult to sustain.  It is hard to understand the very character with 
whom we are told to sympathize when the object of our sympathy is, in the words of 
another 1860 review, such a “faint and misty centre” (qtd. in Smalley, 245).  Just as Alice 
cannot make up her mind whether to accept Grey or Vavasor, the very motivations 
behind Alice’s vacillation are constantly shifting, even with regard to the same suitor.  In 
the case of John Grey, we are told first that Alice resents the engagement because she 
feels she accepted him too fast, only to later learn that it is her “ambition” that holds her 
back from settling down.  But lest the protagonist’s ambition help steer her toward a more 
definite course, the narrator insists that this ambition itself is “undefined”: though she 
fears that life in Cambridgeshire will offer her “no scope for action,” Alice “did not 
herself know what she meant by action” (I.110).   
It might be argued that we do not need to “know” Alice’s motivations entirely 
because the aim of the novel, as its narrator stresses so clearly in its opening, is to have 
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sympathy for the condition of Alice’s vacillation itself.  I do not mean to suggest that no 
reader has ever been sympathetic to Alice’s tendency to waver.  Instead, I wish to 
emphasize how our sympathy for Alice, if it does exist, must endure in spite of the 
techniques of indecision through which the narrator repeatedly derails his own sympathy-
getting project   Where the novel at once uses the moralizing voice to position indecision 
as a value, it quickly disrupts this advocacy by arguing the opposite point.  Take, for 
instance, the following narratorial claim that Alice was “over-prudent in calculating the 
chances of her happiness and of [Grey’s]” (I.112):  
I am not sure, however, that marriage may not be pondered over 
too much; nor do I feel certain that the leisurely repentance does 
not as often follow the leisurely marriages as it does the rapid 
ones…That Alice Vavasor had thought too much about it, I feel 
quite sure. She had gone on thinking of it till she had filled herself 
with a cloud of doubts which even the sunshine of love was unable 
to drive from her heavens…But she had gone on thinking of the 
matter till her mind had become filled with some undefined idea of 
the importance to her of her own life. What should a woman do 
with her life? There had arisen round her a flock of learned ladies 
asking that question, to whom it seems that the proper answer has 
never yet occurred. Fall in love, marry the man, have two children, 
and live happy ever afterwards. I maintain that answer has as much 
wisdom in it as any other that can be given;—or perhaps more 
(I.109-110). 
 
Again the primarily third-person narrator brings in the first-person pronoun to solidify his 
friendly confidence with the reader, but instead of evoking this relationship to bolster our 
sympathy for Alice’s plight, he uses it to repeatedly criticize Alice’s indecision.  The 
protagonist’s major fault, it turns out, is her tendency to think “too much” and for too 
long rather than settling down with the first decent man who comes along. This 
prescription for happiness obviously illustrates Trollope’s attachment to conventional 
gender roles, and has justifiably tested the sympathy of feminist critics who attempt to 
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understand how the author’s stated aversion to intellectual women could differ so 
markedly from his sensitive portraits of the free-thinking female characters (such as 
Alice, Mrs. Greenow, or Madame Goesler).110  In addition, the narrator’s remarks 
contradict the prescription for character development we often find in nineteenth-century 
Bildungsromane, which dictates that protagonists must use their superior intellects to 
defy received traditions and to carve out their own unique spaces in the world of the 
story.  But even if we allow Trollope’s narrator his stereotypically Victorian notions 
about which behaviors should make women happy or his divergence from the novelistic 
paradigms that link character development with convention-challenging thought, his 
remarks here, which suggest that Alice’s vacillation is unwise, directly oppose his earlier 
suggestions that vacillation characterizes mature, sympathetic individuals. The novel’s 
use of the same tone of moralistic imperative both to praise vacillation as a value and to 
disparage it as an unproductive practice works to confuse our sympathies, since it 
emphatically encourages us to respond both positively and negatively to Alice’s 
characteristic behavior.  This tension between opposing conceptions of vacillation itself 
produces a kind of higher-level indecision within the rhetorical background structured by 
the narrator’s third-person voice: the narrator, in short, vacillates on the subject of 
vacillation.  He therefore effectively criticizes Alice for employing his own narrative 
strategy of taking up a large amount of time by repeatedly deferring decisions.  And the 
passage’s reliance on thought report, which allows the unresolved ambitions of a whole 
“flock of learned ladies” to conflict with the narrator’s command that Alice live “happily 
ever after,” underscores the fact that his is only one amidst a cacophony of opinions.  
While such a mise en abyme advances the production of the series insofar as it puts off 
    
 162
narrative closure as well, it also risks deferring—or even defusing—both the 
conventional character development that results from enduring irrevocable decisions and 
the sympathy of those readers who are willing to wait for Alice to eventually undergo this 
revelatory development process.  
As might be expected, Trollope addresses the tension between valuing and 
devaluing indecision less through moments of resolution than through the multiplication 
of various operations of irresolution throughout his texts.  Take, for example, the contrast 
produced in the previous passage by its juxtaposition of moral imperatives (“Fall in love, 
marry the man”; “I feel quite sure”) with assertions of not knowing (“I am not sure”).  
The Trollopian narrator’s frequent, almost characteristic assertion of his own imperfect 
knowledge show up everywhere throughout the Palliser novels, often playing on some 
variation of the statement “I think”: in the first volume of Can You Forgive Her? alone, 
the narrator declares that “I am disposed to think” (I.87); “I believe” (I.123); “I think very 
probable” (I.128-29); “I am inclined to think” (I.155); and “I am, however, inclined to 
believe” (I.345).  While Wall has argued that such formulations “imply the achievement 
of that familiarity with a character’s interior life which it is the overriding purpose of 
Trollope’s art to promote” (375), I read Trollope’s “I think,” on the contrary, as an 
indication that the “achievement” of total familiarity between narrator and characters is 
far from certain. To the degree that Alice’s internal disposition remains perpetually 
undecided—full of what this passage calls “undefined idea[s]”—it can never be fully 
known, though it can be the subject of endless speculation.  This commitment to 
uncertainty becomes clearer when we contrast it with the rhetoric of those nineteenth-
century narrators who demonstrate pretensions to omniscience, such as the narrator of 
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Balzac’s Comédie humaine, whose system of characterization is built upon categorical 
maxims that showcase his interpretive dexterity.  That Trollope’s narrator should harp on 
his own partial knowledge about different characters—rather than simply sticking to 
knowing, declarative statements that define character in one or another way—reaffirms 
the novel’s structural reliance on indecision to avoid the both the fantasy of 
epistemological certitude and the temporal economy of snap judgments.  “Thinking” 
about character over the course of a novel (or in the case of the Palliser series, over many 
novels) takes up more deliberative time than simply knowing and cataloguing 
characteristics from the beginning, and it thereby emphasizes the difficult process of 
cognition rather than focusing on cognition’s end result or reward.  So where he might 
provide a resolute counterpoint to his characters’ vacillations, the Palliser series’ third-
person narrator more often relies on thought report to add his own waffling into the mix. 
Along with the narrator’s refusal to directly characterize his central characters, his 
occasional avowals of not being able to fully depict a given situation further contribute to 
the atmosphere of indecision that permeates the Palliser novels.  Of The Eustace 
Diamonds’ Sir Griffin, for example, the narrator remarks, “[w]hat could have been the 
man’s own idea of his future married life, how can any reader be made to understand, or 
any writer adequately describe!” (489), and he performs similar rhetorical hand-wringing 
with regard to Alice Vavasor: “How am I to analyse her mind, and make her thoughts and 
feelings intelligible to those who may care to trouble themselves with the study? (I.383). 
The latter admission of descriptive weakness throws the stated purpose of the novel (i.e., 
acquiring forgiveness for its protagonist) into suspense, as the narrator questions his 
fitness to take on the role of persuasive storyteller that he elsewhere so imperiously 
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assumes.  By bringing his own apparent anxieties to the fore and thereby suggesting that 
we, whom he addresses, should have sympathy for his narratorial inadequacy, he risks 
creating a competition in which he vies for reader sympathy with Alice.  Such a narrative 
maneuver leaves the reader herself ample opportunity to vacillate not only over whether 
to trust a narrator who doubts his own abilities, but also over who (narrator or character) 
is the proper object of sympathy in the first place.  Further, the narrator’s professed 
inability to narrate effectively highlights the novel’s suspicion of verbal lucidity.  As 
Kendrick points out, Trollope’s novels continually imply that passionate feeling is 
stronger than any turn of phrase which would attempt to express it: “the truth of feeling is 
always described as resistant to the articulate analyses and deductions that characterize 
‘thinking’” (92).  Where novels with a primarily subjective first perspective might 
consider the meticulous analysis of feeling as indispensable to the evocation of 
characterological depth, Trollope suggests that the deepest feelings actually resist such 
verbal inventory. 
The form of each of the previous two narratorial apologies—the rhetorical 
question—is one of Trollope’s favorite persuasive techniques, since it allows him that 
direct address to the reader that I have suggested is integral to his sympathetic mission.  
The rhetorical question is the structural medium through which Trollope frames his 
habitual performance of what Miller calls “tolerance” through variations on the question 
“Which of us has not…?,” thus “assimilating individual delinquencies to the general 
ways of humankind” (Novel, 135).  But far from merely functioning as a sympathetic 
device, the rhetorical question exhibits its tactical versatility throughout all of the Palliser 
novels.  Though it features most prominently in Can You Forgive Her?, whose very title 
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bears its imprint, Trollope uses the rhetorical question, for example, to emphasize 
Phineas’s uncertainty about the morality of his relationship to Lady Laura Kennedy (“On 
which side lay strength of character and on which side weakness?  Was he strong or was 
she?”[PR I.176]), and to convey the collective voice of society gossip (“Of what nature 
would be the meeting between Lord Fawn and his promised bride?” [ED 160]).  What 
binds together these disparate uses of the rhetorical question, I contend, is its miniature, 
sentence-level rendering of the overall mood of vacillation that pervades Trollope’s novel 
series.  As Randall Craig explains, “the rhetorical question engenders contradiction, for it 
is subject to mutually exclusive interpretations—one literal and one figurative” (219).111 
The rhetorical question, functioning as both query and statement, enacts the tension 
between decision and indecision that characterizes figures like Alice Vavasor, Phineas 
Finn, and Frank Greystock, as well as structuring the discourse of a third-person narrator 
who struggles to be at once convincingly decisive and realistically insecure about the 
story he tells.  Pointing in two different directions, eternally yes and no at the same time, 
the rhetorical question suggests an answer but never definitively delivers one, thus yet 
again allowing Trollope’s narrative to moralize while ostensibly refusing the confidence 
of moral declaration.  So while the rhetorical question works to procure sympathy, it also 
necessarily estranges it, leaving sympathetic judgment up to the reader, on the one hand, 
but also demanding our assent to the judgment it tacitly supports.  The rhetorical question 
is, finally, a trope that answers perfectly to the poetics of the novel series, which must 
enforce closure (in the form of installment endings) only to defy it once again in 
subsequent installments. 
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The formal strategy of indecision we find throughout Can You Forgive Her?—in 
which the narrative continually volleys between sympathetic and critical assessments of 
vacillation itself—resists not only the tidy closure we might expect from conventional 
nineteenth-century plotlines, but also the type of change-centered character development 
with which such closures classically coincide.  Like Plantagenet Palliser, Alice Vavasor 
does not change so much as she simply gives up in the end of Trollope’s novel:  “Of 
course she had no choice but to yield. He, possessed of power and force infinitely greater 
than hers, had left her no alternative but to be happy” (II.355).  That Alice must be forced 
into happiness proves that this is no happiness at all; as Sharon Marcus writes, “[t]he 
marriage that promises to liberate Alice from the circular indecision in which she has 
trapped herself encloses her even more thoroughly in John’s power” (248).  The state of 
nuptial elation that finalizes character development in novels like David Copperfield and 
Jane Eyre thus becomes what Can You Forgive Her? calls an “enforced necessity” 
(II.361), serving as a provisional finish to both the heroine’s developmental trajectory and 
the ending of this part of the Palliser series.  Further, Alice’s final assent to Grey’s 
proposal illustrates yet another figuration of literary character development as loss insofar 
as it eliminates the power of “choice” which manifests itself through her resistance to 
decision making.  Choosing to marry Grey effectively ensures that the potential for 
choice on which vacillation is based is no longer an option.  Hence Glencora’s remark to 
the protagonist—“I know that it is quite a misery to you that you should be made a happy 
woman of at last” (II.359)—seems more discerning than playful.  The depiction of 
Alice’s submission to forces beyond her control only awkwardly passes for the kind of 
characterological change it purports to represent.  
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But if Alice’s loss of recourse to an “alternative” renders her happiness lukewarm, 
neither does it incite the kind of tragic crescendo we saw in the finales of Corinne and 
The Mill on the Floss, in which both Staël’s and Eliot’s protagonists were formally 
sacrificed so that their moral character(s) could remain untainted by the compromise of 
change. That Alice’s final feelings lie somewhere in the middle of the already 
abbreviated emotional continuum available to Trollope’s characters (“She was happy, 
though she was slow to confess her happiness to herself” [II.358]) indicates that the 
choice into which she is pushed at the end of Can You Forgive Her? only dulls—but does 
not destroy—the internal tension that keeps this particular novel going.  If we view it as 
the inaugural installment in a novel series rather than a free-standing novel, Can You 
Forgive Her? holds out the possibility of Alice’s further development in the five 
substantial novels that follow it.  Alice’s role as Lady Glencora’s foremost confidante, in 
fact, suggests that she, like Glencora, will play a substantial part in the Palliser series.  
But, unlike any of the novels’ other protagonists, Alice hardly shows up ever again, and 
when she does appear, it is merely in passing, as “Mrs. Grey.”  Instead, Madame Max 
Goesler, whom Trollope introduces midway through Phineas Finn, takes the place that 
seemed, in the previous novel, to be carved out for Alice: she becomes both Glencora’s 
closest friend, and acts as Palliser’s counselor after Glencora dies (not to mention 
marrying Phineas in the process).   
So why, after spending so many pages detailing Alice’s vacillating conscience, 
and after suggesting that her marriage is only an artificial kind of closure, does Trollope 
proceed to make Alice vanish into near-anonymity upon marrying?  While any definite 
answer to this question is obviously unknowable, I want to suggest that Alice’s 
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disappearance relates, on several different levels, to her propensity for indecision.  First, 
as we have seen, Alice’s extended refusal to choose between two suitors, coupled with 
the narrator’s own refusal to commit to one or another moral stance relative to Alice’s 
vacillating behavior, rendered her unsympathetic to many documented readers (and, I 
would imagine, to many undocumented ones as well).  Trollope’s own agreement that 
Alice was not drawn as sympathetically as she might have been therefore provides one 
compelling reason for his relative excision of her character from the series after its first 
volume.  But bringing back Alice as a major character in subsequent narratives would not 
only risk further alienating the sympathies of the Palliser novels’ readers.  Were Trollope 
to depict Alice after she surrenders to Grey, he would have to illustrate her as so changed 
as to be unrecognizable, since her character, throughout Can You Forgive Her?, is built 
upon her resistance to the developmental changes that her ultimate decision-making 
incurs.  Making a choice effectively brings Alice to a dead end, especially since, as a 
female protagonist in a Victorian novel, choosing whom (or whether or not) to marry is 
characterized as the most important and self-defining of actions.  Any substantial 
depiction of Alice as “Mrs. Grey” would compromise the inertia of character that her 
indecision ensured throughout Can You Forgive Her?  Ever respectful of his characters, 
Trollope remains faithful to Alice’s desire to suspend choice by refusing to depict the 
inevitable changes that her decision implies—not the least of which is ultimate 
submission to another’s will and the concomitant removal of indecision as a 
characterological possibility.   
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Indecision and Serial Development 
If indecision, as both a theme and a formal practice, allows Trollope a way to 
narrativize the aimless machinations of his characters’ thinking, it also provides an 
organizing concept for the novel series, which formally refuses closure until its last 
possible moment.  Trollopian indecision is thus encompassed by the narrative 
phenomenon Miller calls the “narratable,” that is, “the instances of disequilibrium, 
suspense, and general insufficiency from which a given narrative appears to arise” 
(Narrative, ix).  The narratable, according to Miller, seeks to avoid narrative closure 
despite its operation within the teleological confines of the nineteenth-century novel: 
“narrative attention,” he writes, “is distracted from what logically and culturally ‘ought’ 
to happen; and it is instead focused on what retards or frustrates the articulation of the 
scenario” (261).  If, as Robyn Warhol suggests, the novel series exaggerates the primary 
characteristics of the novel—that “the feelings that come with following a serial are the 
feelings associated with all narratives, only ‘more so’,” (72)—then the Palliser series’s 
panorama of indecision ought to offer an example of narratability writ exceptionally 
large.112 
The Palliser novels’ formal resistance to closure results in a construction of moral 
character development that, similarly, resists resolution: though vacillation allows 
Trollope to dedicate ample time to interior exposition, it actually lends a curious quality 
of inertia to his characters.  Character development, as Trollope’s novel series often 
presents it, is the result not of individual decision or action but simply of sustaining a 
state of cognitive paralysis that, paradoxically, throws narrative production and its 
representation of passing time into overdrive.  As Trollope spins out pages, his characters 
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seem forever to be spinning their wheels, only arriving at decisions when the end of a 
given novel dictates that something, anything, must be done.  This tendency of Trollope’s 
focus on characterological suspension to turn many of his characters into passive 
creatures is strikingly demonstrated, for example, in Alice’s reluctant submission at the 
ending of Can You Forgive Her? 
The characterological stasis of Trollope’s vacillators becomes most apparent 
when the narrator insists that they have, in fact, endured transformative changes.  Phineas 
Finn, whose namesake novels several critics have likened to a Bildungsroman despite the 
title character’s absence from a significant portion of the narrative, offers perhaps the 
most obvious example of this process.113  Phineas Redux (1874) sees Finn go through the 
ordeal of being locked in jail and very publicly tried for the murder of his adversary, Mr. 
Bonteen.  Once acquitted of the false accusations against him, Phineas reflects on the 
meaning of the experience:  
And now what should be his own future life?  One thing seemed 
certain to him.  He could never again go into the House of 
Commons, and sit there, an ordinary man of business, with other 
ordinary men.  He had been so hacked and hewn about, so exposed 
to the gaze of the vulgar, so mauled by the public, that he could 
never more be anything but the wretched being who had been tried 
for the murder of his enemy (II.244). 
 
Note here how Phineas focuses not on what kind of person he has become, or on what he 
has learned, but rather on what he can no longer do and on what has been done to him.  
The trial, and the enforced opportunities for introspection that his jail time offers, do not 
galvanize Phineas into reformatory action but, rather, convince him that he must forsake 
his political career.  Note also how Trollope’s language (“hacked and hewn 
about…mauled by the public”) positions Phineas as the inert object of those more active 
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forces of others.  Even the trial itself is based on something that Phineas didn’t do.  
Compare Finn’s legal proceedings to those of Julien Sorel, who shares many superficial 
qualities (physical beauty, political ambition, provincial origins) with Trollope’s Irish 
MP: where Julien is tried and executed for a deliberate, ostentatious action (shooting 
Mme de Rênal in the middle of a church), Phineas is simply in the wrong place at the 
wrong time and gets swept up in a dispute that hardly concerns him.  If Phineas changes 
at all from this experience, those changes are unwittingly thrust on him; he does not turn 
at the end of the novel, like Julien, into someone “strong and resolute, like a man who has 
seen clearly into his own soul”114 (Red and Black, 403), but rather devolves into a 
psychological and physical shadow of his former self. 
Though its scope is much grander, Plantagenet Palliser’s political trajectory 
resembles that of Phineas in terms of its concentration on a characterological change 
alleged to result from forces outside the control of a passive individual.  Palliser does not 
try to become Prime Minister of the Coalition government: he is essentially browbeaten 
into the position by the tripartite forces of his Liberal colleagues, his wife’s ambition, and 
his aristocratic pedigree.  The first words out of the Duchess’s mouth in The Prime 
Minister (1876)—“And what are they going to make you now?” (I.54)—attest to her 
husband’s docile position relative to the more dynamic figures that surround him.  No 
wonder that Palliser’s greatest fear is of being a “fainéant”—literally, a do-nothing, Prime 
Minister “from whom no real ministration was demanded” (I.303-304).  Though Palliser 
ostensibly occupies the position most disposed to action in all of Britain, his 
characteristic prudence causes an inability to act and a consequent portrait of indecision 
which occupies the bulk of the development story that The Prime Minister purports to 
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tell.115  The Duke is so frightened of making unwise political moves that he ends up 
making very few moves at all.  Palliser’s confidante, the Duke of St. Bungay, wisely 
remarks of his friend that “[t]here is such a thing as a conscience with so fine an edge that 
it will allow a man to do nothing” (I.75).  And Palliser’s eventual resignation from office 
prompts not a marked augmentation of the Duke’s character, but a gradual petering-out of 
all that potential for which he had previously been known: “[t]here could be nothing for 
him now till the insipidity of life should gradually fade away into the grave” (II.365).  As 
Overton notes, “[t]he central acts of both Phineas Finn and Plantagenet Palliser are 
resignations”(14); the characters’ most overt actions therefore serve to bring all other 
actions to a halt.    
The series’s placement of characters like Alice, Phineas and Palliser in a state of 
developmental suspension helps account for the relatively sober quality of Trollope’s 
prose in comparison with the vast affective spectrum we find throughout the 
Bildungsromane of Dickens, Charlotte Brontë, Eliot and Staël.  The length of the series—
its promise of continuation—effectively strips character development of both its exultant, 
revelatory quality (as in Jane Eyre or David Copperfield) or its tragic climax (as in 
Corinne or The Mill on the Floss).  Trollope’s ample use of thought report throughout 
contributes to this evenhanded tone, since thought report’s depiction of multiple, 
conflicting centers of consciousness prevents a single character’s interiority from running 
into unchecked excess.  But while this characteristically subdued affect might seem 
monotonous to some—most famously, as we have seen, to D.A. Miller—at least one 
critic has praised Trollope’s middling tone as an aesthetic asset when positioned within 
the context of the novel series.  Robyn Warhol argues that “[b]oredom is built into the 
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serial form.  It is a product of the familiarity, the formulaic nature, the predictability, and 
especially the repetitiveness of Trollope’s texts” (80). In this reading, the “boring” 
elements of Trollope’s prose create a tonal “counterbalance” to the suspense that would 
have originally accrued between the Palliser novels’ serial installments.  Boredom works, 
in other words, to pull serial readers back from emotional extremes to an affective 
middle, a state in which they will be primed for yet more ups and downs.  Warhol’s 
comments thus suggest another way that the serial cultivates a vacillating reader, whose 
“alternating and oscillating feelings” (81) resemble the internal tug-of-war that I have 
been describing with regard to Trollope’s indecisive characters. 
If formulaic prose helps facilitate the series’s habitual re-establishment of its 
readers’ affective equilibrium, so too does the static (and therefore, potentially “boring”) 
nature of recurring, serialized characters contribute to a sense of readerly comfort.  The 
device of recurring characters depends on our ability to recognize those characters as 
familiar presences across and between novels—that is, as figural beings who remain 
plausibly continuous with those we have met in previous installments.  Indeed, this 
familiarity with characters is one of the serial novel’s principal appeals: those who enjoy 
Trollope’s portrait of the irrepressible Lady Glencora, I strongly suspect, read on not so 
much to see whether or not she becomes more pious or restrained, but to delight in the 
fact that her character remains impervious to the various impediments it encounters.  She 
can only change minutely, insofar as she must remain, unquestionably, “our” Lady Glen: 
“Nothing,” Trollope’s narrator remarks reassuringly in the last line of Phineas Redux, 
“will ever change the Duchess” (360).  In the series, popularity and believability is built 
on this kind of stability, a stability which, as Laurie Langbauer argues, is bound up with 
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readers’ sense of the reliability and the rhythm—if also the banality—of everyday life 
itself.116  We read serials not so much to challenge our expectations, but to confirm and 
re-experience the same narrative elements that we already know we enjoy.117   
The comforting repetitiousness we find at both the level of plot and the level of 
character in the novel series, however, remains at odds with the series’s ostensible goal of 
chronicling the changes that a group of characters encounters as they interact and grow 
older: the form welcomes change, but many of the characters never seem to do it.  Here 
the difference in stances on character development between Trollope’s texts and Eliot’s 
and Staël’s Bildungsromane becomes apparent, insofar as the Palliser novels assert that 
change is precisely what they exhibit.  When discussing his methods of characterization, 
Trollope insists that the illustration of character development is especially important:  
In conducting these characters from one story to another I realized 
the necessity, not only of consistency,--which, had it been 
maintained by a hard exactitude, would have been untrue to 
nature,--but also of those changes which time always produces.  
There are, perhaps, but few of us who, after the lapse of ten years, 
will be found to have changed our chief characteristics.  The 
selfish man will still be selfish, and the false man false.  But our 
manner of showing or hiding these characteristics will be 
changed,--as also our power of adding to or diminishing their 
intensity.  It was my study that these people, as they grew in years, 
should encounter the changes which come upon us all; and I think 
that I have succeeded (Autobiography, 114). 
 
In writing Phineas Finn I had constantly before me the necessity of 
progression in character,--of marking the changes in men and 
women which would naturally be produced by the lapse of years.  
In most novels the writer can have no such duty, as the period 
occupied is not long enough to allow of the change of which I 
speak (ibid., 197). 
 
The sheer number of times Trollope uses various forms of the verb “change” in these two 
statements to describe what he wants to happen to his characters illustrates the strong 
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correlation the author sees between character development and transformation: to be a 
character in one of Trollope’s series novels, it seems, is to be susceptible to “the changes 
which come upon us all.”  Moreover, Trollope maintains in no uncertain terms that the 
progressive change he champions is the special province of the novel series: “most 
novels” do not attempt to cover a comparable “lapse of years,” nor do they follow 
characters “from one story to another” and so allow themselves to travel past the 
Victorian novel’s (and indeed, the Bildungsroman’s) typical endpoint at marriage in 
young adulthood.118  The novel series’s accommodation of a broader canvas on which to 
depict character therefore challenges the tighter focus on youth that scholars like Moretti 
cite as one of the defining elements of the Bildungsroman and, by extension, of the 
dominant method of dealing with developing characters in nineteenth-century literature.   
The progression Trollope describes, it would seem, is meant to produce the 
opposite effect of characterological indecision, which suspends any conclusive 
understanding of character in its perpetual back-and-forth.  However, at the same time 
that the previous passages show Trollope’s insistence upon the importance of change 
within his overall conception of character, they also reveal his almost regretful admission 
that his characters hardly change at all.  Like the majority of “us” whom they are 
supposed to represent, Trollope’s characters retain a “consistency” insofar as they rarely 
change “their chief characteristics,” (they just alter how much those consistent 
characteristics become externally manifest).  So while Trollope certainly emphasizes his 
characters’ inevitable changes, we would do well to look closer at the manner of 
“change” he actually portrays here.  On three separate occasions within a relatively brief 
amount of text, the author refers to “the lapse of years” as the agent of character 
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development in his novels.  In his work on serialization, Umberto Eco has fleshed out a 
serial category he calls “the saga,” which speaks to the Palliser novels’ focus on its 
characters’ passage through an extended time period.  “The saga,” Eco writes, “concerns 
the story of a family and is interested in the ‘historical’ lapse of time.  It is genealogical.  
In the saga, the actors do age; the saga is a history of aging of individuals, families, 
people, groups” (87).119   To grow, according to Eco’s paradigm as well as to Trollope’s, 
is to grow “in years,” that is, quite simply, to get older; time itself, regardless of the 
experiences it may or may not demarcate, becomes the major means through which 
development is chronicled.120   
Dames usefully summarizes this emphasis on time—what he calls “gradualism”—in 
an essay on Trollope’s stories of professional ambition: 
What replaces the aesthetic appeal of forward propulsion (suspense, 
surprise, the denouement), all the rage in the sensationalistic 1860s 
and 1870s, is an aesthetics of slow accumulation.  Unlike narratives 
of ‘vocation,’ where sudden epiphanies of devotion or failure are the 
norm, the career-narrative presents a sequence of tutelary examples 
whose full meaning can only be known once the entire sequence has 
been consumed and all the examples are present to compare to one 
another.  The aesthetic appeal of the career narrative, aside from its 
deep familiarity to a middle-class readership, is perhaps the savoring 
of tactical time: the dilated, elongated temporality of careful choice, 
where each new piece of information slightly adjusts our sense of the 
previous choices made...  Such a narrative aesthetic would of course 
demand a wholly new size: the series (253-54, emphasis in original). 
 
While Dames is more interested in Trollope’s depiction of the systematized nature of the 
career itself than in the author’s representations of bildung, the contrast he makes between 
the “forward propulsion” of “narratives of vocation” and the “elongated temporality” of 
Trollope’s oeuvre also speaks to a major difference between the novel series and those 
nineteenth-century Bildungsromane for whom the process of finding one’s vocation is 
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synonymous with character development.  In the Bildungsroman, character development is 
always revealed in time, but not usually because of it, in a predetermined causal sequence.  
Many of the experiences that memorably mark development in the Bildungsroman (and its 
masculine subgenre, the “novel of vocation”) partake of the temporal process but cannot be 
reduced to it: Julien Sorel’s sexual education begins when he decides, at age nineteen, to 
seduce Mme de Rênal, and Jane Eyre’s decision to leave her governess post at Lowood 
catapults her into new relationships that see her morph from hesitant governess, to 
erstwhile schoolteacher, to self-assured wife/caretaker over a relatively brief period.  The 
most well-known nineteenth-century development novels stress the individual power of the 
developing character to shape what he or she becomes (or, in Maggie’s and Corinne’s case, 
to refuse becoming something new altogether).  But the novel series, as Dames points out, 
is more interested in the painstaking temporality of the decision-making process than in the 
epiphanic nature of the decisions themselves.  This attention to “gradualism” throughout 
Trollope’s work turns time’s inevitable physical progression into the driving force of 
development, and therefore deemphasizes the characters’ agentic relationship to their own 
growth.  It is not only the career that, as Dames writes, “has a melancholy ability to hollow 
out agency,” (263), but also the serial structure Trollope uses to lengthily chronicle both 
careers and characters. Trollopian character is always “developing” in time, but the series’s 
very dependence on temporal development—and on the complex choices that temporal 
development continually presents—discourages its characters from ever being definitively 
“developed.”  By contrast, character development in Julien’s or Jane’s cases ends 
concurrently with the protagonists’ youth and the concomitant end of narrated time:  “A 
Bildung,” Moretti writes, “is truly such only if, at a certain point, it can be seen as 
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concluded: only if youth passes into maturity, and comes there to stop there” (26, emphasis 
in original).     
 We can view Trollope’s association of character development with the slow, 
inevitable process of aging as a final corollary of the Palliser series’s poetics of indecision.   
Where the series’s attention to its characters’ internal vacillations foregrounds the dilation 
of the thought process rather than the product of decision, so too does its focus on the 
protracted quality of the developmental process diverge from the Bildungsroman’s 
conventional emphasis on a definable characterological product.  Hence Trollope’s refusal 
to figure thought as it so often appears in nineteenth-century Bildungsromane: that is, as an 
introspective practice that instantiates internal transformation insofar as its subjects 
frequently emerge from contemplation with life-lessons learned.  For Trollope, 
development is neither a goal to be reached nor an object to be obtained, but, rather, a 
progression that simply happens whether one likes it or not, as time goes by.  The formal 
constraints of the novel series—most importantly, its commitment to self-continuance and 
consequent resistance to closure—therefore underwrite moral propositions about character.  
In the Palliser novels, the mental activity involved in refusing to make a decision is 
preferable to the ontological state of decisiveness that would foreclose on both the process 
of thinking and the progression of the narrative that depicts it. The suggestion that the 
protracted form of character development matters as much or more than its content (which 
in Trollope’s case is difficult to define, since vacillation renders it terminally in flux) thus 
destabilizes an assumption that so many nineteenth-century Bildungsromane teach us to 
cherish: that private, self-conscious thinking will grant us the gift of morally ameliorative 
self-knowledge.     
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 Instead, Trollope’s novel series presents a version of character development that, 
while more modest than the developmental trajectories we find in contemporaneous 
Bildungsromane, remains infinitely more accessible.  The series’s focus on multiple 
characters over many years—rather than on a single protagonist within a comparatively 
short, tumultuous period of life—suggests that moral character development is not only the 
province of the sensitive young genius possessed of acute psychological depth.  Rather, it is 
open to all those individuals (boring or unsympathetic as they might seem) who, together, 
negotiate the vast social field and the broad swathe of time that the novel series represents.  
Trollope’s preference for the socially inflected, temporally malleable technique of thought 
report provides abundant structural support for such a democratized notion of character 
development.  But, as I have argued, this same commitment social thinking risks rendering 
Trollope’s characters less likeable to those readers who are used to sympathizing with 
verbally “mimetic” thought and minimally invasive third-person narrators.  Trollope’s 
divergence from the nineteenth-century Bildungsroman’s more individually focused 
models of character development consequently threatens to diffuse the sympathy that he 
claims so often to cultivate.  In the following chapter, I turn to two development novels that 
profess no such lofty aims, depicting instead a pair of protagonists whose utter lack of 
sympathetic qualities bring out the ironies attendant on the Bildungsroman’s project. 
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                                                    Development’s Failures: 
Unsympathetic Protagonists and Narrative Distance 
in Born in Exile and Sentimental Education 
 
“Godwin Peak appears to us the most unlovable creation that ever appealed to the 
misdirected sympathies of a reader.” 
  -Anonymous review of Born in Exile, Saturday Review (1852) 
 
“Frédéric is positively too poor for his part, too scant for his charge; and we feel with a 
kind of embarrassment, certainly with a kind of compassion, that it is somehow the 
business of the protagonist to prevent in his designer an excessive waste of faith.” 
  -Henry James, “Gustave Flaubert” (1902)121 
 
With its focus on a single character’s developmental struggle, the conventional 
Bildungsroman offers an especially clear-cut arena for novels to distinguish where our 
sympathies should lie.  Reader-protagonist sympathy seems coded into its very structure, 
as the character development within the novel happens concurrently with the story’s 
reading: Bildungsromane famously seem to offer their own consumption as a character-
building endeavor in itself.  This formal association between reader and protagonist, as 
we have seen, helps explain many readers’ lack of sympathy for the Palliser characters, 
since Trollope’s series focuses on the development of an entire social network rather than 
on any particular individual who takes part in it.  We have also seen—in contrast to 
Trollope’s preference for thought report—how Bildungsromane attempt to inspire reader 
sympathy by showcasing the eloquence of their protagonists’ speech and thought.  
Forming a sympathetic attachment to characters like Lucy Snowe, Corinne, or Elizabeth 
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Bennet through our special access to their preternaturally clever thoughts is one of the 
greatest payoffs of reading a Bildungsroman.  And while the varying proclivities of 
particular readers ensure that such fellow-feeling for a given protagonist will not always 
occur, sympathy for the central character of nineteenth-century development narratives 
remains a generic expectation. 
It is with understandable frustration, then, that even the most discerning readers of 
George Gissing’s Born in Exile (1892) and Gustave Flaubert’s Sentimental Education 
(1869) approach these novels’ protagonists.  This chapter’s epigraphs offer particularly 
eloquent illustrations of a specific complaint that undergirds the reception of both 
Bildungsromane: even readers mindful of Gissing’s and Flaubert’s literary achievements 
protest that protagonists Godwin Peak and Frédéric Moreau are simply not sympathetic 
enough for the kind of narratives in which they appear. Both the anonymous writer for 
the Saturday Review and the illustrious Henry James seem prepared by the generic 
markers of the Bildungsroman to identify with its central character, but they find that to 
read Flaubert’s and Gissing’s Bildungsromane is to follow closely the story of 
protagonists for whom they are prompted not to feel compassion.  Unlike the Trollopian 
narrator’s relative failure to awaken readers’ sympathy for his characters, the narrators of 
Born in Exile and Sentimental Education actively encourage us to withhold the sympathy 
we customarily afford to developing protagonists. 
This chapter will consider the connection between the textual construction of 
Peak and Moreau as unsympathetic characters and the failure of both to “develop” 
according to the terms set forth by the ostensible growth narratives in which they appear.  
(Peak dies of humiliation at the end of Gissing’s novel, while Moreau loses most of his 
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fortune and remains as naïve as when we first meet him).  I argue that what I am calling 
the “developmental failure” of Gissing’s and Flaubert’s protagonists is intimately linked 
to the narrator’s unconventional distance from them.  While postmodern readings of “the 
narrator” as a formal category (and of the Flaubertian narrator in particular) tend to 
privilege the way in which narrators are dispersed and “unlocatable” or “impersonal,” my 
concept of distance requires us to recognize how narrators, by virtue of their position 
relative to the unfolding story, are always purveyors of moral judgment.  By examining 
how the inescapably judgmental third-person narrator withholds sympathy along both 
moral and formal dimensions of character in these two late Bildungsromane, I will 
demonstrate that the Bildungsroman requires the narrator’s evocation of sympathy for the 
protagonist as a precondition for development itself.  The identification of this narrator-
character exchange will, in turn, help clarify how the novel’s conception of development 
is contingent upon the narrative voice: character development is not an external “given,” 
but a process shaped by the moral systems that take shape in narrative form. 
Using Gissing’s novel as a case text to explain my understanding of narrative 
distance, I will begin by looking at Godwin Peak’s failure to develop the kind of 
transparent moral character that previous Bildungsromane teach us to expect from 
protagonists.  Though Gissing’s narrator pays a great deal of attention to Peak’s thoughts 
and feelings, he vocally admonishes the protagonist with a vigor unmatched in more 
canonical nineteenth-century novels.   The most striking of these narratorial rebukes 
occur when Peak attempts to “perform” a kind of moral character that is inconsistent with 
what the narrator figures as his “inner nature”: Peak becomes an object of narrative 
distance because his inside and outside do not correspond. 
    
 183
I subsequently build on Born in Exile’s apparent distaste for Peak’s concealment 
of his interior landscape by examining the formal construction of Frédéric Moreau as 
excessively, ironically interiorized.  Moreau’s character becomes formally incoherent as 
the narrator silently allows his protagonist’s interior monologues to overtake the novel’s 
storyline.  Questioning to the critical consensus that sees Flaubert as the creator of the 
“modern” narrator whose impersonality resists communicating the kind of moral 
judgments for which earlier nineteenth-century novelists are famous, I will argue that the 
Flaubertian narrator’s distance from Moreau actually amounts to a moral judgment in 
itself.  Specifically, the narrator’s conspicuous refusal to authorize Moreau’s countless 
interior digressions is a strategy for presenting his central character as a failed 
bildungsheld.  Moreau cannot reconcile his outer appearance with his “inner nature” 
because the narrative presentation renders both the former and the latter indiscernible. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the protagonists’ conception of 
development diverges from the paradigm that the narrators’ distance implies. Both Peak 
and Moreau view development as indistinguishable from the possession of female love 
objects; they see their own growth as contingent upon romantic relationships with 
Sidwell Warricombe (in Peak’s case) and Mme Arnoux (in Moreau’s).  Such a scheme 
drives Peak and Moreau to abstract these two female figures into fixed character types 
whose exceptional qualities can be incorporated into the protagonists’ selves.  The 
narrators clearly mark this generalization of Sidwell’s and Mme Arnoux’s particular 
characters as a kind of faulty characterization, indicating to the reader where abstraction 
of others turns into fantasy about oneself.  But despite this injunction on Peak and 
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Moreau, the narrators betray an affinity for the kind of abstraction they condemn, an 
affinity that their distancing tactics allow them to conceal.  
 
Born in Exile: The Failure of Moral Character Development 
 
In a letter to his correspondent Edouard Bertz, George Gissing provided as conclusive 
a statement about the sympathetic orientation of Born in Exile as we are likely to find.  “It 
seems to me,” he wrote to Bertz, “that the tone of the whole book is by no means identical 
with that of Peak’s personality; certainly I did not mean it to be so” (qtd. in Grylls, 135).  
This statement repeats, in miniature, what I want to argue is the central tension of the novel: 
the disjunction between its object of focus (“Peak’s personality”) and the “tone” it uses to 
explore that object.  That Gissing should feel the need to address the difference—the 
misidentification—between the character of his protagonist and the overall stance of the 
narrative illustrates a cultural assumption that attended contemporaneous novels about 
“personality.”  If we read “personality” here for the broader rubric of “character” under 
which the nineteenth-century novel habitually subsumes it, we can make out Gissing’s 
anxiety about an imagined readership that would automatically assume an affinity between 
the third-person narrator (for who else is the arbiter of “tone” in Born in Exile?) and the 
moral character of Godwin Peak.  But what is different about Gissing’s version of the 
Bildungsroman—what Gissing himself cannot help but point out about it—is that Born in 
Exile devalues, rather than lionizes, the central character who nevertheless forms its subject. 
Critics frequently explain Gissing’s position on the fringes of the Victorian canon 
by characterizing the author as old-fashioned.  Gissing, the story goes, was “too Victorian” 
for the late Victorian period; he refused to listen to the voice of modernity that was quickly 
redefining the poetics of the novel. Indeed, Gissing still seems to be remembered more 
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often for his social concerns (the plight of poor intellectuals or odd women, for example) 
than for the formal originality of his prose.122  But the exploration of character development 
in Born in Exile tells another story: the novel is not retrograde, but rather is strikingly 
innovative in the way it presents a protagonist to whom the narrator ultimately stands in 
opposition.  The conventionally sympathetic relationship between the teller and the “told” 
in the Bildungsroman breaks down as Godwin Peak pretends to develop a kind of moral 
character that he actually finds repugnant in the hopes of securing material and social gains.  
Gissing’s apparently unsentimental attitude toward his protagonist therefore has a lot more 
in common with Flaubertian poetics (whose “modernity,” as we will see, is practically 
undisputed) than critics of nineteenth-century literature seem to have noticed.      
Because Gissing’s novels are less widely read than many of the other texts that this 
dissertation examines, I want to offer a brief plot summary for those readers who may not 
be familiar with the story of Godwin Peak. Born to a working-class family and sent to 
Whitelaw College as a scholarship boy, Peak dreams of pursuing an intellectual career that 
will win him social prestige.  Though he has little money and few connections, Gissing’s 
protagonist is convinced that he is, nevertheless, “an aristocrat of nature’s own making” 
(41).  His future plans are cut short, however, when his Cockney uncle Andrew —a man 
whom Peak considers part of the “detestable tie of [his] kindred” (56-57) –endeavors to set 
up an eating-house near Whitelaw.  The shame of association with a member the working 
classes is enough to make Peak decide to leave the school altogether.  Born in Exile 
proceeds to pass silently over the next several years, and we find out that Peak has taken up 
work as a laboratory scientist in London.  On a vacation in Exeter, he runs into Buckland 
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Warricombe, a former Whitelaw acquaintance; the two young men rekindle their friendship 
and Peak becomes a frequent visitor at the Warricombes’ comfortable table.  
Though Peak is a steadfast atheist, he finds the Warricombes’ genteel lifestyle 
attractive despite the family’s Christianity.  He becomes increasingly enamored with 
Buckland’s sister Sidwell, whom he feels shares his “aristocratic temperament” (270).  
Accordingly, Peak decides to pretend he is studying for religious orders so that he can 
curry favor with Sidwell and her father, Martin.  But Peak’s ultimate goal—to marry 
Sidwell and become part of her circle—falls through once the Warricombes discover the 
duplicitous nature of his “religious conversion.”  An anonymous article in The Critical 
denouncing liberal Christianity’s project of reconciling scientific and spiritual principles—
a project that the protagonist enthusiastically endorses in the Warricombes’ presence—
turns out to have been Peak’s handiwork.  Buckland and his parents immediately 
excommunicate Peak, and, despite her growing sympathy for Peak’s intellectual point-of-
view, Sidwell eventually follows suit.  The novel ends after Peak travels to Vienna and 
suddenly dies there, “in exile” (506). 
Born in Exile’s interest for this study lies in the way its narrator refuses to grant 
Peak the kind of sympathy that would turn his lie into a developmental experience.  It is not 
uncommon for protagonists of the nineteenth-century Bildungsroman to take wrong turns 
before they are able to recognize those that end up leading to developmental fulfillment; 
indeed, Jeffers asserts that “there will be no Bildung without a measure of folly along the 
way” (18) and Michael Beddow claims that Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, the 
Bildungsroman to which all others seem to be traced, is a veritable “chronicle of errors” on 
the protagonist’s part (82).   However, Gissing’s narrator does not rationalize or apologize 
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for Peak’s behavior in a way that would dismiss it as so much youthful caprice; rather, he 
dilates upon Peak’s “false” (impersonated) development from a comparatively aloof 
distance.  Instead of being identificatory or compassionate, the relationship between the 
narrator and the ostensible subject of development here is palpably divided.  And it is 
precisely the distance between the narrator’s conception of moral character and the 
mockery that the protagonist makes of this conception that predestines Peak’s ultimate 
failure to “develop” morally according to the novel’s own terms.123 
In Narrative Discourse, Genette provides us with the most famous, and perhaps the 
most detailed, examination of narrative “distance.”  For Genette, distance is intimately 
related to how often a narrative employs direct, “mimetic” discourse—that is, the degree to 
which it presents “discourse fictively reported as it supposedly was uttered by the 
character” (170, emphasis in original).  The most direct form of narrative discourse would 
thus be what Genette calls “reported speech,” as in the statement “Amy said, ‘I must go’” 
(172).  Here we have Amy’s speech without the “distancing” influence of the narrator’s 
voice.  Conversely, the most distanced form of narrative discourse takes shape through 
“narrated speech,” as in “Mary said she had to go” (171).  Narrated speech is “distant,” 
according to Genette, because it paraphrases a character’s words rather than letting those 
words speak for themselves.  Genette’s hypothesis that the most “emancipated” novels 
focus on “obliterating the last traces of the narrating instance and giving the floor to the 
character right away” does not leave much doubt as to his suspicion of the “narrative 
patronage” that narrated discourse requires.124  Such privileging of direct discourse amply 
illustrates the widespread devaluation of thought report that we saw reflected in the critical 
reception to Trollope’s prose: for Genette, the blending of a character’s intention with a 
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narrator’s speech prevents the character from being presented with the greatest possible 
“immediacy” (173-74). 
But since I am concerned specifically with the kind of narrative intervention that 
Genette finds so clumsy in nineteenth-century novels, I want at the outset to distinguish my 
own understanding of distance from the one popularized by Narrative Discourse.  Where 
Genette would equate a narrator’s obvious presence with a greater degree of “distance,” I 
would make the opposite claim: “distance” obtains when a narrator does not intervene 
sympathetically on the part of a character—when he refuses compassion for that character 
despite her ostensible shortcomings.  Drawing on Wayne Booth’s discussion of narrative 
distance in The Rhetoric of Fiction, my use of the term centers on the narrator’s sympathetic 
orientation toward a given character.125  Booth’s conception of “distance” famously takes 
account of the communicative situation inherent in the act of novel-reading.  “In any reading 
experience,” he writes, “there is an implied dialogue among author, narrator, the other 
characters, and the reader.  Each of the four can range, in relation to each of the others, from 
identification to complete opposition, on any axis of value” (155). 126  Although such distance 
manifests itself formally—through a benevolently charged instance of free indirect discourse, 
for example, or a long section of the narrator’s direct address to the reader—distance’s 
relationship to sympathy highlights its unquestionably moral inflection. Moreover, the 
concept of moral distance between narrator and character requires that we conceive of the 
narrator as an entity who can be characterized through his judgments.127  These judgments 
may of course be more or less overt (compare the embodied “I” of the narrator of The Mill on 
the Floss to the quasi-scientific objectivity of the voice behind Sentimental Education), but 
the very designation of The Narrator as an agent with a speaking voice and a moral 
    
 189
sensibility—if not with a moving body—reveals our reliance, as readers and critics of 
narrative, upon the characterization of the narrative function.  Booth’s communicative model 
of narrative thus helps us rethink criticism’s persistent overinvestment in the “impersonal 
narrator”—an overinvestment whose continuing prevalence seems odd considering, for 
instance, the numerous cognitive studies that suggest our instinctive tendency to attribute 
personalities to narrative voices. 128  For my purposes, understanding distance as a morally 
inflected narrative technique illuminates both the Bildungsroman’s generic conventions and 
the developing narratological figure of the character.   
We can begin to examine distance and its effects in Born in Exile by looking at 
instances of direct characterization that crop up throughout the novel.  These moments—in 
which a narrator stops the unfolding of events to label a character’s moral, intellectual, or 
emotional qualities—show that narrator’s judgment of character at its most overt.  (Think 
back to the narrator of The Mill on the Floss, who confidently apprises readers that the “need 
of being loved” is “the strongest need in poor Maggie’s nature”).  And while modern and 
contemporary novels may prefer to sidestep this kind of definition in favor of narrative 
techniques that reveal character more obliquely, the nineteenth-century realist novel simply 
cannot do without them.  For, as Barthes reminds us, the concept of “realism” depends on a 
shared system of meaning in which definable character traits point to some unnamed truth 
that “passes through” a given character (S/Z, 62).   
Although the nature of Gissing’s realism remains a subject of literary-critical debate,129 
it is hardly arguable that Born in Exile belongs to a tradition of novels in which the narrator’s 
assessment of the moral character of his subject will be reaffirmed throughout the narrative 
discourse.  So when Gissing’s narrator introduces Godwin Peak in the following manner 
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early in the novel, he immediately establishes the color of the lens through which we glean 
information about Peak’s character: 
 
No common lad.  A youth whose brain glowed like a furnace, whose heart 
throbbed with tumult of high ambitions, of inchoate desires; endowed with 
knowledge altogether exceptional for his years; a nature essentially 
militant, displaying itself in innumerable forms of callow intolerance—
apt, assuredly, for some vigorous part in life, but as likely as not to rush 
headlong on traverse roads if no judicious mind assumed control of him.  
What is to be done with the boy? (38). 
 
This set-piece of direct characterization takes a new spin on a familiar narrative 
tactic.  We learn here that Peak has something in common with the hero of the traditional 
Bildungsroman: he paradoxically resembles characters like David Copperfield and 
Wilhelm Meister insofar as he, like them, is uncommon.  Jeffers reminds us that the genre’s 
hero is typically an individual who is able and desires to be “different” from those around 
him (different from his family, primarily, but also different enough from his peers and any 
other character in the novel) (19).  The ordinary condition of many nineteenth-century 
protagonists is to be out of the ordinary on the level of moral sensitivity.  With its emphasis 
on the way narrative events shape a protagonist’s personal notion of ethical conduct, the 
Bildungsroman traditionally feature heroes who are acutely receptive to the moral import 
of their own thoughts and feelings.  (This receptiveness becomes manifest in the novels’ 
liberal presentation of the protagonist’s represented thought as she scrupulously assesses 
her own reactions to the struggles she encounters).   
But if the Bildungsroman’s protagonist is uncommon within her own milieu, she is 
never so different that she becomes inscrutable to readers.  Gissing’s repeated use of the 
kind of direct characterization we see in this passage—in which the narrator refers to 
characteristics such as “uncommon” and “exceptional” that describe Peak’s moral 
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character—suggests a consensus between reader and narrator as to the kind of individual 
who might be described in such a manner.  What is generically original in Gissing’s work 
is not the strategy its narrator uses to label the social categories from which direct 
characterization draws its meaning, but is rather the moral disparagement of the novel’s 
protagonist within the familiar context of direct characterization.  The character of Peak’s 
predictable singularity markedly differs from the characters of those crowned with 
sympathetic epithets: Peak is unique due to the way his character combines the traditional 
nineteenth-century protagonist’s requisite “uncommon stores of knowledge” with a 
militant, egotistical nature that “[displays] itself in innumerable forms of callow 
intolerance.”  His exceptional intellect does not inform the kind of exceptional moral 
sensitivity that is virtually indispensable to other central characters of the Bildungsroman 
during its most important historical period. 
In Godwin Peak, then, Gissing presents a protagonist who is not the narrator’s pet 
so much as his whipping-boy.  The previous passage shows us how a narrative voice can 
employ direct characterization to distance narrator from character rather than solidifying an 
affinity between them.  Moreover, the narrator’s descriptive aside here works to relate the 
tension between Peak’s moral character and the narrator’s own implicit moral standards 
directly to the problematic development that this tension occasions. The admission that 
Peak is “apt, assuredly, for some vigorous part in life” invokes the literary genre in which it 
appears.  For finding one’s “part in life”—whether that “part” is an emotional fulfillment, a 
professional vocation, a romantic relationship, or some combination thereof—is the 
Bildungsroman’s thematic territory.  But what will become clear about Peak’s character 
later on in the novel is that he, unlike the narrator, will not consider this “playing” in 
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metaphoric terms.  The denouement of Born in Exile occurs when Buckland Warricombe 
discovers what its reader has known all along: Peak’s development from radical atheist to 
liberal Christian is self-consciously theatrical.  The protagonist ingratiates himself into the 
Warricombe family’s genteel circle by acting the part of a young man whose moral 
sensitivity resembles the self-searching of a Jane Eyre or a David Copperfield, thus 
ironizing the possibility of transformative epiphany that Bildungsromane ostensibly 
promise. 
The tone in which the narrator relates these metaphors of performance further 
clarifies the novel’s position relative to traditional structures of narrator-character 
sympathy.  Like previous nineteenth-century “omniscient” narrators, Gissing’s narrator 
provides us with a quick look into Peak’s future: we learn that Peak is “as likely as not to 
rush headlong on traverse roads if no judicious mind assumed control of him.”  And it is 
precisely the “mind” of Gissing’s narrator—that is, the portrait of a “mind” that his 
narrative maneuvers help to shape—that fits this rather cryptic description.  Judiciousness, 
after all, is one of the qualities that the nineteenth-century narrator historically enacts; it 
frequently wields authority by exercising moral judgments about character that are 
nonetheless tempered with forgiveness.  (Think, for example, of the Middlemarch 
narrator’s infamous contention that Edward Casaubon is not as unsympathetic as he seems, 
or of the way that the worldly narrator of The Charterhouse of Parma perennially excuses 
Fabrice del Dongo of his youthful follies).  If we acknowledge a relationship between the 
narrator’s judiciousness and his sympathy, then Gissing’s narrator becomes an inconsistent 
figure in comparison with his historical peers.  The narrator’s judiciousness—exemplified 
in the previous passage by his numerous assessments of Peak’s character—does not flow 
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into a demonstration of compensatory compassion that would “assume control” over Peak 
by vigorously insisting upon the sympathetic properties of his apparent “intolerance.”  
Rather, the narrator’s refusal to figure the position of the protagonist as one that is 
necessarily worthy of sympathetic presentation reveals a tacit assumption behind the 
nineteenth-century Bildungsroman’s notion of character development.  That Peak’s 
imitation of moral character development leads directly to his demise (not to mention the 
narrative’s end) illustrates how a character’s “maturation” relies upon the help of the 
narrator that constructs and oversees it, how the Bildungsroman traditionally structures 
development as a process of agreement between narrator and character.   
Born in Exile’s narrator highlights the protagonist’s isolation from this agreement by 
frequently allowing Peak to speak in his own words.  Direct discourse—the presentation of a 
character’s speech “just as she said it,” without the aid of narrative summary or 
commentary—offers the narrator an opportunity to formally separate himself from the 
numerous points-of-view that he presents.  In such a reported discussion with his school 
friend John Edward Earwaker, Peak continues to defend his duplicity toward the Warricombe 
family even after they have severed ties with him: 
“You know that I have only followed my convictions to their logical issue.  
An opportunity offered of achieving the supreme end to which my life is 
directed, and what scruple could stand in my way?  We have nothing to do 
with names and epithets.  Here are the facts of life as I had known it; there 
is the existence promised as the reward of successful artifice.  To live was 
to pursue the object of my being.  I could not feel otherwise; therefore 
could not act otherwise” 
 
[…]“M—m—m,” muttered Earwaker, slowly.  Then you have never been 
troubled with a twinge of conscience?’ 
 
“With a thousand!  I have been wracked, martyred.  What has that to do 
with it?  Do you suppose I attach any final significance to those torments?  
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Conscience is the same in my view as an inherited disease which may 
possibly break out on any most innocent physical indulgence” (439-40). 
 
 
The only indications of the narrator’s presence here are the quotation marks that separate the 
characters’ discourse from his own and the information that he provides about the tone of 
Earwaker’s voice; it is as if the narrator has momentarily stepped aside to allow the reader to 
get closer to the action.  And the narrator’s disappearance from the scene allows Peak to 
recount his own version of the events that took place at Exeter.  The protagonist is, as always, 
utterly self-conscious about his own development, referring explicitly to the experience with 
the Warricombes as one that might contribute to his life’s “supreme end.”  But what we 
discover from listening to Peak’s self-justification is not remorse for his previous behavior 
but rather an alarmingly eloquent confidence that his development actually depended upon it. 
According to Peak, the object toward which he was searching (i.e. marriage to Sidwell 
Warricombe) required that he jettison both his “conscience” and the moral “scruples” that 
inform it, and the decision to feign a conversion from vociferous atheism to devoted 
Christianity was simply a logical solution to the problems that his intellectual and financial 
exile imposed upon him. 
 Such feigned morality works to detach Gissing’s protagonist from the sympathies of 
the narrator who describes him.  For while Peak himself alleges that he has nothing to do 
with “names and epithets,” Born in Exile’s narrator is markedly fond of them.  As we have 
seen through his employment of direct characterization, the narrator of Gissing’s novel is 
explicitly concerned with the codification of moral character through descriptive epithets like 
“militant egotism.”  Peak’s refusal to label himself with the kind of moral epithet in which 
the narrator traffics actually reinforces the narrator’s earlier pronouncements about Peak’s 
“difficult” character without requiring him to step in.  Earwaker’s wary interjection, of 
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course, makes clearer the novel’s distinction between the narrator’s characterization of Peak 
and Peak’s own reluctance to characterize himself according to the same abstract model.  
And while Peak’s profession that conscience is a disease to be overcome is exceptional for 
the way it breaks with the tradition of the incessantly self-monitoring protagonist of many a 
Victorian Bildungsroman, Born in Exile’s narrator stops short of granting his central 
character the “supreme end” that Peak proposes to obtain through moral relativism.   
The narrator-character sympathy that Born in Exile withholds from Godwin Peak 
becomes visible not only through morally summative strategies like direct 
characterization, but also through the way that the novel configures its protagonist in 
terms of textual space.  According to Woloch, not only do Bildungsromane use minor 
characters as models for the protagonist to follow, but they juxtapose the protagonist 
against minor characters in order to individuate her.  The protagonist, Woloch argues, 
“needs a contrast” (47); her identity as protagonist is shaped according to the narrative 
system that measures her against those characters who do not garner as much space.  
What might this “asymmetrical structure of characterization” tell us about the uneven 
sympathetic involvement between narrators and the various characters they depict?  The 
One vs. The Many suggests that the amount of narrative space a character receives is 
tantamount to the amount of social power she wields: “the reality of social privilege is 
embedded into, indissociable from, the construction of narrated centrality: power is 
earned through attention” (117).  And though Woloch does not specifically discuss 
sympathy as such, the “power” of which he writes ultimately seems to encompass the 
sympathetic interest—the identification—of the novelistic narrator, with whom the 
cadence of the protagonist’s interior monologues increasingly dovetails (78).  Narrative 
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sympathy (or the vaguer category of “affective presence” under which it falls in The One 
vs. The Many) thus seems to figure in Woloch’s model as a by-product of a character’s 
“narrated centrality.”  
Born in Exile, a novel that is ostensibly part of the literary corpus to which 
Woloch’s study refers, provides an interesting counterpoint to The One vs. The Many’s 
alignment of a character’s social (and, by extension, sympathetic) presentation with the 
amount of textual space she garners.  Here, minor characters do not buttress the 
development of the protagonist so much as they indicate his developmental shortcomings. 
Gissing’s narrator continues to manifest his distance from the protagonist by the way in 
which he distinguishes Peak from his closest acquaintance, John Edward Earwaker.  We 
first meet both characters in Chapter One, after learning that each is the recipient of one 
of the sought-after end-of-the-year prizes at Whitelaw College.  Earwaker, who wins the 
prizes for the best poem and essay, is a young man whom the narrator promptly tells us 
“bore a certain generic resemblance to Peak, for his face was thin and the fashion of his 
clothing indicated narrow means” (18).  The suggestion that Earwaker generically 
resembles the protagonist seems at first to stipulate that this might just as well be his 
story, that both characters are representative of a whole class of scholarship boys who are 
about to embark upon their adult lives.  But the narrator marks this similarity only to 
exaggerate the ultimate difference between Earwaker and Peak, a difference that comes 
to define the character of each.  Near the end of the novel, after the discovery that Peak’s 
professed desire to join the clergy was a ruse, the disgraced protagonist visits his college 
acquaintance at the latter’s newly purchased London flat.  The narrator remarks here of 
Earwaker that 
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[h]e was fortunate in his temper, moral and intellectual; partly 
directing circumstances, partly guided by their pressure, he advanced 
on the way of harmonious development.  Nothing great would come of 
his endeavours, but what he aimed at he steadily perfected.  And this 
in spite of the adverse conditions under which he began his course 
(443). 
 
This quick moral portrait of Born in Exile’s most successful character thus reiterates a 
familiar narrative, in which an individual from humble beginnings ultimately obtains, after 
long struggle, the mark of “harmonious development” and the material goods (like a new 
flat) that generally accompany it.  But while Gissing’s novel includes this oft-told tale, it 
receives a comparative lack of narrative fanfare.  For though Earwaker is a sympathetic 
character—he is, after all, the only one of the protagonist’s male friends who continues to 
speak to him after the revelation of his elaborate lie—he is hardly a central one.  It is Peak, 
with all the “difficulties inherent in his character,” whom the novel rigorously tracks (260). 
That Born in Exile preoccupies itself with the character who does not develop rather than the 
one for whom development is conclusively professed allows us to see how its narrative is an 
exception to Woloch’s assumptions about the connections between “affective presence” and 
narrative centrality in nineteenth-century fiction.  The character that Born in Exile 
encourages us to pursue, in other words, is not the same one it encourages us to like.  
Following a pattern we have seen in development narratives from David Copperfield to Can 
You Forgive Her?, Gissing’s narrator shows more interest in those characterological 
distortions that trouble, rather than safeguard, developmental harmony. 
Though Earwaker remains peripheral to Born in Exile’s narrative, his character helps 
to illustrate the connection between development and sympathy that inheres in the 
nineteenth-century Bildungsroman.  Never formally developed as much as the protagonist, 
Earwaker instead pops up in the narrative at certain definitive moments in Peak’s story.  It is 
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Earwaker who prints Peak’s radical article in The Critical, and it is also Earwaker to whom 
Peak goes to explain his behavior once the Warricombes banish him.  Most importantly, 
Earwaker is the only character (out of Peak’s five or six acquaintances) who elucidates the 
protagonist’s imitation of a character not his own.  In a conversation with a mutual 
acquaintance, Earwaker wonders whether Peak “has found it necessary to assume a character 
wholly fictitious—or, let us say, quite inconsistent with his life and opinions as known to 
us?” (284). The “harmoniously developed” character here shows a marked rhetorical 
alignment with the narrator, who, as we have seen, uses similar theatrical metaphors to sum 
up Peak’s conduct at Exeter (“Now for the first time was [Peak] taking count of the character 
he had played” [178]).  In a sense, then, the narrator himself could be said to play a theatrical 
role, as he “hides” behind the voice of a character he resembles.  And the apparent 
identification between Earwaker and the narrator becomes most striking in the last line of the 
novel, as it is Earwaker who gives voice to the full import of Gissing’s title once he hears of 
Peak’s lonely death in Vienna: “Dead, too, in exile!” was his [Earwaker’s] thought.  “Poor 
old fellow!” (506). That the last comment the novel makes about Peak is through Earwaker’s 
expression of sympathy leaves us with a compelling portrait of both those characters who 
survive in the Bildungsroman and those who fail to meet its developmental standard.  For 
while the narrator focuses on the foibles of a protagonist whose moral character it finds 
problematic, it gives the last word to the novel’s most morally “fortunate” individual.  Small 
wonder that this last word efficiently combines Earwaker’s sympathy for Peak with an 
aptitude for narrative summation that Peak’s “lack of self-possession” never allows him to 
achieve (96). 
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Sentimental Education: Formal Character and Interior Overload 
After Buckland Warricombe discovers the truth behind Godwin Peak’s hasty 
religious conversion, he remarks to Sidwell that Peak “has somehow got the exterior of a 
gentleman; you could not believe that one who behaved so agreeably and talked so well was 
concealing an essentially base nature” (380).  Peak’s actions were so reprehensible, 
according to Warricombe, because they actively concealed the true character that was inside 
him. And the assumption with which Buckland is working—that character is truest “on the 
inside”— suggests how character and interiority are mutually constitutive.  This figuration of 
moral character as interior belongs to a larger debate about how novelists and their readers 
deal with the unwieldy concept of “selfhood.”   In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor argues 
that the modern notion of being “a human agent”—a self—depends on one’s sense of an 
“orientation toward the good” (toward being a “moral” individual) (68).130    According to 
Taylor, the Bildungsroman in particular reflects a “new” conception of the self that is bound 
up with reflexive narration: one way that we come to know ourselves and to give our lives 
meaning is by internalizing our life stories.131  We become possessed of a status endemic to 
modern selfhood that Taylor calls our “radical reflexivity.”  “Radical reflexivity,” Taylor 
writes, “brings to the fore a kind of presence to oneself which is inseparable from one’s being 
the agent of experience.”  We therefore no longer define our identities relative to preordained 
structures or archetypes that are external to our experience; rather, we come to privilege the 
“inward” reflection that allows us to self-narrate (111).   
Though not all, or even most, Bildungsromane use first-person narration, the 
overwhelming amount of interior discourse in late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels 
still supports Taylor’s explanation of our sense that the most authentic self is located “inside” 
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the mind.  The inclusion of interior passages within novels of character development 
purportedly works to create a sympathetic relationship between the reader and the developing 
protagonist with whom the novel encourages us to identify.  And the development of interior 
discourse, in which novels dramatize the turn inward, is crucial for the larger development of 
nineteenth-century understandings of moral character.  The search for the good begins with a 
search inside oneself, an examination of one’s proper feelings through self-interlocution.  
While sacrificing the kind of undiluted examples of “radical reflexivity” that first-person 
novels provide, novels in the third person often stage another kind of devotion to the “turn 
inward” by aligning their own moral values with those that the reflexive central character 
develops through her represented thought.  We saw in the Palliser series, for example, how 
Trollope’s narrator defended his characters’ psychological indecision by structurally 
mirroring it in his own vacillating asides to the reader, and in Corinne and The Mill on the 
Floss, both narrators justified the protagonists’ refusal to “balance out” their internal 
characteristics as evidence of moral tenacity.    
Flaubert’s Sentimental Education, on the other hand, reverses the development 
novel’s conventionally sympathetic stance toward the cultivation of the inner nature by 
illustrating what happens when a character’s self-consciousness threatens to engulf the 
novel’s plot.  Like the Palliser novels, Sentimental Education diffuses the developmental 
force of interiority not by ignoring interior discourse as a formal technique, but by presenting 
its protagonist, Frédéric Moreau, as excessively, indeed stultifyingly, interior.  However 
Flaubert’s novel diverges crucially from Trollope’s series insofar as Sentimental Education’s 
third-person narrator seems unwilling to sanction the protagonist’s aimless thoughts as moral 
contemplation.  So transported by his own imagination that he refuses to live outside it, 
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Moreau becomes unsympathetic when Flaubert’s narrator cloaks his immoderate reflection in 
an ironic silence.   
If the narrator of Born in Exile is comparatively transparent (and unabashedly vocal) 
about the gap between Peak’s character and the character of harmonious development, the 
lack of identification between narrator and protagonist in Sentimental Education depends on 
the narrator’s apparent disengagement and on the textual effects this disengagement produces 
when we situate it within the generic context of the Bildungsroman.  The voice that narrates 
Flaubert’s novel refuses to step in and sanction Moreau’s dependence, as a character, on the 
interior monologue; Moreau’s problematic self-understanding is not overtly mediated by 
another, narrating “self” who would assign it developmental import.  At the end of 
Sentimental Education, the protagonist remains exactly where he started, elaborating 
relationships and scenarios in his mind far more articulately than he does in his waking life. 
The statement at the end of the novel that Moreau’s life (along with that of his friend 
Deslauriers) has failed [“Ils l’avaient manqué tous les deux” (517]) demonstrates the stunted 
course of a development narrative whose teller makes himself conspicuously absent.132  And 
the protagonist’s failure ultimately reveals how close he is to slipping into the realm of non-
character, how the absence of a sympathetic narrator can prevent character from forming 
what Jonathan Culler has elsewhere called “a centre of coherence” (89).  Where Born in 
Exile focuses on the protagonist’s failure to develop moral character, Sentimental Education 
illustrates how the distancing of narrator from protagonist makes it more difficult to 
distinguish the protagonist as a consistent literary form. 
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Sentimental Education says as much about character development through what it 
does not do as through what it does.  The novel does not strictly “open” with Moreau, but 
with the setting in which he subsequently appears: 
On the 15th of September 1840, at six o’clock in the morning, the Ville-de-
Montereau was lying alongside the Quai Saint-Bernard, ready to sail, with 
clouds of smoke pouring from its funnel. 
 
People came hurrying up, out of breath; barrels, ropes and baskets of 
washing lay about in everybody’s way; the sailors ignored all inquiries; 
people bumped into one another; the pile of baggage between the two 
paddle-wheels grew higher and higher; and the din merged into the hissing 
of the steam, which, escaping through some iron plates, wrapped the 
whole scene in a whitish mist, while the bell in the bows went on clanging 
incessantly (15). 133 
 
It is only once the boat leaves the dock, once the jostling of nameless people and sailors 
settles down, that the narrative voice zeroes in on anyone in particular: 
At last the boat moved off; and the two banks, lined with warehouses, 
yards, and factories, slipped past like two wide ribbons being unwound. 
 
A long-haired man of eighteen, holding a sketchbook under his arm, stood 
motionless beside the tiller.  He gazed through the mist at spires and 
buildings whose names he did not know, and took a last look at the Île 
Saint-Louis, the Cité, and Notre-Dame; and soon, as Paris was lost to 
view, he heaved a deep sigh. 
 
Monsieur Frédéric Moreau, who had just matriculated, was returning to 
Nogent-sur-Seine, where he would have to hang about for two months 
before going to read for the Bar (15).134  
 
The passage is long, but its length is part of the point.  That the introduction of 
Frédéric Moreau—whose education it promises to chronicle—occurs not in its opening 
sentence but seemingly as the narrator’s afterthought reverses the structure of narrative 
attention that Woloch describes as a central feature of our conceptual notion of “the 
protagonist.”  This is not to argue, however, that Woloch’s model is mistaken: a great many 
nineteenth-century novels begin with a marked emphasis on the protagonist’s voice and 
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point-of-view.  Like Gissing’s novel, Sentimental Education is crucial for a study of 
character development because it evokes the Bildungsroman’s generic conventions in the 
very act of subverting them.  A case in point is the direction of the boat trip itself: William 
Paulson astutely notes that, unlike the traditional nineteenth-century French protagonist who 
initially makes his way to the city from comparatively humble beginnings in the provinces, 
Moreau begins by leaving Paris to go back to his mother’s country home (26).   
The odd chronology of the novel’s opening paragraphs, in which “objects and 
impersonal groupings take precedence over human individuals” (Paulson 25),135 contributes 
to the narrator’s depiction of Moreau as a character who doesn’t necessarily deserve his own 
story, who ranks below paddle wheels and warehouses as a subject of immediate narrative 
interest.  The narrator underscores the protagonist’s ordinariness by presenting him first 
through external focalization, in a technique Genette identifies as a kind of “enigmatic 
introit…where the hero is described and followed for a long time as an unknown person 
whose identity is problematic (190-91).136  The statement that “a long haired man of 
eighteen” is holding a sketchbook does not do a lot of work to align this man with the 
focus—much less with the sympathy—of the voice describing him.  That the narrator does 
not begin his portrait of Moreau by descending into the latter’s consciousness, but rather 
chooses to relate his more or less banal external mannerisms (gazing, sighing) illustrates how 
Moreau is, first and last, a member of a crowd.  The presentation of the protagonist is as 
straightforwardly descriptive as the depiction of the very boat on which he is traveling.  And 
the novel’s continued implication that its protagonist is not special, that he may as well be 
anyone, will come to inform Moreau’s failed development directly.  Moreau is a kind of 
protagonist manqué, neither aspiring enough to merit a rags-to-riches success story like 
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Eugène de Rastignac nor subversive enough to be labeled an anti-hero like Julien Sorel.137  
Moreover, the historical specificity of the novel’s first sentence emphasizes the protagonist’s 
membership (like Flaubert’s) in the generation of 1848, whose political conflict struck 
figures from Tocqueville to Marx as a deflated imitation of the more romanticized 
revolutions of 1789 and 1830 (Paulson 114).   
Sentimental Education’s point of entry into Frédéric’s life continues the project of 
disturbing the developmental trajectory that often attends the Bildungsroman’s 
protagonist.  Like Born in Exile, Flaubert’s novel begins with an absence: we first 
encounter Moreau at the age of eighteen, and the narrator provides very few backward 
glances into his past. Sentimental Education’s failure to treat its protagonist’s childhood 
in any detail becomes a strategy for the blockage of Moreau’s growth once we situate the 
text within the generic framework of the character development narrative.  Because the 
novel begins in medias res, during the young adulthood of an already established central 
character, Flaubert’s narrator does not allow its readers to discover whether or not and 
how the protagonist’s childhood shaped the conception of him that the novel’s first pages 
present.  We do not have the privilege, for example, of the causal link between David 
Copperfield’s adoration of the capricious Dora and his earlier worship of a mother whose 
lack of practicality clearly prefigured that of his first wife, nor are we afforded the 
parallel between Jane Eyre’s voluntary seclusion in the window-seat at Gateshead and her 
later recapitulation of this isolating practice in her bedroom at Thornfield.  Though it is 
true that the nineteenth-century French novel is in general far less concerned with the 
protagonist’s childhood than is its English counterpart, Sentimental Education never 
offers a portrait of Frédéric Moreau that is markedly different from the one we encounter 
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in its first chapter.138 By frustrating the reader’s access to its protagonist’s formative 
years, Flaubert’s Bildungsroman dispenses with a novelistic practice that figures 
development as a temporal trajectory whose earliest moments help shape the character 
whom the protagonist will become by the end of the narrative.   
 Doubtless related to the lack of narrated childhood in these two novels is the 
minor role they accord to nostalgia.139  Culler’s discussion of character in Flaubert’s work 
claims that the author refused to offer the reader stable meanings through which to 
interpret his novels.  One way to prevent communicating the sense that the protagonist 
was a fully-formed individual was to “avoid the retrospective structure which transforms 
time into intelligible history as viewed by one who has lived through it” (31).  Because 
Flaubert’s novel is told through a heterodiegetic narrator—that is, through a narrator who 
does not participate in the story’s events—it cannot take the form of a reflexive first-
person narrative in which the protagonist delivers up his or her life history as a nostalgic 
memory.  When characters like Jane Eyre and David Copperfield recuperate their past 
into nostalgic narratives, they offer their lives as histories that they implicitly believe are 
worth telling.  Narrating from the standpoint of the happy and “successful” formation of 
the self, they are able to use nostalgia to shape their life-narratives into equally 
meaningful wholes.  First-person nostalgic narration thus offers a mode through which to 
exemplify the development not only of moral character, but also of the formal 
construction that equates self-narration with well-roundedness and sympathy.140  
Flaubert’s protagonist lacks the comfort of an already-determined path before 
him, and the degree of commentary that Sentimental Education provides about Moreau’s 
eventual development therefore falls, in large degree, upon the stance of the narrator.  
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Third-person narrators often wield an extraordinary degree of discursive power because 
they are able to point us in the direction of meaning.  Think, for instance of the narrator 
of Dickens’s Bleak House, whose numerous apostrophes challenge us to recognize 
London’s appalling treatment of its poor, or of the grandiose social maxims with which 
Balzac’s narrators so notoriously summarize Parisian social convention.  Indeed, the 
popularity not only of Dickens and Balzac, but of novelists from Eliot to Stendhal to 
Trollope helped to conflate the tradition of opinionated third-person narrators with 
nineteenth-century novelistic practice itself.  Flaubert’s narrators become especially 
striking in the wake of this convention: since the publication of Flaubert’s major works, 
literary scholars such as Marcel Proust, Erich Auerbach, Genette and Culler have 
variously noted the ways that novels like Sentimental Education and Mme Bovary (1857) 
seem almost to narrate themselves.  The Balzacian-style narrator whose opinions orient 
the story has totally disappeared in favor of what Auerbach calls Flaubert’s “objective 
seriousness”: “His opinion of his characters and events remains unspoken; and when the 
characters express themselves it is never in such a manner that the writer identifies 
himself with their opinion, or seeks to make the reader identify himself with it” (486).  
Flaubert’s narrator does not tell us that Frédéric Moreau thinks in lavishly elaborated 
clichés, for example; he instead provides us with enough of Moreau’s thought to allow us 
to come more independently to this conclusion.  If it is nearly impossible to pick up a 
Balzac or a Dickens novel without setting one’s eyes upon an episode of pedagogical 
fervor, then it is equally difficult to find passages in Flaubert which do not illustrate the 
narrator’s refusal to comment explicitly on what his subject matter suggests.  The direct 
characterization we find throughout Born in Exile would likely have seemed odious to 
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Flaubert, who considered summary character analysis to be “a blemish in any work of 
fiction and a confession of weakness in any author” (Steegmuller 307). 
The sober eye with which Flaubert’s narrator passes over his characters has prompted 
numerous critics to rapturously claim that Flaubert’s work marks the end of the third-person 
narrator’s tyranny and ushers in the comparatively liberating advent of modernism that 
follows it.  Received criticism about Flaubert puts an almost priceless value on the author’s 
endeavor to create what he called “pure art” (qtd. in Steegmuller, 147).  Such style, according 
to Flaubert, necessitated that the writer (and the narrator whose voice Flaubert often equates 
with that of the writer) excise his own opinions from a text.141  Genette’s comment in 
Narrative Discourse about the “emancipation” of the novel from “narrative patronage,” for 
example, echoes an earlier essay he wrote on Flaubert which claims that “ce refus 
d’expression …inaugure l’experience littéraire moderne” (“Silences de Flaubert” 242). 
Culler does Genette one better by claiming Flaubert as a figurehead for postmodernist 
literature, arguing that the anti-pedagogical style of the Flaubertian text renders it “a text in 
which no one speaks; a text which is simply written” rather than situating it as the apparent 
record of a narrator’s speech (15, emphasis in original).142 Culler’s interest in Flaubert stems 
from the novelist’s alleged talent for “incorporating the problems of self-consciousness in the 
writing itself rather than in a persona” (69); Flaubert’s particular achievement lies in 
“[rendering] irrelevant the process of identifying narrators and attributing themes to them” 
(72).  According to this argument, Sentimental Education is an original text because it allows 
its reader to do away with the notion that novel reading is an exchange between a real human 
being who reads and an illusory human being who tells her what to feel.  To understand 
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Flaubert in Culler’s model is to avoid the kind of epistemological “optic” that “denatures 
strangeness by personalizing it” (113). 
But however distant the presence of Flaubert’s narrator may seem, and however 
ardently Flaubert himself may have hoped that personal opinion would remain outside his 
work, it is equally productive to think about the way his novel—indeed, most novels—rely 
on the humanlike qualities of the narrative voice.143  The very idea that Flaubert’s work 
contains a “refusal” of expression assumes a speaker who could be expressing himself if he 
chose; to refer, as Genette famously does, to Flaubert’s narrator as “silent” presupposes the 
existence of a voice (or “persona”) that is not speaking.  Though I agree with Culler that 
Flaubert’s narrator is not “characterizable” in the same, ostentatious way that the Balzacian 
narrator often is (110), I argue that the seeming absence of Sentimental Education’s narrator 
can also be a lens through which we can discern the reliance of novelistic character 
development upon an identification or collusion between narrator and character.  The aloof 
attitude that Flaubert’s narrators often take represents a particular strategy—that is, the 
withholding of sympathy that might otherwise be given—in the service of a characterization 
whose lack of pedagogical loquacity actually exploits the narrator’s potential position as an 
affective center.  
As I have already suggested, the narrator’s depiction of Moreau’s consciousness 
illuminates how narrative sympathy bears upon the construction of the protagonist’s 
formal character.  Flaubert’s presentation of Frédéric uses interior monologues not to 
bring the narrator in line with the protagonist (a maneuver the Bildungsroman habitually 
employs), but to exaggerate the distance between them.  Such estrangement of the 
protagonist’s thought from the ostensibly sympathetic project of represented 
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consciousness occurs most frequently when Moreau daydreams about capturing the 
affections of Mme Arnoux: 
He envied pianists their talent and soldiers their scars.  He longed for a 
dangerous illness, hoping that he might arouse her interest in this way. 
 
One thing astonished him, and that was that he did not feel jealous of 
Arnoux.  Again, he could not imagine her otherwise than clothed, her 
modesty seemed so natural, hiding her sex in a mysterious darkness. 
All the same he dreamt of the happiness of living with her, of talking 
familiarly with her, of passing his hand slowly over her hair, or of 
kneeling before her with both arms round her waist, gazing into her eyes 
and drinking in her soul.  To bring this about he would have to conquer 
Fate; and so, incapable of action, cursing God, and accusing himself of 
cowardice, he turned restlessly about in his desire, like a prisoner in his 
dungeon.  A perpetual anguish stifled him.  He would remain motionless 
for hours at a time, or else he would burst into tears (79).144 
  
 Taken on its own, this passage seems at first to recreate the very structures of 
sympathetic interiority that abound in nineteenth-century character development novels.  
What is more stereotypically sympathetic, after all, than a character’s inner torment over 
a love for whom he knows he is inadequate?  We might just as easily come across such 
romantic agonizing during certain sections of David Copperfield or The Red and the 
Black.  But when we place the passage in the context of Sentimental Education, we must 
first keep in mind its proximity to pages upon pages of other passages that are similar in 
tone and subject matter.  Moreau’s desire for Mme Arnoux perennially exhibits itself 
through imaginary scenarios such as the one I’ve just cited; in fact, Frédéric’s very 
facility for prolonged and detailed fantasy is as dominant a characteristic as Maggie 
Tulliver’s need for love.  Never does Moreau diverge from his strictly interiorized 
romantic relationship with Mme Arnoux. Despite the novel’s indication in its final 
chapters that she would be happy to oblige (415), Moreau avoids externalizing his desires 
by acting on them. 
    
 210
What is similar here to earlier Bildungsromane in tone is thus radically dissimilar 
in frequency: Copperfield, Sorel, and the majority of their contemporaneous counterparts 
eventually turn their internalized desires outward rather than keeping them “hidden” from 
other characters within the realm of represented thought.  While the presentation of 
interiorized, frustrated desire is a familiar maneuver within the traditional narrative of 
character development, the ultimate externalization of this desire nearly always attends it.  
(Isn’t it enough for us to witness the way David silently pines after Dora to be sure that 
he will ultimately marry her?).  Located within the developmental trajectory that the 
Bildungsroman’s narrative continually signals, the illustration of interior desire figures as 
only the first step in a series of actions—as the catalyst to a series of actions—that will 
ensure that the protagonist ends up far from where he began.  But, as Georg Lukàcs 
writes, Sentimental Education’s sacrifice of action for interiority dramatizes not “a 
sensuously meaningful story,” but instead “the disintegration of form in a nebulous and 
unstructured sequence of moods and reflections about moods” (113).  Because Moreau is 
unwilling or unable to consummate the longing that holds dominion over his 
consciousness, the novel cannot turn that longing into an event that marks a stage in its 
protagonist’s development.  The repetitive quality with which Flaubert’s narrator presents 
Frédéric’s interiority effectively divests it of the sympathetic valence that would attend it 
were it not so consistently reiterated.  And although Frédéric’s inaction resembles that of 
Trollope’s serial vacillators, the distance from which Flaubert’s narrator portrays his 
protagonist diverges from Trollope’s chatty insistence that inaction possesses its own 
characterological virtues. 
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On a localized level, this passage illustrates the way that Moreau dreams, 
bizarrely, of imitating the kind of individual whom he imagines Mme Arnoux will notice.  
He longs not for her to see through to some idiosyncratic “inner self” that he is afraid to 
put on view, but rather to take on the identity of other categories of men (pianists, 
soldiers) because of the stereotypical merits he assigns to them (talent, scars).  And if 
Moreau chooses to covet a character not his own, it is because Sentimental Education 
consistently questions the very notion of individualized character that the discourse of 
earlier nineteenth-century growth narratives takes pains to evoke.  Literary critics, of 
course, have long reminded us that the notion of the “true self” that appears so central in 
nineteenth-century literature inevitably breaks down when we try to put pressure on it.145  
But Flaubert’s novel differs from other nineteenth-century fiction by suggesting that there 
is very little to break down in the first place.  Moreau’s belief that the only way to win 
Mme Arnoux’s affection is through impersonation pushes to the fore a tension between 
original and what we might call “imitative” character that  recalls Godwin Peak’s false 
conversion.  Both protagonists, that is, predicate the idea of development on a kind of 
performance.  However, Peak is hiding his atheism—a specific moral stance that renders 
him unsympathetic to the Warricombes—in order to ingratiate himself further into the 
bourgeois circles that he idealizes. He impersonates the stock characteristics of a kind of 
moral character that Born in Exile insists is not his own.  What lies beneath Moreau’s 
envy for other categories of men is simply more envy and more desiring, as the snapshot-
paced imagery of the Flaubertian sentence makes clear.  Moreau’s formal character 
becomes difficult to assess because it consists in fleeting and fragmented desires (here, 
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talking with her, kneeling before her, gazing at her) that repeat themselves throughout the 
novel’s representation of its protagonist’s thought.   
One of Flaubert’s most famous statements about Sentimental Education appears 
in an 1864 letter to a frequent correspondent, Mlle Leroyer de Chantepie.  The letter, 
quite typically for Flaubert, describes the author’s misgivings about the future reception 
of his work: “It’s a book about love, about passion; but passion such as can exist 
nowadays—that is to say, inactive.  The subject as I have conceived it is, I believe, 
profoundly true—but for that very reason probably not very entertaining” (Letters, 80).146  
When we read this statement in light of passages from the novel like the one I have 
quoted above, it becomes clear how much the construction of Moreau’s character 
contributes to the overall effect that Sentimental Education was apparently intended to 
produce in its audience.  For if we want to understand Moreau as a character, we must do 
so through a narrative mode—represented consciousness—that is “inactive” in its very 
nature.  Interior discourse does not advance the narrative’s plot so much as it insists that 
reader and character linger together in a moment of contemplation.  Typically, such a 
moment will provide us with new information about a character’s feelings or motivations, 
and (as I have stated above) it often acts as a catalyst toward a narrative’s action.  (Julien 
Sorel, for example, imagines in detail what it would be like to seize Mme de Rênal’s 
hand, and he proceeds actually to seize it).  But since Moreau follows up his internal 
desires not with action but only with variations on an internal theme, the novel effectively 
severs the relationship between thought and action that typically underpins the 
characterization of the Bildungsroman’s protagonist.   It is this division between what 
Moreau thinks and what he does not do that Flaubert assumes will render his novel “not 
    
 213
very entertaining.”  Though the author does not specifically equate the projected boredom 
of his audience with the presentation of Moreau as a central character, it would be 
difficult to avoid this conclusion.  Moreau’s character embodies the inactive passion that 
Flaubert’s novel recapitulates as one of its major themes, so boredom with the novel 
would necessarily amount to boredom with he whose ostensible “education” supplies its 
title.   
Sentimental Education dilates upon the inaction that characterizes Moreau’s 
thought through Flaubert’s now infamous use of free indirect discourse (FID), the deft 
manipulation of which, as we have seen, contributes to the sense of psychological depth 
that readers often attribute to characters.147  The narrator liberally intersperses Moreau’s 
interior monologues with FID, thus intensifying the already parodic excessiveness of the 
protagonist’s reveries.  Not only do Moreau’s interior monologues occur one after 
another, but the narrator doubly accentuates the pointlessness of each by aping Moreau’s 
language patterns.  The following passage occurs during a walk home that Moreau takes 
after visiting the Arnoux household:  
He had been endowed with an extraordinary talent, the object of which he 
did not know.  He asked himself in all seriousness whether he was to be a 
great painter or a great poet; and he decided in favour of painting, for the 
demands of this profession would bring him closer to Mme Arnoux.  So he 
had found his vocation!  The object of his existence was now clear, and 
there could be no doubt about the future. 
 
When he had shut his door, he heard somebody snoring in the dark closet 
next to his bedroom.  It was his friend.  He had forgotten all about him.  
 
His own face presented itself to him in the mirror.  He liked the look of it, 
and remained there for a minute gazing at himself (61).148 
 
Moreau admires himself in the mirror: so ends the fourth chapter of the first volume of 
Flaubert’s novel.  In his book on Jane Austen—probably the only novelist whose use of 
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FID has prompted more critical analysis than Flaubert’s—D.A. Miller eloquently 
compares the technique of the chapter break to a kind of narrative “hurdle… which, like a 
fade-to-black in film, executes as strong an internal disconnect as the Novel has at its 
disposal” (64).149  The chapter break here allows us to meditate on the sheer deflation of 
the moment, as the protagonist’s reflection on his reflection (and on his friend’s noisy 
slumber) easily distracts him from what seconds earlier seemed a revelation about his life 
course.  Not simply questioning the value of the epiphany (as do The Mill on the Floss 
and the Palliser novels), Sentimental Education joins Born in Exile in openly mocking it.  
Where in a Bildungsroman like Emma, Austen uses FID to signal and sympathize with 
the protagonist’s revelation, Flaubert’s employs the same narrative technique to contrary 
ends, turning the very possibility of Frédéric’s revelation into a parody.  The time for a 
reader’s laughter at Moreau’s inanities seems literally built into the narrative’s form, and 
the absence of any verbal commentary by the narrator—the distance at which he places 
himself from Moreau’s complacency at the end of this chapter—becomes a strategy of 
derision that is all the more forceful for its linguistic silence.  
But if we feel the narrator’s distance at the end of the previous passage and the 
chapter that it concludes, the FID that precedes the chapter break underscores a moment 
when the narrator is unquestionably present. The jumbled quality of free indirect 
discourse, in which the narrator’s and character’s voices become confused, here 
heightens the absurdity of Moreau’s impromptu career choices by disingenuously 
infusing them with the narratorial brio to which the protagonist’s idiom must submit itself 
(“So he had found his vocation!”).  The passage is crucial to Sentimental Education’s 
project of charting its protagonist’s failed development in formal terms; it illustrates how 
    
 215
the narrator uses such linguistic mimicry as a space of commentary on Moreau’s 
(un)developing character.  Not only does Moreau here move indiscriminately from 
reverie to reverie (as he does in his more detailed fantasies about Mme Arnoux), but the 
content of his reflections directly addresses the novel’s commitment to gesturing toward 
structural aspects of the Bildungsroman.  The discovery of a life’s object, for example, 
could hardly be a more pervasive plot point in the coming-of-age narrative.  What 
diverges from the Bildungsroman’s conventional structure here, though, is not the 
inclusion of the life-object’s discovery, but the alacrity with which it is discovered and 
discarded.  Moreau does not, like Wilhelm Meister or David Copperfield, find vocational 
satisfaction at the end of a long journey (and a long narrative that would relate it).  We 
must keep in mind that this revelation occurs in the first volume of a three-volume novel, 
that it is only one in a veritable procession of similarly structured “breakthroughs.”  That 
the narrator should ironically imitate the protagonist’s voice at the same time that Moreau 
imagines he has found “the object of his existence,” and that this “object” goes from 
Moreau’s mind as quickly as it comes, reveals the narrator’s investment in refashioning 
the developing protagonist into a character who never learns.  (The irony of the novel’s 
title, of course, depends on our understanding of the resistance to education that 
Moreau’s excessive, clichéd interiority—his extreme sentiment—brings about).   
Though Moreau’s “talent” lies if anything in moving quickly from one imagined 
vocation to the next, the image of him that the narrator ultimately presents is a 
comparatively static one.  Insofar as Flaubert constructs his protagonist through 
techniques of repetition and exaggeration, Frédéric’s character resembles those of 
Maggie Tulliver and Corinne, each of whom demonstrates a persistent characterological 
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intransigence.  But Frédéric’s tenacity, paradoxically, lies in his refusal to govern himself 
according to any one characteristic, or to settle on any principle that would orient his 
psychological meanderings morally.   Unable to act upon the dreams he constructs for 
himself before new dreams begin to accrue, the protagonist finally finds himself unable to 
even dream: the imagination that tenuously holds his character together gradually 
recedes.  Toward the end of the novel, the narrator informs us that even Moreau’s love 
for Mme Arnoux has cooled: “the violence of desire, the very flower of feeling, had gone.  
His intellectual ambitions had also dwindled.  Years went by; and he endured the idleness 
of his mind and the inertia of his heart” (411).150  Although this diminishment of feeling 
does represent a change for Moreau, it is essential for Flaubert’s narrative of failed 
development that this change be figured as a loss: Moreau does not mature as a result of 
his mental idleness, but rather loses the imaginative power of which his character has 
largely consisted.   
The Flaubertian narrator’s unsympathetic treatment of his protagonist—the way 
that the narrator exaggerates, repeats, and mimics Moreau’s self-reflection to the point at 
which that reflection serves no ostensible goal but to further itself—thus contributes 
largely to Moreau’s failure to develop as a formal character.    The protagonist’s 
interiority comes across not as a productive “search within” that leads to 
characterological transformation, but as an incessant hindrance to his life-plot’s 
unfolding. And since we are dealing with a Bildungsroman, this life-plot is also the plot 
of Flaubert’s novel itself.  Given both the frequency of the interior passages and the 
narrator’s refusal to provide either a tongue-in-cheek apology for or an analytic 
evaluation of them, it is hardly surprising that certain reviews of Sentimental Education 
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did not warm to the structure of its storyline.  Flaubert himself complained to George 
Sand that [some critics of the novel] “are of the opinion that what I have written is merely 
a series of scenes, and that composition and pattern are completely lacking” (Letters, 
136).151  What such negative views are responding to, I would argue, is the way that 
Moreau’s interiority—copious enough to be confused with the novel’s plot itself—seems 
episodic without a narrator who underwrites its importance for the protagonist’s 
“education.”  The revelation of consciousness that should turn Moreau into a “deep” 
character instead turns him into a comical portrait of depth as Flaubert’s narrator 
alternates between withholding sympathy (through silent “distance” from Moreau’s 
reflection) and actively undermining it (by infusing that reflection with the mocking 
language of FID). And even though it does take place over many years, the “journey-
like” quality toward which Sentimental Education’s structure might gesture collapses as 
the insistent multiplication of Moreau’s interior monologues decelerates the forward 
movement upon which earlier Bildungsromane rely for the formation of plot and 
protagonist alike.  Henry James’s contention about Flaubert’s own development—that 
“no life was ever simpler or straighter in the sense of being a case of growth without 
change…the Flaubert of fifty differs from the Flaubert of twenty only in size” (Literary 
Criticism, 299)—thus provides an eerily appropriate description not only of Frédéric 
Moreau, but also of those numerous other protagonists (Maggie Tulliver, Corinne, Alice 




    
 218
Development and the Character Type 
If Frédéric Moreau and Godwin Peak do not develop according to the 
Bildungsroman’s conventional schema, it is not for their own lack of engagement with 
the idea of character development itself.  David Grylls’s observation that “Gissing’s 
people take their self-improvement seriously, [including] cultural and mental as well as 
moral and psychological development” (109) might also be applied to Sentimental 
Education’s hero, whom the narrator tells us “[plans his life] like an architect designing a 
palace” (109).  In both novels, this desire for character development becomes 
indistinguishable from the protagonists’ fixation upon an abstracted female love-object.  
Moreau and Peak think about their loves (that is, Mme Arnoux and Sidwell Warricombe) 
as if the possession of each was a veritable raison d’être: Peak remarks that “my one 
desire is to marry a perfectly refined woman” (140) and, as we have already seen, 
Moreau specifically describes Mme Arnoux as the “object of his existence.”  Further, this 
conflation of the possession of a woman with the development of character ensures each 
protagonist’s developmental failure.  Peak’s determination to marry Sidwell allows him 
to rationalize a feigned moral conversion, and the persistence of Moreau’s fascination 
with Mme Arnoux attenuates both his crippling self-reflection and the incoherent formal 
character that results from it. 
That a Bildungsroman’s protagonist should construct a love-object as a center of 
desirable abstract qualities is not in itself a structural or thematic innovation for the 
character development narrative:  almost any Bildungsroman could be said to effect a 
similar maneuver, from Wilhelm Meister’s worship of Natalie, to David Copperfield’s 
idealization of Dora, to Corinne’s tragic fixation on Oswald.  In Flaubert’s and Gissing’s 
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novels, however, the quality of this abstraction differs from more conventional models 
through the protagonists’ imagination of Sidwell and Mme Arnoux as types.  I use the 
latter term in its more familiar sense of anatomizing these characters according to 
particular social and characterological distinctions (Sidwell is, for Godwin, the very type 
of the genteel Victorian lady, and Mme Arnoux strikes Frédéric as the living incarnation 
of a virtuous, romantic heroine). But more importantly, “typologizing” describes the way 
in which Godwin’s and Frédéric’s desire for these women renders Sidwell and Mme 
Arnoux into static mental portraits.  Both Born in Exile and Sentimental Education 
present their central “romantic” relationships as more psychological than actual, since 
Godwin and Frédéric spend more time with their imagined lovers than they ever do with 
the “real” women themselves.  The novels’ narrators ultimately illustrate not only how 
this typology of character is inaccurate—since it does not allow Sidwell and Mme 
Arnoux room to develop themselves—but also how its inaccuracy reflects the 
protagonists’ larger developmental failures.  For if Godwin and Frederic are permitted to 
pursue their own ideals of development at a distance from the vigorous verbal intrusion 
that occurs in earlier Bildungsromane, this distance also permits the narrators to 
showcase the protagonists’ inability to successfully “read” the female characters on 
whom they focus.. 
The statement that Frédéric Moreau typologizes Mme Arnoux might at first seem 
counterintuitive.  After all, Moreau reflects constantly upon her utter singularity: 
Every morning he swore that he was going to be bold.  An invincible 
sense of decency restrained him; and he could not find any example to 
follow, since she was different from other women.  His dreams had raised 
her to a position outside the human condition.  Beside her, he felt less 
important on earth than the scraps of silk which fell from her scissors” 
(174, emphasis added).153 
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But Moreau’s elevation of Mme Arnoux to the status of goddess—a woman who is 
“outside the human condition”—actually turns her into a type.  To Moreau, everything 
Mme Arnoux does is morally unshakeable, and every item she touches becomes a kind of 
holy relic.  Moreover, the protagonist’s inaction (what he assumes here to be his 
“invincible sense of decency”) indicates how invested he is in keeping Mme Arnoux’s 
faultless image untainted with the dull realities that an actual sexual encounter with her 
might occasion.  Moreau’s unwillingness to seduce Mme Arnoux thus allows his 
fantasies about her as a type of character he desires to be sustained.  And these desires, in 
turn, permit the protagonist to make structural sense of his own story: in the end of the 
novel, Moreau actually tells Mme Arnoux that “in the depths of myself I always had the 
music of your voice and the splendour of your eyes” (414).154  What Mme Arnoux means 
to Moreau is what she means for him, in terms of his self-construction as a character: she 
is the organizing principle of his reveries. 
 Because Sentimental Education’s narrator is so focused on the elaboration and 
ridicule of its protagonist’s interiority, it seldom allows Mme Arnoux a role that is 
independent from Moreau’s abstracted conception of her: we as readers get to know Mme 
Arnoux principally through the protagonist’s thoughts.  However it would be a mistake to 
interpret the narrator’s sparse treatment of Mme Arnoux’s own feelings and actions as his 
tacit agreement with Moreau’s typologies.  Like the chronicler of Born in Exile, 
Flaubert’s narrator provides the protagonist with more space than sympathy; the focus on 
Moreau’s presentation of Mme Arnoux inside monologues that the narrator sardonically 
inflects suggests that readers should give as little credence to the accuracy of Moreau’s 
characterization as they should faith to his musical or literary aspirations.  As Diana 
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Knight notes, “Madame Arnoux is real but Moreau perceives her as if she were an 
image” (86).  And it is this conception of the “real” love-object as an aestheticized 
image—as a mental picture that can be elaborated and embellished interminably—that 
allows the protagonist to depict Mme Arnoux internally as “the substance of his feelings, 
the very essence of his life” (SE 397).155  That the novel’s narrator dilates not upon Mme 
Arnoux, but rather on how Moreau conceives of her, in fact further establishes his 
characterization of the protagonist as no more than the sum of his own imaginings.   
 Most readers of Sentimental Education will remember that its narrator finally 
allows Mme Arnoux to speak for herself in the novel’s closing pages.  The scene in 
which an elderly Mme Arnoux, now widowed, pays an unexpected visit to a middle-aged 
and comparatively dispassionate Frédéric, has captivated critics from Henry James to 
Jonathan Culler, not least because it presents a more detailed version of the “real” woman 
behind the goddess than the novel has previously allowed.  In addition, Mme Arnoux’s 
widowhood makes her more available to Moreau than ever before: there is, in this scene 
that follows so many of the protagonist’s romantic dreams, at least the potential for the 
couple to get together after all.  But such an ending, however ardently even the most 
cynical of critics might secretly desire it, proves impossible because of the strictly 
internal world to which Moreau must relegate Mme Arnoux if he is to make sense of the 
self he has created around her image.   
Mme Arnoux reveals herself, in fact, to possess a capacity for dreaming that 
resembles Moreau’s own.  We learn, in particularly florid dialogue, that she has pined 
after the protagonist all along: “Sometimes,” she confesses, “your words come back to 
me like a distant echo, like the sound of a bell carried by the wind; and when I read about 
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love in a book, I feel that you are there beside me” (413).156  But although this confession 
inspires Moreau with “a frenzied, rabid lust such as he had never known before,” he 
proceeds to restrain himself from what he perceives as its speaker’s sexual advances 
because of an equally powerful “fear of being disgusted later.  Besides, what a nuisance it 
would be!” (415).157  We see here how Mme Arnoux’s revelation of her own emotions—
regardless of how congenial they may seem to Moreau’s desires—complicates his 
reliance on an image of his beloved as a static type.  To finally make love to Mme 
Arnoux would cause him “disgust” because it would curtail the abstraction of her by 
which he lives.  Hence also the protagonist’s feeling that the first sight of Mme Arnoux’s 
white hair “was like a blow full in the chest” (414).158 The revelation of white hair that 
was once black is such a shock to Moreau because it is a visual marker of change: Mme 
Arnoux’s aging body threatens Moreau with the knowledge that she is not “outside the 
human condition” but is manifestly a part of it.  And if Moreau acknowledges that Mme 
Arnoux’s external beauty has faded, he must also become aware of the breakdown of 
what he takes to be “the very essence of his life.”   
Born in Exile explores its protagonist’s confusion of his own development with 
the possession of a female “essence” much more explicitly than does Sentimental 
Education.  The character Christian Moxey once remarks that “a woman’s influence 
takes one out of oneself” (197), and it is this influence that Godwin Peak finds so 
attractive in his abstraction of Sidwell Warricombe as “no individual, but the type of an 
order” (216).  We have seen how Peak’s decision to feign the development of moral 
character at Exeter is contingent upon his refusal to come to terms with what the narrator 
figures as his “inner nature.”  That Peak should locate “the supreme end to which my life 
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is directed” (439) not in himself but in the possession of a woman he styles as 
representative of the level of gentility he desires thus sets the stage for his development to 
fail.  The following passage, which closes Part III of the novel and serves as a transition 
into Peak’s phony conversion, provides a spectacular example of the protagonist’s 
reliance upon the typologization of Sidwell as a way both to figure his own development 
and to rationalize the performance of moral conversion that he hopes will draw Sidwell’s 
attention: 
It was Sidwell or death.  Into what a void of hideous futility would his life 
be cast, if this desire proved vain, and he were left to combat alone with 
the memory of his dishonour!  With Sidwell the reproach could be 
outlived.  She would understand him, pardon him—and thereafter a 
glorified existence, rivaling that of whosoever has been most exultant 
among the sons of men! (274). 
 
Peak’s use of the term “Sidwell” here slides almost comically into abstraction: 
paired with “death,” the “Sidwell” of which the protagonist conceives stands in for Peak’s 
life itself.  Like Moreau’s canonization of Mme Arnoux in Sentimental Education, Peak’s 
idea of Sidwell as a love-object necessitates that the particularities of her character be 
subordinated to the type of woman about whom Peak fantasizes.   Moreover, the delivery 
of this self-given ultimatum in a frenzy of FID points up the mock heroics of Peak’s 
project, the way that Peak throws down the gauntlet and challenges himself to face the 
“combat” with “dishonour” that will follow if he fails to achieve the existence that his 
notion of Sidwell seems to promise.  As in Sentimental Education, the vocal proximity that 
FID makes available between Gissing’s narrator and central character actually amplifies the 
ironic tone in which the interior monologue is delivered. 
Born in Exile’s narrator can give no better evidence of its own distance from Peak 
than by allowing the reader to glimpse aspects of Sidwell’s character to which Peak himself 
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is not privy.  That the protagonist’s focus on Sidwell’s representative qualities deprives 
both him and the reader of a more nuanced look at her character becomes evident in scenes 
when Sidwell interrogates her family members about their own moral compunctions.  She 
responds to Buckland’s complaints about the “ridiculous education” of women, for 
example, with a statement that puts the substance of her own education into practice: “This 
generalising is so easy…and so worthless…there’s no longer such a thing as woman in the 
abstract.  We are individuals” (238, emphasis in original).  And though Sidwell eventually 
capitulates to her father’s wishes that she discontinue her contact with Peak, her refusal to 
scorn the protagonist after discovering his elaborate lie illustrates her exceptionality rather 
than her adherence to the kinds of actions that both Peak and her family expect from her.  
Where Peak’s conception of his own development depends on possessing a woman who is 
“the type of an order,” then, Sidwell is struggling to differentiate herself from such an 
assessment.  Though the character type with which Peak associates her by definition cannot 
grow (it remains static, in a knowable place), Born in Exile’s narrator shows us what Peak 
fails to grasp: that Sidwell is, in fact, moving through the very process of character 
development that the protagonist himself only pretends to undergo.    
Gissing’s novel thus offers alternate views of the abstracted female character, 
whereas Sentimental Education withholds such a view until its final scenes.   But even 
though the two narrators’ techniques for showing the protagonists’ problematic readings of 
character are structurally dissimilar, the effect of those techniques is comparable.  Both 
narrators demonstrate their affective distance from Peak and Moreau by illustrating the way 
that the protagonists’ conception of development relies on the false assumption that their 
abstracted love-objects cannot or will not develop themselves.  Moreover, narrative 
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distance links Peak’s and Moreau’s failures (one to develop the harmonious “moral” 
character that his narrator describes, the other to develop formally, outside the depiction of 
his interior monologues) to the characters’ reliance on the simplification and abstraction of 
female character.  Flaubert’s and Gissing’s narrators ultimately suggest, then, that 
typologizing character is a practice for which they have little sympathy.  
Nevertheless, it is worth asking how such skepticism of the protagonists’ affinity 
for typologizing character reflects back on the narrators’ own methods of characterization.  
For—as this dissertation has repeatedly pointed out—the ability to make generalizations 
about moral character is the very modus operandi of the nineteenth-century novel’s 
narrator.  (Recall the confident assessment of Godwin Peak as a “militant egotist,” or 
Flaubert’s own statement that his “desire was to portray types” rather than individuals in 
his novels [qtd. in Steegmuller 339]). If narrators themselves offer little sympathy for a 
strategy of characterization so common to their practice, how is it that they escape the 
moral judgments that descriptive abstractions attach to characters?  If the narrator is a 
center of judgment, why do we, as readers and critics, tend not measure him by the same 
standards by which he organizes the sympathetic orientation of the narrative?    
The answer, I would argue, involves the narrator’s ability to hide himself from the 
reader through distancing techniques: literary critics rarely recognize any persona behind 
the narration of novels whose narrators are not also characters within the world of the story.  
Though characters in third-person novels are no more “real people” than are the narrators 
who describe them, they do not have the same ability to retreat into the seemingly 
impersonal language that the novelistic narrator often adopts. The whole notion of the 
objective voice—that is, the image of the Flaubertian narrator that critics like Culler and 
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Miller figure as a kind of linguistic liberation—helps avoid discussions of the narrator as a 
moral agent.  And “disembodied language,” too, is an attractive idea for novel theorists 
because it turns the novel into a site of linguistic indeterminacy that is purportedly 
unencumbered by the eternally tendentious arena of human value systems. 
But there is a point at which the decision to see a narrator as impersonal risks 
turning meaninglessness into the highest value.  Booth reminds us that “to write is to affirm 
at the very least the superiority of this order over that order” (298, emphasis in original).  
Though neither Flaubert nor Gissing desired to espouse a particular order in his work,159 
the way that both Born in Exile and Sentimental Education figure a character’s lack of 
sympathetic qualities as a cause of developmental failure helps us understand how the 
construction of development in the novel also attempts to structure the sympathy that 
readers can give or withhold.  A narrator’s distance can mask his attempt to collude with 
his audience, but the very act of telling a story will always refigure this collusion.  If we, 
like the narrators who speak to us through novels, come to withhold sympathy from certain 
characters, we have learned to do so in part by sympathizing with the voice—however 
distant—that fixes those characters as types. 
 










Character Beyond the Novel 
 
  
I began this dissertation by stressing the value of genre as a tool to demarcate my 
area of inquiry.  The genre of the Bildungsroman, I argued, offered an ideal discursive 
field in which to examine literary character, since Bildungsromane traditionally treat 
character development as a central thematic and formal subject.  Further, my analysis of 
character through the Bildungsroman was period-specific: while character development 
novels continue to flourish in our own day, their nineteenth-century ancestors were more 
overtly concerned with character’s moral component.  Though many of the novels I treat 
in this study illustrate different understandings of moral character—from Dickens’s and 
Charlotte Brontë’s alignment of morality with introspection, for example, to Flaubert’s 
refusal, through narrative distance, to sanction introspection as a moral practice—all of 
them appear comfortable, and many even eager, to make value judgments about their 
protagonists’ relative virtues. 
But if nineteenth-century Bildungsromane demonstrate particularly stark 
manifestations of character’s marriage of morality with form, it surely does not follow 
that the Bildungsroman is the only genre in which such a marriage becomes legible.  Is 
“character” as I have described it exclusive to narrative, for example?  How might the 
construction of character in lyric poetry complicate or extend our understandings of 
psychological depth throughout nineteenth-century literature?   And what, exactly, is the 
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status of the term “literature” in this or any inquiry into narratological character: does 
character function differently in historical texts than it does in the novel’s imagined 
histories?  As I bring this study to a close, I want to briefly approach the latter question 
by exploring a prose genre—the non-fictional autobiography—that closely resembles 
David Copperfield and Jane Eyre, the two fictional autobiographies I considered in 
Chapter One.  By looking at Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions (1782) and John 
Stuart Mill’s Autobiography (1873) with the previous four chapters in mind, I will 
suggest a direction in which my analysis of character might move in the future.  I have 
chosen these two texts not only because of their formal affinity with first-person 
Bildungsromane, but also because of the enormous impact of both Rousseau’s and Mill’s 
writings on nineteenth-century discourses about character (whether in its philosophical, 
political, educational or literary guises).    
Asking whether fictional and non-fictional versions of character function 
similarly involves epistemological questions whose theoretical and historical complexity 
deserves far more space than the current study can provide.  In the interest of a 
preliminary sketch, however, I want at least to signal that these questions implicate what 
Dorrit Cohn has called the “distinction of fiction”—that is, the general, underlying 
differences (or lack of such differences) between narratives imagined by authors and 
narratives based on actual historical events.160  Bracketing Cohn’s own take on this issue 
for the moment, suffice it to say that the majority of narratologists make very little, if 
any, distinction between fiction and nonfiction in their generalizations about narrative 
discourse.161  Indeed, both Rousseau’s and Mill’s autobiographies seem in numerous 
ways to support such a conclusion: Rousseau’s steady rise from the bucolic Swiss 
    
 229
countryside to the chic salons of Paris prefigures many a similar installment in the 
Comédie Humaine, for example, and Mill’s emphasis on the benefits and traumas of his 
childhood education reflects the comparable fictions of child development we find in 
Brontë’s and Dickens’s Bildungsromane.  Both works, in addition, are structured around 
the kind of dramatic epiphanies we saw in Emma and The Portrait of a Lady, from 
Rousseau’s youthful realization of “violence and injustice” when he is unfairly punished 
for a theft he did not commit,162 to the reading of Étienne Dumont’s Traité de Législation 
that Mill claims “gave unity to my conception of things.  I now had opinions; a creed, a 
doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a religion” (68).  In 
each case, the autobiographer ascribes transformative value to these youthful events; not 
only were both writers forever changed after undergoing a flash of insight, but these 
changes directly informed the philosophical beliefs for which they would later become 
famous.  By figuring characterological change as both the focal point and the justification 
for each work, and Rousseau’s and Mill’s autobiographies support the tradition of 
progressive Bildung which writers like Eliot, Staël and Trollope resisted through their 
own development novels. 
Mill’s Autobiography in particular bears a striking similarity to David 
Copperfield, exhibiting variations on the techniques of “character sacrifice” that we have 
seen at work in Dickens’s novel.  When discussing his debating society years, for 
example, Mill casts several of his colleagues in plainly functional roles, remarking that 
“both Maurice and Sterling were of considerable use to my development” (145).  This 
construction of his own character through others becomes most elaborately wrought in 
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Mill’s reflections on Harriet Taylor, his longtime friend and, later, wife.  Take for 
instance, the first sentence of Chapter VI: 
It was at the period of my mental progress which I have now 
reached that I formed the friendship which has been the honour 
and chief blessing of my existence, as well as the source of a great 
part of all I have attempted to do, or hope to effect hereafter, for 
human improvement (145). 
 
Here, Mill refigures the conventional Bildungsroman’s stage-based trajectory both by 
carving up his life story into discrete “periods” and by defining this specific period in 
terms of a person who had an ameliorative effect on his moral development.  Compare 
this paean to Taylor with David’s confident assertion that Agnes is “the source of every 
worthy aspiration I had ever had; the centre of myself, the circle of my life” (808).  Not 
only do both Mill the man and David the character implicitly showcase their belief in 
individual progress, but their similar positioning of a female love-object as the origin of 
this progress allows them to seem selfless at the same time that it builds up their own 
self-narratives.  Moreover, Mill’s subsequent remark that “[i]n this third period…of my 
mental progress, which now went hand-in-hand with hers, my opinions gained equally in 
breadth and depth” (174) illustrates how his introjection of his wife’s character renders 
his own character fuller, more changed, and finally, morally superior to its earlier 
incarnations in pre-Harriet “periods.”  Finally, Harriet becomes an increasingly powerful 
guiding force for Mill after she dies, as he is left to try to derive moral benefit from the 
loss: “Her memory is to me a religion,” he writes, “and her approbation the standard by 
which…I endeavour to regulate my life” (183).  Mill’s formulation here recalls 
Copperfield’s narrative of being “sustained and led on” in hard times by the memory of 
his dead mother (177).  In the fictional and the non-fictional passage alike, the death of 
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another gives the narrator an occasion to comment on his own character’s forward 
trajectory.   
 While such parallels appear to substantiate a theoretical reading that positions 
fictional and non-fictional autobiographies on the same discursive plane, Cohn insists that 
the relationship between non-fictional narrative and real historical events obliges critics 
to approach them differently.  “The fact is,” she writes, “that a text-oriented poetics of 
fiction excludes on principle a realm that is at the very center of the historiographer’s 
concern: the more or less reliably documented evidence of past events out of which the 
historian fashions his story” (Distinction, 112).  In particular, Cohn has suggested that 
narratology’s traditional, bi-level story/discourse model—which divides narrative into a 
sequence of events (the “story”) and the fashion in which those events are presented (the 
“discourse”)—is “insufficient and incomplete” when analyzing historical narratives, 
which latter necessitate a third tier of “reference” inapplicable to narrative fiction (111).  
And although Cohn readily admits that that non-fictional autobiographers are notoriously 
inaccurate self-historians (citing Rousseau here in particular), she maintains that the 
crucial distinction between a book like Confessions and a book like Jane Eyre is one of 
generic convention: Rousseau professes to tell his story as accurately as he can, and 
implied readers intend to take this profession in good faith (30-35).  Brontë’s implied 
readers, on the other hand, recognize from the beginning that the first-person narrator is 
not the author, and that her truth claims function in an imagined and therefore 
unverifiable world. 
 Somewhat paradoxically, Cohn goes on to assert that although non-fictional 
autobiographies possess a relationship to real events that separates them from their 
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fictional counterparts, at least one aspect of narrative technique allows fictional first-
person narratives to appear more real than the real historical narratives they implicitly 
impersonate.  This technique—or rather, constellation of techniques—is none other than 
represented thought, i.e. narrative’s mode of illustrating cognitive functioning.  While the 
reflective quality of any first-person narrative emphasizes its status as introspective 
thought, Cohn explains that “the minds of imaginary figures can be known in ways that 
those of real persons can not” insofar as readers of first-person fiction have complete, 
unlimited access to the fictional mind of the narrating character (118).163  When dealing 
with non-fictional autobiographers, on the other hand, just as when dealing with other 
people in the actual world, readers can never totally “know” the minds of others, since 
these minds contain an infinitude of abstract material that, if not intentionally withheld by 
the thinker, is nonetheless constantly shifting, quickly forgotten, and largely non-
linguistic.164  Novelistic autobiographers seem more real than actual autobiographers, 
then, because their entire mental “existence” is, by contrast, offered up to us as a material 
artifact whose discreteness allows it to become common knowledge among readers and 
critics. 
 If Cohn’s work focuses principally on how the presentation of fictional thought 
makes characters come to seem real, I propose to explore how the inverse side of this 
argument might help us better understand the construction of non-fictional, 
autobiographical characters and thereby sharpen our understanding of narratological 
character in general.  For while the “full” mental lives of novelistic autobiographers help 
them to appear genuine, the formal, “constructed” aspect of character becomes more 
overt in autobiographies written by flesh-and-blood human beings.  Indeed, both Mill’s 
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and Rousseau’s autobiographies—each of which transparently concerns itself with the 
construction of moral character—carry the formal tendencies of the traditional 
Bildungsroman to comparative excess.  In this light, Mill’s and Rousseau’s works do not 
resemble the Bildungsroman so much as they exaggerate many of the structural 
properties for which it is known.  Or—to put it another way—the fictional 
Bildungsroman offers a more streamlined version of the “real” character development 
process it imitates. 
 Take, for instance, what is perhaps the most infamous passage of Confessions: its 
lengthy epigraph (often called the “premier préambule”).  Rousseau writes: 
This is the only portrait of a man, painted exactly according to 
nature and in all its truth, that exists and will probably ever exist.  
Whoever you may be, whom destiny or my trust has made the 
arbiter of the fate of these notebooks, I entreat you, in the name of 
my misfortunes, of your compassion, and of all human kind, not to 
destroy a unique and useful work, which may serve as a first point 
of comparison in the study of man that certainly is yet to be begun, 
and not to take away from the honour of my memory the only sure 
monument to my character that has not been disfigured by my 
enemies.  Finally, were you yourself to be one of those implacable 
enemies, cease to be so towards my ashes, and do not pursue your 
cruel injustice beyond the term both of my life and yours; so that 
you might do yourself the credit of having been, once at least, 
generous and good, when you might have been wicked and 
vindictive; if, that is, the evil directed at a man who has never 
himself done nor wanted to do any could properly bear the name of 
vengeance (3).165 
 
The author’s claim to his work’s—and, by extension, his character’s—own uniqueness 
makes explicit what the first-person Bildungsroman only suggests.  In the simplest terms, 
the distinction between the fictional and the non-fictional text is one of showing versus 
telling: where the self-narratives of characters like David Copperfield and Jane Eyre 
convince us, over time, of the protagonist’s extraordinary qualities, Rousseau’s narrative 
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instead commands us, before providing any corroborating evidence, to take its author’s 
singularity on faith.  The Confessions’ précis of what we are about to read therefore 
echoes what Cohn identifies as “the massive prevalence of summary over scene in 
historical narration” (Distinction, 121), but unlike most historical writing, which tends to 
generalize about groups of individuals, Rousseau’s text here uses summative language to 
introduce the life of a single, specific individual.  In an attempt to prematurely justify his 
project’s importance to the reader, Rousseau’s story therefore risks seeming finished 
before it has even begun.  Compare, on the other hand, the first sentence of David 
Copperfield: “Whether I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life, or whether that 
station will be held by anybody else, these pages must show” (3).  Though we have 
already registered the disingenuousness of this sentence insofar as the title of Dickens’s 
novel proves that David is indeed “the hero of [his] own life,” its narrator’s performance 
of uncertainty about his own worthiness affords the reader considerably more judgmental 
power than do Rousseau’s opening lines: in the latter case, we are instructed to respect 
the author’s character, and in the former, we are asked to judge for ourselves whether or 
not the narrator will deserve respect after his story has been told.  So while both the 
fictional and the non-fictional autobiography both try from the beginning to win 
sympathy from their readers, Rousseau’s overt positioning of his book as a massive 
solicitation of sympathy (“I entreat you, in the name of my misfortunes…”) amplifies the 
goals—and therefore, the rhetorical constructedness—of the autobiographical enterprise.  
Unlike a fictional autobiographer, who is by definition unencumbered by real-world 
“enemies,” Rousseau’s actual history (and relationship with actual political adversaries) 
in fact obliges him to erect a formal armature of self-justification that appears antithetical 
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to the “natural” self-portrait he claims to be painting.  By contrast, David’s and Jane’s 
comparatively sparing addresses to the reader work to efface the reality that their “lives” 
are in fact wholly semantic creations, painstakingly imagined by professional novelists.   
I do not mean to suggest that Brontë’s and Dickens’s fictional autobiographies 
never engage in meta-commentary, but rather that Rousseau’s and Mill’s non-fictional 
autobiographies render many formal techniques of novelistic character development 
considerably more visible and therefore—ironically—more novelistic for all their 
referential validity.  Consider, for example, the Confessions’ insistence (in yet another of 
its narrator’s imperative asides to the reader) on telling everything: 
Before going any further, I owe the reader some excuse or 
justification, both for the minute details into which I have just 
gone, and for those into which I will be going later on, and which 
are of no particular interest to him.  But the undertaking I have 
embarked on, to reveal myself to him in my entirety, requires that 
nothing about me should remain hidden or obscure; I must be 
continually present to his gaze; he must follow me into all the 
aberrations of my heart, into every recess of my life; he must not 
lose sight of me for a moment, for fear that, finding in my story the 
least lacuna, the least void, and wondering to himself what I did 
during that time, he should accuse me of not wanting to reveal 
everything (58).166 
 
More than any other single text, Rousseau’s Confessions is renowned for 
pioneering the use of first-person narration not only to plumb the private depths of 
character (what Rousseau here calls the hidden “recesses” and aberrations of [his] 
heart”), but to suggest that those depths provide the lens through which one’s moral 
compass can truly be discerned.  This attempt to defend the first-person narrator’s 
character by granting readers unrestricted access to his mind, of course, will play a 
crucial role in the numerous fictional autobiographies, including Copperfield and Eyre, 
that followed Rousseau’s non-fictional one.  However, as we look back from Dickens’s 
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and Brontë’s Bildungsromane toward what is arguably modern autobiography’s inaugural 
text, we can see how Rousseau’s emphasis on intimacy is more magnified than anything 
we find in these two similarly foundational novels.  For instance, centuries before 
Elizabeth Ermarth suggested that the long duration of the novel cultivates an impression 
of characterological depth by allowing readers to follow characters throughout numerous, 
connected episodes, Rousseau made a similar proposition explicit in his own 
autobiography.  The previous passage illustrates Rousseau’s insistence that we will know 
him better (and, presumably, know him to be better) the more the more he tells.  
Consequently, as readers of the Confessions can verify, his story keeps on going and 
going, including not only a bevy of “novelistic” episodes (reading romances with his 
father; the theft of Madame de Vercelli’s ribbon), but a seemingly innumerable array of 
digressions and rationalizations as well.  But despite Rousseau’s insistence that he has 
left “nothing hidden,” representing a “whole life” remains an impossible task for the 
flesh-and-blood autobiographer: Rousseau’s avowal of painting his entire character could 
only be true if the Confessions were a fictional account whose characters did not exist 
outside the covers of a book.  A fictional autobiography, by contrast, actually does “tell 
everything” at the same time that it suggests that it has been deliberately and thoughtfully 
pieced together out of the unnarratable multiplicity of real-life experience.  
If the Confessions prefigures, in an ostentatious manner, the novel’s ability to 
evoke deep character through extended duration, Mill’s Autobiography lands far on the 
opposite side the narrative spectrum.  At around 200 pages, the Autobiography is as short 
as the Confessions is long; indeed, it is far shorter than any of the nineteenth-century 
Bildungsromane I mention in this dissertation.  Rather than defending his project through 
    
 237
a proposal to tell all, Mill insists, with stereotypically Victorian modesty, that he will tell 
as little as possible.  When studying the St. Simonians, for example, he writes that “[i]n 
giving an account of this period of my life, I have only specified such of my new 
impressions as appeared to me, both at the time and since, to be a kind of turning points 
[sic], marking a definite progress in my mode of thought” (134).  This statement 
exaggerates, by diminution, the relentlessly advancing plot-trajectory we find in fictional 
autobiographies like Copperfield and Eyre:  Mill’s commitment to chronicling the 
“definite progress” of his character requires any anecdote that threatens this progress to 
be swiftly edited out.  While even more peremptory in tone, Mill’s narrative self-
restrictions therefore structurally resemble Dickens’s and Brontë’s poetics of character 
sacrifice by only retaining narrative elements (whether characters like Agnes or episodes 
like Mill’s philosophical epiphany) that are positively saturated in characterological 
significance.  Mill, David, and Jane all suggest that the crucial parts of a life are those 
from which lessons can ultimately be derived, but the Autobiography carries this belief to 
the point at which its author’s self-portrait seems curiously incomplete.  Readers can find 
far more information on John Stuart Mill in any number of biographies, for example, than 
they can in his own life-narration, which ends as totally and as tidily as the most 
conventional of realist novels: “I have no further mental changes to tell of, but only, as I 
hope, a continued mental progress” (169).  When Mill’s transformation stops, in other 
words, so too does the narrative that depicts it. 
At this point, I can only speculate about why elements of character’s formal 
construction appear far more palpable in the autobiographies of real individuals than they 
do in autobiographical fictions.  Certainly the inability of real human beings to ever “tell 
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all” about themselves contributes to a sense of artifice surrounding Rousseau’s and Mill’s 
works, but this explanation hardly tells the whole story about autobiographical character.  
Another reason for this seemingly contradictory phenomenon—of real characters who 
seem fake and fake characters who seem real—may be related to the avowed concern 
with moral character development for which both Rousseau and Mill were known long 
before the publication of either autobiography.  While the Confessions and the 
Autobiography purport to relate their authors’ own specific development narratives,   
each book also serves to advance its author’s particular philosophy about character in 
general; each, therefore, does double-duty as a kind of how-to manual for the reader’s 
character development, ostentatiously gleaning moral principles from disparate narrative 
events.   
While this dissertation should leave little doubt that first-person Bildungsromane 
can also be laced with characterological pedagogy, its readings nonetheless suggest that a 
significant number of such novels are less confident than either Rousseau’s or Mill’s 
texts that character development—however figured—can favorably transform the 
developing subject.  Despite the Bildungsroman’s preoccupation with chronicling an 
individual’s growth, the novel is not obliged, as the Confessions and the Autobiography 
both are, to characterize developmental change as a virtue.  Instead, from the 
overweening constancy of Maggie Tulliver’s and Corinne’s dominant characteristics, to 
the Palliser characters’ interminable indecision, to Godwin Peak’s and Frédéric Moreau’s 
impersonation of  authentic conversions, we have seen how nineteenth-century novels 
that focus on character often highlight the various ways in which its development is static 
rather than progressive.  But if Rousseau’s and Mill’s texts paint a more dynamic picture 
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of character development than does any of these novels, their exaggerations of the 
Bildungsroman’s structural techniques provide yet another example of the distortions that 
attend character’s presentation in narrative.  Whether through the Confessions’ proposal 
to reveal its author’s character down to the most mundane detail, or the Autobiography’s 
refusal to divulge a single unnecessary episode, these non-fictional autobiographies join 
the nineteenth-century Bildungsroman in suggesting that character’s formal 
embeddedness in narrative will always disrupt the ideal of harmonious balance to which 











1 My attention to the narrative losses that attend the construction of psychological 
depth shares key conceptual concerns with Carolyn Steedman’s Strange Dislocations: 
Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority, 1780-1930.  Steedman’s remarkably 
interdisciplinary work traces uses the numerous historical appearances of Goethe’s 
Mignon figure—in contexts as diverse as literature, parenting manuals, amateur 
acrobatics, and psychoanalysis—to illustrate how the body of the child comes to 
represent “the depths of historicity within individuals” (12).  Part of Steedman’s 
argument suggests that interiority develops out of our sense of childhood as a lost realm, 
which becomes newly located—or rather, uncannily dislocated—in helpless child 
characters like Mignon. 
2 Slaughter’s “Enabling Fictions and Novel Subjects” explores both the history 
and theory of the Bildungsroman and the text of the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, suggesting that “normative human rights law and the 
idealist Bildungsroman manifest themselves in a common conceptual vocabulary, 
humanist social vision, and narrative grammar of free and full human personality 
development” (1406). 
3 See, for example, Michael Beddow’s The Fiction of Humanity: Studies in the 
Bildungsroman from Wieland to Thomas Mann; Susan Fraiman’s Unbecoming Women: 
British Women Writers and the Novel of Development (esp. 3-13); Marc Redfield’s 
Phantom Formations: Aesthetic Ideology and the Bildungsroman; and Martin Swales’s 
The German Bildungsroman from Wieland to Hesse. 
4 These remarks come from a recent article in which Esty reads Olive Schreiner’s 
Story of an African Farm as a “Colonial Bildungsroman” that gestures toward the genre’s 
conventional structure while also “break[ing] apart the entwined narrative telê of personal 
maturity and social modernization” (410).  Though I agree with Esty’s claim that African 
Farm distorts the Bildungsroman’s alleged narrative of progress, it is important to 
consider—as Esty only briefly does—how the “conventional” development narratives 
that preceded Schreiner’s novel also rejected any easy elision between development and 
self-amelioration. 
5 In his early essay, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives,” 
Barthes adopts “the definition of [the] character according to participation in a sphere of 
actions” (107).  Greimas outlines the structure of narrative characterization according to 
what he calls acteurs and actants: where an acteur is a specific character with particular 
traits (Lucy Snowe, Fanny Price, Edward Casaubon), an actant is a more generalized 
category that readers recognize across different narratives.  Greimas divides actantial 
roles into six categories: subject, object, sender, helper, receiver and opponent, and he 
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constructs an “actantial model” that configures how these roles tend to play out according 






Sender       Receiver  
    
 Subject→Object 
                        
Helper                           Opponent 
 
Note how the actantial model refers to what characters do rather than what they are or (or 
how they are conceived).  For Greimas’s own “Reflections on Actantial Models,” see 
Structural Semantics, 57-75.  
6 In Why We Read Fiction, Zunshine contends that our predisposition for 
imagining other minds—and the practice of reading that helps us to imagine them—are 
evolved social behaviors (8).    
7 One of Phelan’s greatest contributions to the rhetorical study of character is his 
delineation of character’s three primary “dimensions”: the mimetic dimension presents 
character as a “real” human being; the synthetic dimension deals with character’s 
constructedness in language; and the thematic dimension uses character as a 
representative of abstract ideas.  According to Phelan, implied authors tend to privilege 
certain dimensions over others depending on the message they want to communicate to 
their readers (Reading People, Reading Plots 1-23). 
8 The phrase “orientation toward the good” comes from Charles Taylor’s Sources 
of the Self; I return to both the phrase and Taylor’s book in Chapter 4. 
9 The distinction shows up, for example, in Uri Margolin’s entry on Character in 
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory (52).  In The Economy of Character, 
Deidre Lynch provides an extended discussion of character’s multiple meanings, 
referring not only to the difference between being a character and having a character, but 
also to the eighteenth-century understanding of character as an imprint—an image 
reproducible upon “legible faces, minted money, and imprinted texts” (35). 
10 In French, the “division” within the concept of character does not manifest 
itself linguistically: the French word for what I call “formal character” (i.e. a character as 
a structural element within a narrative) is not caractère (which refers both to the sum of 
an individual’s qualities and to the printed letter) but personnage.   
11 Speculation on what exactly “moral character,” might entail, of course, has a 
long and various philosophical history, with writers such as Adam Smith, John Stuart 
Mill, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau wielding particular influence on the some of the moral 
discourses in circulation during the broad historical period “Developing Character” 
covers. 
12 While contemporary novels are concerned with the moral valence of character, 
they are much cagier about their projects: where nineteenth-century novelists as various 
    
 242
\ 
as Germaine de Staël, Charlotte Brontë and Anthony Trollope relentlessly dissect and 
comment on character, it would be difficult to find a twenty-first century novelist who 
uses the word (unironically) to describe an individual’s moral compass. 
13 Perhaps the most famous opponent to the idea of the self as a stable identity 
across time is David Hume, who, in A Treatise of Human Nature (1740) claims that 
although we may feel as if we possess a coherent “self,” what we have is no more than a 
“bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (300).  For a succinct 
discussion of the history of this problem—which is also sometimes called the “problem 
of personal identity” in philosophical study—see Searle’s Mind: An Introduction (279-
304).   
14 In Character, Kupperman writes, “The major difference between what we 
would call the nature of someone’s self and what we would call that person’s character is 
that we might include in what pertains to our self characteristic ways of thinking and 
acting in matters not normally considered important (e.g., tastes in food or clothing 
styles), whereas our ordinary use of character emphasizes matters of importance” (44, 
emphasis in original). 
15 “Jamais cette tête n’avait été aussi poétique qu’au moment où elle allait 
tomber” (554). 
16 Stefanie Markovits’s recent book, The Crisis of Action in Nineteenth-Century 
English Literature, offers evidence congenial to this dissertation’s claim that nineteenth-
century Bildungsromane resist characterological change.  Markovits argues that although 
we traditionally associate the nineteenth century with prodigious action (most notably the 
action demanded by political and industrial revolutions), the period’s literature reveals 
how such action forms “the crux of nineteenth-century anxieties,” leading writers from 
William Wordsworth to Henry James to explore practices of “inaction” in great detail (9).  
What Markovits calls “inaction,” I would argue, forms part of the “changelessness” that I 
identify as a moral imperative in many Bildungsromane.  But while Markovits indeed 
alludes to the Bildungsroman in her introduction, suggesting that “[f]rustrated action—
inaction—is character building” (6), her actual readings focus not on the genre of the 
Bildungsroman or its concept of character, but rather on the historical circumstances 
which contributed to the wide variety of abortive plot structures (including stories of 
stagnant marriages and unsuccessful revolutions) that we find throughout nineteenth-
century literature. 
17 I have in mind here principally the “economic” aspect of Woloch’s book; his 
Marxist readings feel forced into an otherwise impressive and original formal analysis of 
character.  In addition, the title of Lynch’s Economy of Character illustrates its author’s 
desire to emphasize how the construction of character in particular texts reflects the 
“market culture” of eighteenth-century England.  
18 See also Marjorie Levinson’s “What is New Formalism?,” which, in its sharp 
synthesis of current discussions surrounding formalism, remarks that “[w]ith remarkable 
regularity, one reads that New Criticism was more historical and more activist in its 
notions of form than reputation has had it and that new historicism’s notion of form was 
both more formalist and more agential in its working ideas of form than current practice 
suggests” (563).  And for a more pointed defense of formal close reading in the face of a 
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perceived institutional bias toward historicism, see Jane Gallop’s “The Historicization of 
Literary Studies and the Fate of Close Reading.”  
19David Copperfield’s multiple representations of death are hardly anomalous 
within Dickens’s fiction, though critics have often read them as sociological evidence 
rather than as functional narrative maneuvers.  The deaths strewn throughout Bleak 
House, for instance, famously offered John Ruskin an occasion to lament the depraved 
state of contemporary fiction in general; the novel, according to Ruskin, uses death “not 
in a tragic, adventurous, or military story, but merely as the further enlivenment of a 
narrative intended to be amusing” (Fiction, Fair and Foul, 159).   
20 While few Bildungsromane relate quite as many improbable deaths as 
Copperfield and Eyre, the latter two novels offer prominent examples of a structural trend 
that is spread more diffusely throughout the nineteenth-century’s most famous narratives 
of fictional development.  A few characters who I would argue fit into a “sacrificial” 
character structure include Middlemarch’s Edward Casaubon; Daniel Deronda’s 
Henleigh Grandcourt; Born in Exile’s Marcella Moxey; Wilhelm Meister’s Aurelie; 
Phineas Finn’s Mary Flood Jones, and the title character of Le Père Goriot.  
21 Charlotte Brontë rivaled Jane Eyre for the number of deaths to which she bore 
witness: not only did Brontë’s mother and sister (both named Maria) die when she was 
young, but she famously lost her brother Branwell and two more sisters (Anne and 
Emily) all within the span of a single year in 1848-49.  Interestingly, Gaskell’s Life of 
Charlotte Brontë (1857) depicts its heroine as one who believed in the character-building 
properties of traumatic loss.  In one letter, Brontë writes that “the loss of what we possess 
nearest and dearest to us in this world, produces an effect upon the character” (383).  
Elsewhere, Brontë explicitly refers to this “effect” as a positive one: “burdens, if well 
borne, benefit the character” (382).  Gaskell herself seems to have agreed, as the Life’s 
narrative uses Brontë’s bravery in the face of death as a way of emphasizing her 
(Brontë’s) exemplary moral character.    
22 For various formulations of the development-as-acculturation argument, see 
also M.M. Bakhtin, “The Bildungsroman and its Significance in the History of Realism 
(Toward a Historical Typology of the Novel)”; Franco Moretti, The Way of the World; 
and Marc Redfield, Phantom Formations. 
23 For an interesting interpretation of how this passage from Emma illustrates the 
difference between the marriage-endings in Austen’s and the Brontës’ domestic fiction, 
see Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction, 192-94.  
24 In his work on literary character in the Victorian novel, Baruch Hochman 
similarly remarks that Victorian protagonists are “figures who do not discover their 
largest potentialities, but rather undergo an education and an initiation that teaches them 
their limits” (Test of Character, 16), and Lorna Ellis concurs that “maturation comes at 
the expense of adventure and some personal autonomy” (Appearing to Diminish, 19).   
25 According to D.A. Miller, the “happiness” at the end of nineteenth-century 
novels is never itself narratable; though novels may seem to propel themselves in search 
of happiness, happiness itself can only be an ending (Narrative and Its Discontents, 3).  It 
is as if, once the central character of a novel receives what she has been wanting, then it 
is time for her to quickly exit her own story.  Ermarth, too, seems to register a connection 
between happiness and decreased character depth in her discussion of Our Mutual 
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Friend’s Bella Wilfer: “Bella’s contradictory nature is most realistic, that is, has most 
depth, when she is giving herself penitential pokes, and it is a pity she has to lose her 
depth and interest in order to succeed, as it appears she does in the episodes after 
marriage.  Once wrestling with ‘contradictory’…impulses, Bella suddenly seems 
lobotomized, no longer thinking of a self or even appearing to have one” (207-208). 
26  Girard was not the first scholar to posit a relationship between individual 
sacrifice and social cohesion.  Sociologists Émile Durkheim and George Herbert Mead, 
for example, had both previously explored how the “collective rejection” of social 
deviants actually works to consolidate “normal” social groups (Coser 173).  I focus on 
Girard’s work, however, because it examines the phenomenon of sacrifice through 
readings of literature rather than through empirical study, therefore emphasizing how 
narrative structures mirror real-world social phenomena.  While this chapter quotes 
principally from Violence and the Sacred, The Scapegoat provides a more extended look 
at Girard’s general theory of sacrifice as it pertains specifically to medieval writing, 
classical mythology, and the Christian gospels. 
27Susan Derwin’s chapter on Jane Eyre in The Ambivalence of Form provides a 
thoughtful analysis of death in Brontë’s novel.  Derwin specifically relates these deaths to 
Jane’s authorship: “killing” characters through narrative becomes a way for the 
protagonist to exercise control over language (and the life it creates in the novel form).   
28 Derwin comes close to making this point in relation to Jane Eyre and St. John 
Rivers, arguing that the moment at which Brontë’s protagonist hears the mysterious call 
that beckons her back from Marsh End to Thornfield is the “inaugural moment of Jane’s 
literary imagination,” and hence of her autonomous subjectivity (106).  But it is also in 
this moment that Jane forsakes St. John (“her namesake” and rival), and must accordingly 
cordon him off from her happy ending by imagining that he has died: “Her anticipation of 
his death thus attests to her desire to emphasize her otherness, to establish a vital 
difference between herself and her namesake in face of the possibility that such a 
difference might not in reality exist” (Ambivalence of Form, 108). 
29In their work on orphans, Auerbach and Hochman and Wachs mention survival 
as one of the orphan’s characteristics, but neither text focuses specifically on survival’s 
narrative poetics within the nineteenth-century novel.  In this chapter, I build on what 
these writers have to say about literary orphanhood through an extended look at 
characterological survival and sacrifice. 
30 Poovey makes a similar assertion, arguing that the first-person narrative allows 
David to “split agency from knowledge in such a way as to detach responsibility from 
action” (Uneven Developments, 119). 
31 Hochman and Wachs present a comparable list, including eighteenth-century 
orphan characters Tom Jones and Moll Flanders (Orphan Condition, 12). 
32 Hochman and Wachs note that the actual “orphan condition” in Victorian 
England was no less dismal than Dickens made it out to be: “Among the children of the 
poor, those who survived faced an average mortality age of twenty-two.  The abandoned 
child typically lived by casual labor, as a prisoner in jails, or as an inmate of the brutal 
system of workhouse incarceration instituted by the Poor Law of 1834” (206).  For more 
on the orphan in nineteenth-century England, see Ivy Pinchbeck and Margaret Hewitt’s 
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Children in English Society and Laura Peters’s Orphan Texts: Victorian Orphans, 
Culture and Empire. 
33 A few well-known examples of novels that use this narrative maneuver are 
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795); James’s The Portrait of a Lady 
(1881); and Stendhal’s The Red and the Black (1830). 
34Steedman is instructive on this point, as she argues that not just orphans, but 
children in general came in romanticist writing to evoke a sense of loss: “The child 
within was always both immanent—ready to be drawn on in various ways—and, at the 
same time, always representative of a lost realm, lost in the individual past, and in the 
past of the culture” (Strange Dislocations, 10). 
35Nina Auerbach claims that orphanhood provides an apt metaphor for the modern 
self: “Although we are now ‘all orphans,’ alone and free and dispossessed of our past, we 
yearn for origins, for cultural continuity.  In our continual achievement of paradox, we 
have made of the orphan himself our archetypal and perhaps only ancestor” 
(“Incarnations of the Orphan,” 416). 
36 Jaffe interestingly reads the sale of David’s caul as “a dispersal or fragmentation 
of self” that helps the protagonist seem “undefined” in relationship to the other characters 
he depicts (Vanishing Points, 117-18). 
37 Derwin remarks on the lack of affect with which Jane seems to pass over the 
deaths in her narrative: “Not only does [Jane] display no outward remorse; even her 
private reflections betray no sense of loss” (Ambivalence of Form, 98).   
38 For two excellent discussions about the different ways narratives manipulate 
story time (e.g. summary, ellipsis, stretching), see Chatman’s Story and Discourse (62-
84) and Genette’s chapter on “Duration” in Narrative Discourse (86-112). 
39Gayatri Spivak also notes the family-like nature of the Eyre-Temple-Burns 
triumvirate in her suggestion that “Jane, Miss Temple, and Helen Burns [are] a counter-
family that falls short because it is only a community of women” (“Three Women’s 
Texts,” 247). 
40Critics have suggested that the Brontës in particular were instrumental in the 
“deep” character’s ascendancy over the nineteenth-century novel.  According to 
Armstrong, novels like Jane Eyre and Wuthering Heights sought to make desirable 
“[women] who possessed psychological depth rather than a physically attractive surface” 
as a way to elevate middle-class women over their aristocratic counterparts.  Depth itself, 
in this argument, becomes not just a moral value but a new way of looking at artistic 
practice: “It was Charlotte Brontë who turned the demonstration of emotional power into 
an aesthetic imperative when she criticized Jane Austen for failing to plumb the depths of 
her characters” (Desire, 20; 45). 
41 Discussing what she calls Jane Eyre’s “erotics of talk,” Cora Kaplan uses this 
and other passages of Jane’s memorable dialogue to illustrate what feminist critics such 
as Gilbert and Gubar, Poovey, and Showalter take to be evidence of Jane’s liberation as a 
speaking subject and her quest for an “ideal listener”  (“Girl Talk,” 5-6). 
42 My argument about the restraint that Jane must master in order to tell her story 
has obvious affinities with other scholarly work that examines this restraint in terms of 
psychosexual “repression.”  For two of the most influential of such works, see Nancy 
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Armstrong’s Desire and Domestic Fiction and John Kucich’s Repression in Victorian 
Fiction. 
43 Although I am not using the terms “identification” and “introjection” here in a 
strict psychoanalytic sense (that is, as evidence of the protagonist’s regression to the oral 
stage of libidinal development), I do believe that many of the psychic processes 
represented in Brontë’s and Dickens’s novels resemble more inclusive descriptions of 
identification and introjection put forth by contemporary psychologists.  Nancy 
McWilliams, for example, describes a broad process of “identification” as “a natural 
developmental line from the earliest infantile forms of introjection, which have the 
quality of swallowing the other person whole, to more subtle, discriminating, and 
subjectively voluntary processes of selectively taking on another person’s characteristics” 
(135).  
44 Poovey’s work on Jane Eyre uses Brontë’s novel to illustrate the contradictions 
that inhered within the construction of the governess in the mid-Victorian era.  Uneven 
Developments specifically claims that the governess was imperiled by a public image that 
painted her as both a figure of motherly influence and one of potentially unrestrainable 
sexual energy.  In this view, Brontë embodies Jane’s angry sexuality (and also kills it off) 
in the character of Bertha Mason.  (Poovey 126-63).  Gilbert and Gubar, Armstrong, and 
Showalter all put forth various formulations of the argument that Bertha is an incarnation 
of Jane’s dangerous physicality and therefore must die to facilitate the sexual 
domestication inherent in the novel’s traditional marriage-ending. 
45 Woloch’s spatial model does not treat death or sacrifice as such; rather, it 
focuses on how the differential attention given to different novelistic characters reflects 
socioeconomic inequalities within nineteenth-century European culture.  However, 
Woloch’s statement that “derealized” minor characters “en masse, facilitate the 
development of the protagonist” (55-56) certainly supports my own conclusion that 
character development in the nineteenth-century novel often structures itself around loss.  
46 Among Dickens’s most prominent critics of the past twenty years, Welsh is one 
of the few who registers both the considerable amount of death in David Copperfield as 
well as the fact that “the main action of [the novel] might be described as the replacement 
of one wife by another” (From Copyright to Copperfield, 125). 
47 Hager’s work is part of a larger trend in Victorian studies that seeks to 
recuperate the “angel of the house” as a subversive figure.  Jaffe’s discussion of Esther 
Summerson’s narration in Bleak House (Vanishing Points, 128-49) offers another 
excellent example of such work. 
48 While it is true that Dickens sends David off to Italy and Switzerland to take 
stock of his life later on in the novel, this self-searching voyage occurs in a single chapter 
some time after the actual narration of Dora’s death (as well as Ham’s and Steerforth’s).  
Moreover, the Switzerland chapter (titled “Absence”) focuses less on David’s suffering 
than on his continued correspondence with, and admiration of, Agnes Wickfield.   
49 The feeling that the protagonist does not change as much as he ought is due in 
part to the structure of first-person retrospection in which both Copperfield and Eyre are 
written: David and Jane narrate from the point-of-view of one whose development has 
already “happened.”  Two analyses of Copperfield that question whether or not David 
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actually changes as a character can be found in Miller’s in The Novel and the Police 
(192-220) and Moretti’s The Way of the World (181-228). 
50 This, in fact, is one of Woloch’s central points in his chapter on Dickens: 
“Above all, centrality in Dickens has become (epistemologically and psychologically) 
passive, posterior to the characters—and characteristics—it observes” (144).  Colorful 
minor characters like Heep and Wemmick, in other words, actually wrest the narrative 
away from comparatively bland protagonists like David and Pip.  For a reading that 
openly discusses the Dickens protagonist as “on the whole shallow, uninteresting, and 
unconvincing,” see Hochman’s Character in Literature, 163. 
51Kaplan and Sharon Marcus both agree with Fraiman that Jane Eyre’s “happy 
ending” isn’t actually as happy as earlier critics have suggested.  See Kaplan’s “Girl 
Talk” and Marcus’s “The Profession of the Author: Abstraction, Advertising, and Jane  
Eyre.” 
52 Poovey provides an excellent discussion of Agnes as the “key” to contradictions 
the novel sets up around cross-class desire and female sexuality.  See Uneven 
Developments, 99-101. 
53 The fact that Maggie actually reads Corinne (albeit without enjoying or 
finishing it) in Eliot’s novel would seem to invite critics to comparatively analyze the two 
texts, but the available work pairing Staël’s work with Eliot’s is surprisingly sparse.  To 
my knowledge, only a handful of critics have written jointly about these two novels, and 
the focus of existing work—most notably by Ellen Moers and Linda Lewis—falls 
squarely on the historical significance of Eliot’s and Staël’s heroines within discussions 
about the construction of fictional and real-world women artists throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Both Moers’s Literary Women and Lewis’s 
Germaine de Staël, George Sand, and the Victorian Woman Artist exhibit strong 
biographical strains, making explicit comparisons between Maggie and Eliot (whose 
beloved brother, Isaac Evans, denounced her relationship with G.H. Lewes) or Corinne 
and Staël.  The latter association—on which almost everyone who writes on Staël 
comments—seems particularly apt, since Staël and her heroine share a kind of respect in 
artistic circles that was uncommon for French female writers during the late-eighteenth 
and early- nineteenth centuries.  Moreover, Corinne’s role as an improvisatrice clearly 
resembles the gift for intellectual conversation that Staël cultivated as a lifelong 
salonnière. 
54 The tragic fate that results from a refusal to see other characters as expendable 
or sacrificial aligns Maggie and Corinne with a number of nineteenth-century 
protagonists who famously cannot “let go,” including Henry James’s Isabel Archer and 
Emily Brontë’s Heathcliff and Cathy. 
55 Aside from the conventional development novels I have mentioned, many of the 
Victorian period’s most well-read nonfiction texts, such as J.S. Mill’s Autobiography 
(1873) and Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1869) exhibit the development-as-
progress paradigm.  The success of contemporary Bildungsromane based on similar, 
meliorist understandings of character development, such as Jeffrey Eugenides’s 
Middlesex (2002) and Arthur Golden’s Memoirs of a Geisha (1997), proves how 
influential this nineteenth-century prototype remains. 
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56 Granted that “growth” and “development” can of course have negative 
connotations (“growing threat of terrorism”; “developing tension among citizens”), but I 
would argue that the words more frequently function as positive concepts when applied 
to the individual—growth, development, and change in the abstract are all processes that 
human beings are supposed to desire.   
57 For a detailed exposition of Corinne’s relationship to Sibylline figures, see 
Lewis,13-63. 
58My discussion of “the dominant characteristic” expands upon Woloch’s 
examination of how novels transform characters into abstract characteristics (see esp. The 
One vs. the Many, 50-56).  Our interests diverge, however, insofar as Woloch is 
principally concerned with the part that minor characters play in what he calls the 
“asymmetrical” characterological structure of the novel.  In contrast, this essay attends 
particularly to the moral imperatives that Eliot suggests through her illustration of the 
protagonist’s character development. 
59 When I refer to the “tragic flaw,” I am aware that such a concept does not 
actually appear in Aristotle’s Poetics, the work to which its origins are often ascribed.  As 
Isabel Hyde argues, the idea of “tragic flaw”—an innate characteristic that drives a 
character toward tragic actions—most likely came into being as a mistranslation of the 
term hamartia, which Aristotle uses in Chapter 13 of the Poetics to refer to a tragic error, 
i.e. to an action that leads to tragedy and not to a characterological trait (321).  But even 
though “tragic flaw” is a mistranslation, it is a concept which was already associated with 
classicism when Eliot was writing.  Indeed, Michael Hancher’s discussion of the term 
reveals that J.M. Bremer speculatively dates the idea (rather than the actual expression) 
of the “tragic flaw” as far back as far as Lorenzo Valla’s 1498 translation of the Poetics 
(Hancher, “Tragic Flaw”). 
60 I am grateful to Michèle Hannoosh for suggesting this particular connection 
between Eliot’s and Staël’s novels and the structure of classical tragedy.  
61 Though most literary characters are “consistent” enough for us to discern them 
as characters, Margolin brings up the interesting counterexample of the characters in 
novels by authors such as Le Clézio and Robbe-Grillet, for whom “the possession of any 
stable property set, identity, or definition is continuously being undermined” (120).  One 
of the difficulties these postmodern novels present is, precisely, the lack of that structural 
consistency which traditionally allows readers to distinguish one character from another. 
62While my argument here depends on a similar understanding of Maggie’s 
character, Hirsch and I cite Maggie’s “dominant feeling” (what I call the “dominant 
characteristic”) to support different—but not mutually exclusive—arguments about the 
Bildungsroman.  Hirsch specifically reads Maggie’s continual returns to her past as the 
result of a female-gendered inwardness from which she has no means of escape (Voyage 
In, 26).  My focus on Maggie’s lack of change differs from Hirsch’s insofar as I use the 
examples of Maggie and Corinne to illustrate the broader structure of loss that underpins 
conceptions of development in both “male” and “female’ Bildungsromane. 
63 This essay takes part in a more recent movement among The Mill’s critics, 
including Joshua Esty and Susan Fraiman, which suggests that Eliot uses the 
Bildungsroman form to challenge the very terms it is assumed to employ.  In contrast to 
earlier feminist readings of the novel, Fraiman urges us to see The Mill not as a “failed” 
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or “successful” Bildungsroman, but rather as a critique of the development novel’s 
traditional focus on a single (male) individual (137-38).  In “Nationhood, Adulthood, and 
the Ruptures of Bildung,” Esty relates Maggie’s development story to the conventions of 
nation-building narratives, which he argues that The Mill both utilizes and critiques.  
64 For a related discussion of “traits” as they operate in fictional narratives, see 
Chatman 122.  There are, of course, critics who disagree with trait-centered theories of 
character altogether.  Recent philosophical studies of character, for example, showcase 
debates between those who find it productive to think about human beings as possessors 
of moral “traits” (sometimes called “personologists”), and those “situationists” who 
believe that character is determined not by interior traits but by contextual factors.  For a 
discussion of the conflict between these two models of character, see Kupperman’s “The 
Indispensability of Character.” 
65 Margolin points out that this cluster of properties only holds true for narrative 
texts which feature “a chronologically related, third-person, past tense story with a single 
global narrator who makes explicit characterization statements” (121); The Mill on the 
Floss and Corinne clearly correspond with this set of conditions. 
66 In Psychonarratology, Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon use empirical data to 
illustrate how readers’ cognitive reception of literary character mirrors the kind of trait-
collecting that Margolin and others describe: “As a working hypothesis,” they write, “we 
suggest that readers’ prior knowledge determines naïve personality theories.  The 
essential notion is that people assume that other people’s personality can be described by 
a list of traits (such as friendly, morose, or domineering) and that readers expect such 
traits to be related to how people behave in a variety of contexts” (154, emphasis in 
original).   
67 The first critics of The Mill on the Floss were quick to point out Maggie’s 
dominant characteristic; E.S. Dallas, for example, wrote in 1860 of “Maggie, [who] is full 
of affection, and whose affection is continually leading her into blunders and 
misfortunes” (qtd. in Carroll, 134).  The same year, an anonymous writer for the Saturday 
Review interestingly used Maggie’s characterization as a springboard for a more general 
assessment of contemporary women’s fiction: “[T]here is a kind of love-making which 
seems to possess a strange fascination for the modern female novelist.  Currer Bell and 
George Eliot, and we may add George Sand, all like to dwell on love as a strange 
overmastering force which, through the senses, captivates and enthralls the soul” (ibid., 
118).  While I argue here that “passion” in Charlotte Brontë (Bell) is not ultimately an 
“overmastering force” the way it is in The Mill (Jane Eyre, after all, does not die like 
Maggie does, as a result of her passion), the statement indicates how The Mill prompted 
even its earliest readers to compare its thematic preoccupations with those of Sand—and, 
by extension, with other female novelists we now call ‘romantic,’ like Staël. 
68 “[D]e toutes mes facultés la plus puissante, c’est la faculté de souffrir” (126).  
Citations from Corinne in the body of the chapter are from Avriel H. Goldberger’s 
English translation.  I provide the original French text in endnotes. 
69 “[E]lle était, un moment du moins, fière de s’immoler pour qu’Oswald fût en 
paix avec son pays, avec sa famille, avec lui-même” (504). 
70 “Si l’on peut deviner comment on arrive à la folie, c’est sûrement lorsqu’une 
seule pensée s’empare de l’esprit, et ne permet plus à la succession des objets de varier 
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les idées.  Corinne était d’ailleurs une personne d’une imagination si vive, qu’elle se 
consumait elle-même quand ses facultés n’avaient plus d’aliment au dehors” (470). 
71 “[C]e qu’il redoutait le plus pour elle, c’était la désapprobation de l’Angleterre” 
(171). 
72 “On dirait, à les entendre, que le devoir consiste dans le sacrifice des facultés 
distinguées que l’on possède, et que l’esprit est un tort qu’il faut expier, en menant 
précisément la même vie que ceux qui en manquent” (366). 
73 Naomi Schor, for example, remarks, “[O]ften classified as a guidebook, 
Corinne has bewildered, not to say dismayed, many readers by its seemingly aberrant 
generalization of description” (123).  More than a decade earlier, Ellen Moers gives 
Staël’s novel the following backhanded compliment: “Let us try to take Corinne 
seriously; it was the book of the woman of genius.  At least a few chapters and scattered 
passages, as well as the complex scheme of the novel that Mme de Staël had the 
brilliance but not the talent to write, should be familiar to anyone pretending to an interest 
in the traditions of women’s literature” (173).  
74 The structural similarities between Staël’s two novels and Benjamin Constant’s 
Adolphe (1816) are remarkable.  Long interpreted as reflecting his relationship with Mme 
de Staël, Constant’s novel tells the story of Adolphe, a noble young Frenchman, and 
Ellénore, the older Polish countess with whom he falls in—and quickly out—of love.  
The entire novel consists of scenes that depict Adolphe’s crippling indecision about 
whether to end the relationship, on the one hand, and Ellénore’s intense desire to continue 
it, on the other.  Constant’s statement in the Preface that “the characters are reduced to 
two, and the situation is always the same” might just as well describe Corinne (3).  And 
like Corinne and Oswald, both Ellénore and Adolphe die in the end. 
75 For a more systematized (and more gender-conscious) look at this “Male-
Female Double Bildungsroman” genre as it manifests itself throughout key nineteenth-
and twentieth-century novels, see Goodman. 
76 As Buckley points out, the epigraph of Eliot’s novel (“In their death they were 
not divided”) is enough to signal The Mill’s interest in the problem of how it could 
possibly unify its two central characters (96-97).  For more on the issue of “unity,” see 
also George Levine 402-09.  In contrast, Fraiman specifically criticizes Buckley’s Season 
of Youth (1974), claiming that its individualist paradigm “can only make sense of The 
Mill on the Floss by hitching Maggie’s moral stamina to Tom’s commercial success, as if 
sister and brother were the inseparable halves of a single, battle-worthy character” (145).   
77 “Il ne faut chercher dans un people, comme dans un homme, que son trait 
caractéristique: tous les autres sont l’effet de mille hazards différents; celui-la seul 
constitue son être” (206).  The English translations/citations of On Literature in the body 
of this chapter are Morroe Berger’s. 
78 “le progrès universel des lumières par le simple effet de la succession des 
temps” (86). 
79 Additionally, both Tenenbaum and Levy link Corinne’s multicultural 
imagination to the influence of Montesquieuian comparativism on Staël’s thought.  After 
Montesquieu, Staël believed that “The ‘general spirit’ of a nation was the product of the 
totality of its physical and moral causes.  It accounted for the unique character of each 
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society and undergirded Staël’s defense of national independence and cultural 
heterogeneity” (Tenenbaum, 159). 
80 For literary manifestations of Staël’s influence on these writers, see, for 
instance, Landon’s The Improvisatrice and Other Poems (1824), and Hemans’s poem 
“Corinne at the Capitol” (1827).  Elizabeth Barrett Browning memorably remarked that 
Corinne “is an immortal book, and deserves to be read three score and ten times—that is 
once every year in the age of man” (qtd. in Moers, 173). Barrett Browning’s Aurora 
Leigh—a half-British, half-Italian poetess—bears obvious resemblances to Staël’s 
protagonist.    
81 Fraiman claims that Jacobus’s critical stance falls somewhere in the middle of 
those who condemn and those who “romanticize Maggie’s fate” (138), but Jacobus’s 
assertion that the act of killing off Maggie somehow allowed Eliot to be reborn as a 
writer strikes this reader as romantic indeed. 
82 Beer has also argued that The Mill’s ending is redemptive insofar as it reunites 
Maggie and Tom and therefore puts forth “a claim for a profound reconstitution of the 
self as split between the permitted potentialities of male and female” (George Eliot, 101).  
However, she quickly complicates this “positive” reading by noting how the siblings’ 
union is only possible in death. 
83 Armstrong’s wording here and throughout How Novels Think seems tailor-made 
to provoke.  Her larger argument uses The Mill’s ending to illustrate a more general point 
about the Victorian novel’s construction of the modern individual, a movement which 
allegedly “kills off the robust individualism of an earlier epoch in favor of homogeneous 
normativity and realism” (97). 
84 “[T]oute ma manière la surprenait, [et qu’]elle se proposait de la changer, si elle 
le pouvait” (362). 
85 “Mes talents, mes gouts, mon caractère même étaient formés, quand la mort de 
ma tante décida mon père à me rappeler près de lui” (361).  N.B. Goldberger’s translation 
leaves the information about Corinne’s aunt dying until the end of the sentence, which I 
have not quoted in the body of the text. 
86 “[L]e souffle desséchant de la mediocrité malveillante” (380). 
87 “J’étais dans une sorte d’ivresse, je sentais pour l’Italie tout ce que l’amour fait 
éprouver, désir, enthousiasme, regrets; je n’étais plus maîtresse de moi-même, toute mon 
âme était entraînée vers ma patrie…Si la vie était offerte aux morts dans les tombeaux, ils 
ne soulèveraient pas la Pierre qui les couvre avec plus d’impatience que je n’en éprouvais 
pour écarter de moi tous mes linceuls, et reprendre possession de mon imagination, de 
mon génie, de la nature!” (384-85). 
88 While my argument dovetails with Shuttleworth’s claim that The Mill questions 
whether change is always “progress,” Shuttleworth is much more concerned with the 
impact of Victorian science on Eliot’s view of social duty than with the author’s narrative 
construction of character. 
89 That Eliot’s last published work, Impressions of Theophrastus Such, should be 
a collection of character sketches in the style of Theophrastus (and his seventeenth-
century translator/imitator, La Bruyère), further exemplifies the author’s interest in 
formally cataloguing the various characteristics that comprise moral character. 
90 “[L]a source de tout est tarie” (521). 
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91 “[M]on génie, s’il subsiste encore, se fait sentir seulement par la force de ma 
douleur” (583). 
92 “Je suis une exception à l’ordre universel…il y a du bonheur pour tous, et cette 
terrible faculté de souffrir, qui me tue, c’est une manière de sentir particulière à moi 
seule” (514). 
93 “Il faut que vous soyez vous et moi tout à la fois...mon seul désir personnel est 
encore qu’Oswald retrouve dans vous et dans sa fille quelques traces de mon influence, et 
que jamais du moins il ne puisse avoir une jouissance de sentiment sans se rappeler 
Corinne” (578-79). 
94 “Le caractère dominant de Mme de Staël, l’unité principale de tous les 
contrastes qu’elle embrassait, l’esprit rapide et pénétrant qui ciruculait de l’un à l’autre et 
soutenait cet assemblage merveilleux, c’était à coup sûr la conversation, la parole 
improvisée, soudaine, au moment où elle jaillissait tout divine de la source perpétuelle de 
son âme” (Portraits de Femmes) 84-85. 
95 Phineas Finn therefore demonstrates, by negative example, the connection 
between sympathy and “depth” we find in Jane Eyre and David Copperfield, both of 
which depend on sympathetically complex narrators to conceal what I have called 
“sacrificial” narrative techniques. 
96 Two important works from the cognitive science perspective on which Palmer 
draws in this discussion are Antonio Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens: Body, 
Emotion, and the Making of Consciousness and John R. Searle’s The Rediscovery of the 
Mind.  For a more detailed rendering of what Palmer means by “the social mind,” see 
Fictional Minds 130-69.    
97 Palmer also cites Chatman’s Story and Discourse and Genette’s Narrative 
Discourse as examples of narratological studies that privilege subjective first accounts of 
represented thought (Fictional Minds, 63).  Though neither Chatman nor Genette focuses 
as closely on represented thought as Cohn, Palmer suggests that both of the former 
authors have been so influential in the field of narrative theory that subsequent 
narratologists have inherited their particular critical bias in favor of inner speech. 
98 The depiction of introspection as a tool for self-revelation, of course, has a long 
and illustrious history throughout western literature, from St. Augustine’s garden 
conversion scene in Book VIII of Confessions, to Proust’s infamous encounter with the 
madeleine near the beginning of Swann’s Way.  My goal in outlining the way in which 
novels like Emma and The Portrait of a Lady privilege introspective thinking is not to 
suggest that the alignment of introspection and character development is specific to 
nineteenth-century English fiction, but rather to establish the particular narrative 
techniques that dominate the discursive field from which Trollope’s represented thought 
diverges.  
99 In Unspeakable Sentences, Ann Banfield presents an interesting exception to 
the majority of work on free indirect discourse, which tends to single out the technique’s 
unique capacity to represent the internal idiom of the thinking subject.  Although 
Banfield joins fellow narratologists in celebrating the aesthetic potential of free indirect 
discourse, she claims that its distinction lies not in its ability to heighten the 
representation of a character’s subjectivity, but rather in its verbal presentation of a kind 
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of language that is expressive but non-communicative, and therefore “empty of all 
subjectivity” (10). 
100  This “presentation of intermental thinking,” Palmer contends, is crucial to the 
eminently dialogic project which, since the influence of Bakhtin, has been celebrated as 
one of the novel’s most powerful aesthetic and political qualities (83). Bakhtin’s 
collection of essays titled The Dialogic Imagination, in which the author discusses the 
novel’s special ability to present a wide range of viewpoints and voices in dialogue with 
one another, has become a staple of contemporary literary criticism.  For Palmer’s 
excellent discussion of Bakhtin and the larger circle of Russian discourse theorists to 
which he belonged, see Fictional Minds 147-57. 
101Many editions of the Palliser novels—including several that I cite here—retain 
the two-volume structure of the texts as they were originally published in novel format.  
Accordingly, the pagination of these volumes re-starts at “1” in the beginning of Volume 
II.  To avoid confusion, I have included both volume and page numbers when I cite these 
editions in the body text. 
102 Both Cohn and Palmer discuss the various presentations of narrative 
temporality that thought report (which Cohn calls “psycho-narration”) can accomplish.  
As Cohn writes, “[P]sycho-narration has almost unlimited temporal flexibility.  It can as 
readily summarize an inner development over a long period of time as it can render the 
flow of successive thoughts and feelings, or expand and elaborate a mental instant” 
(Transparent Minds, 34).  For Palmer’s contribution to Cohn’s discussion on thought 
report, see Fictional Minds 82. 
103Umberto Eco and Robyn Warhol each note that one of the series’s most 
distinctive factors is its fashion of catering to many different kinds of readers at once.  As 
Warhol writes, “[a]t any given moment in the serialized text, the narrator is speaking to a 
range of possible audiences, from the devoted readers who remember every detail from 
parts that were published weeks, months, and even years earlier, to those whose first 
entry into the novel is the present installment” (78).  Eco, somewhat differently, claims 
that the series attempts to satisfy two different levels of readerly competence, that is, it 
“presupposes and constructs always a double Model Reader—a naïve and a ‘smart’ one, a 
semantic reader and a semiotic or critical reader” (92).   
104 Instead, much influential scholarship on Trollope focuses on what his novels 
reveal about a particular aspect of Victorian culture.  In this vein, John Kucich’s The 
Power of Lies argues that Trollope “reappropriates” the ostensibly transgressive and 
“antibourgeois” practice of lying in order to consolidate middle-class ideology (41); in 
Between Women, Sharon Marcus uses Can You Forgive Her? to illustrate the surprisingly 
widespread Victorian phenomenon of “female marriage” (228); and Dames’s “Trollope 
and the Career” suggests that the Palliser novels’ chronicles of political careers reflect an 
increasingly regimented, hierarchical structure of professionalism that, in the later 
Victorian period, served to harness “the disruptive energies unleashed by the spread of 
professionalism itself in the early and mid-nineteenth century” (248). 
105 While Wall gives the fullest account of Trollope’s vacillating characters that I 
have found, numerous critics comment on the phenomenon in passing.  See, for example, 
Kendrick (78) and Miller (124-26). 
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106Wall (333-61) usefully examines the recurrence of this phenomenon of 
“Obstinacy and Insanity” throughout six of Trollope’s novels. 
107 Marcus reads the tonal fluctuation in this passage according to a larger 
argument that sees Alice Vavasor moving from a “contractual” marriage with her cousin 
Kate to a “hierarchical” marriage with Grey: “The shift within the narrator’s direct 
address from a question (‘can you forgive her?’) to an order (‘you must forgive her’), 
she writes, “reproduces at the level of metanarrative the plot of contract giving way to 
force, autonomous individuals coalescing into one person” (250). 
108 In her 1982 Introduction to the Oxford Can You Forgive Her?, Flint speculates 
on the difference in responses between Trollope’s original and his present-day readers: 
“In an age when obedience can safely be omitted from the marriage vows, the text has a 
far harder task in convincing the reader that Alice’s capitulation is worthwhile, despite 
Grey’s handsomeness and tediously indefatigable sense of honour” (xxvi). 
109 Such a proffered alliance between quick decision making and good character 
does not stop with the form of the novel, but rather, suffuses some of the most 
conventional Victorian thought.  Take, for instance, Samuel Smiles, who makes clear to 
his readers that “the power of exercising the will promptly…is of essential importance in 
moral discipline, and absolutely necessary for the development of character in its best 
forms” (198). 
110 See, for instance, Flint and Marcus. 
111 Craig’s work on Can You Forgive Her? provides a detailed explanation of 
Trollope’s use of the rhetorical question (as well as the oxymoron) in scenes of courtship. 
112 Lynette Felber, like Warhol, sees the novel series as an extended amplification 
of the novel form: “[t]he exaggerated characteristics of the subgenre illuminate, by 
magnifying, features of the novel itself” (Gender and Genre, 2). 
113 In Trollope and the Magazines, Mark W. Turner sees Phineas Finn as “a male 
Bildungsroman” within the context of the Victorians’ increased attention to the category 
of “manliness” (5; 150). apRoberts notes that the two Phineas novels “might be classified 
structurally as a loose sort of Bildungsroman,” though she admittedly prefers to see them 
as “situation structured” (51).  In a similar move, Jane Elizabeth Dougherty agrees with 
Felber that Phineas Finn is “ostensibly a Bildungsroman” (136), then proceeds to explain 
how the novel concerns itself with “rupturing its own Bildungsroman narrative” by 
chronicling Phineas’s political and nuptial failures (140).  Aside from withholding 
complete perspectival centrality from the title character, the two Phineas novels differ 
formally from more traditional Bildungsromane in important ways: they pay very little 
attention to Phineas’s childhood, for example, and they comprise multiple volumes 
(rather than a single, conclusive one).   
114 “Julien se sentait fort et résolu comme l’homme qui voit clair dans son âme” 
(550). 
115 For a related comment on The Prime Minister, see Kincaid, who claims that 
“the Duke is frustrated because he is not only denied the opportunity to act but is shown 
that all action is meaningless” (223). 
116 Langbauer’s work on Trollope explores how the formal aspects of novel series 
like Trollope’s helped construct (rather than simply reflect) their readers’ sense of 
everyday life.  “‘[T]he everyday,’” she writes, “was the special province of a particular 
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form—that precisely because of their expansiveness, their repetitiveness, their 
complication of closure, those linked novels that are part of extended series seem to 
mirror and carry properties often defined as essential to everyday life: that it’s just one 
thing after another, going quietly but inexhaustibly on and on” (2). 
117James offers further evidence supporting these arguments about the serial 
novel’s affective comforts, famously claiming that “[t]here are two kinds of taste in the 
appreciation of imaginative literature: the taste for emotions of surprise and the taste for 
emotions of recognition.  It is the latter that Trollope gratifies” (Partial Portraits, 133).   
118 Trollope comments explicitly on this difference between the developmental 
trajectory of his own novels and those of his contemporaries. “Novelists who have 
undertaken to write the life of a hero or heroine,” he opines, “have generally considered 
their work completed at the interesting period of marriage, and have contented 
themselves with the advance in taste and manners which are common to all boys and girls 
as they become men and women” (Autobiography, 197). 
119 Though Trollope’s work has many affinities with Eco’s “saga,” Eco himself 
does not mention the Palliser novels.  Instead, his principal example of a “saga” is a more 
recent one: the 1980’s television series, Dallas.   
120 While Kincaid’s claim that Trollope’s “emphasis on education” propagates 
“certain rational notions of progressive development” contrasts with my own reading of 
Trollopian character development as relatively static, I agree with Kincaid that Trollope 
“was consistently strong on the superiority of age to youth” (54-55).  Rather than seeing 
age in Trollope as a richness of experience, I argue that the author’s reverence for age 
centers on the series’s larger dependence on a drawn-out time scheme.   
121 I quote the first epigraph from Coustillas’s Gissing: The Critical Heritage, 
202; the second appears in James’s Literary Criticism, 327. 
122 Because Gissing’s own obsession with social class suffuses his oeuvre, it is 
hardly surprising that the vast majority of Gissing critics focus on class in their 
interpretations of his novels.  A recent addition to such studies is Simon J. James’s 
Unsettled Accounts (2003), which sees the figure of “money” as singularly productive of 
Gissing’s aesthetic idiosyncrasies.  Though I do not disagree with those who seize on 
what is obviously a key theme in Gissing’s work, this chapter shifts its focus away from 
these well-worn money issues, illustrating how “class” need not be taken as the defining 
element either of Gissing’s aesthetic or of his interest for contemporary criticism.   
123 Although this chapter examines “distance” primarily as a novelistic technique, 
it bears emphasizing that nineteenth-century practices of narrative distance informed a 
wide variety of philosophical and political agendas.  On this topic, see especially Amanda 
Anderson’s The Powers of Distance, which links the Victorian “cultivation of 
detachment” to practices as diverse as moral character development, aesthetic 
perspective-making, and cosmopolitanism. 
124 Genette’s “emancipated” novels include masterpieces of high modernism such 
as Joyce’s Ulysses and Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, as well as those novels 
collectively known as nouveaux romans (most famously written by Nathalie Sarraute and 
Alain Robbe-Grillet).   
125 My readers may argue that I would do better to examine Genette’s concept of 
“voice,” a term the author defines as “a set of signs characterizing the narrative instance” 
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(Narrative Discourse, 213). But it is striking how little time Genette spends discussing 
“voice” in relation to character (and, by extension, how little Genette discusses character 
at all).  I make the distinction between Genette’s “distance” and my own for two reasons.  
First, simply because Genette’s name has become associated with the term as narrative 
theorists tend to use it; and second, because the “distance” of Narrative Discourse 
provides a good example of the ways in which certain critics figure the absence of a 
narrator’s mediation as a less didactic (and hence more salutary) narrative technique than 
is its overt presence (in the novels of Dickens or Eliot, for example). 
126 Although this chapter examines other works that question the equation of 
narration with communication (notably Jonathan Culler’s), Genette himself does not 
disagree with Booth on this particular point.  Like Booth, Genette believes that “In the 
most unobtrusive narrative, someone is speaking to me, is telling me a story, is inviting 
me to listen to it as he tells it, and this invitation—confiding or urging—constitutes an 
undeniable stance of narrating, and therefore a narrator” (Narrative Discourse Revisited, 
101).  The difference I am delineating between Booth and Genette deals, rather, with how 
each of the authors conceives of the term “distance.” 
127 As I explained in the Introduction, structuralist narratologists such as Genette 
and Bal tend to emphasize the ability of the narrative voice to transcend the allegedly 
problematic “humanization” that makes character so difficult to describe.  More recently, 
D.A. Miller’s Jane Austen, Or the Secret of Style argues that Austen’s narrative voice 
(which Miller pointedly calls “narration” rather than “narrator”) acquires its exemplary 
style through acting out the kind of impersonality that a character could never achieve.  
But as compelling an argument as Miller makes, I want to question whether or not novels 
can ever escape the connection between a narrative voice and a humanlike, subjective 
narrator.  Simply because a narrator does not say “I” does not mean that it contains none 
of the qualities we associate with a speaking subject.  For more on this point, see 
Vanishing Points, in which Audrey Jaffe analyzes how narrative voice actually 
characterizes itself in the very act of evading characterization. 
128 Zunshine, for example, argues that our anthropomorphic assessment of the 
narrator actually fuels our desire to read and, thus, exercises our theory of mind: “it is our 
awareness that there is a source behind the representation,” she writes, “that legitimates a 
variety of personal and institutional endeavors to resituate, reinterpret, and reweigh every 
aspect of a literary text” (66).  Such research helps position Booth less as an old-
fashioned belletrist than as a critic who was deservedly attentive to narrative’s inherently 
subjective overtones.  See also Bortolussi and Dixon, whose studies demonstrate that 
“[r]eaders treat their representation of the narrator much as they would a representation of 
a conversational participant” (16).  Even granting the case of “impersonal” narrators, the 
authors insist “it is still possible to draw inferences concerning the narrator based on 
indirect signs.  In general, such indirect features derive from the logic that the narrator 
must select information from the story world and decide to present it in a particular 
manner” (65). 
129For a recent overview of Gissing’s relationship to the realist novel, see Aaron 
Matz’s essay, “George Gissing’s Ambivalent Realism.” 
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130 Sources of the Self attempts to reclaim morality as the primary source of 
human identity from what it takes to be the prevailing trend of contemporary philosophy 
to regard the sense of “what it is good to be” with a kind of clinical disdain (3-4). 
131 “New” is of course a relative term in philosophical studies.  Taylor’s concept 
of the self as an object of narration dates as least as far back as St. Augustine. 
132 The full statement appears in free indirect discourse: “Ils l’avaient manqué 
tous les deux, celui qui avait rêvé de l’amour, celui qui avait rêvé le pouvoir” (517). 
133 This chapter’s English citations of Flaubert’s novel come from Robert 
Baldick’s translation.  I provide the original text here in the footnotes: 
“Le 15 septembre 1840, vers six heures du matin, la Ville-de-Montereau, près de 
partir, fumait à gros tourbillons devant le quai Saint-Bernard. 
Des gens arrivaient hors d’haleine; des barriques, des cables, des corbeilles de 
linge gênaient la circulation; les matelots ne répondaient à personne; on se heurtait; les 
colis montaient entre les deux tambours, et le tapage s’absorbait dans le bruissement de la 
vapeur, qui, s’échappant par les plaques de tôle, enveloppait tout d’une nuée blanchâtre, 
tandis que la cloche, à l’avant, tintait sans discontinuer” (19). 
134 “Enfin le navire partit; et les deux berges, peuplées de magasins, de chantiers et 
d’usines, filèrent comme deux larges rubans que l’on déroule. 
            Un jeune homme de dix-huit ans, à longs cheveux et qui tenait un album sous son 
bras, restait auprès du gouvernail, immobile.  A travers le brouillard, il contemplait des 
clochers, des édifices dont il ne savait pas les noms; puis il embrassa, dans un dernier 
coup d’œuil, l’île Saint-Louis, la Cité, Notre-Dame: et bientôt, Paris disparaissant, il 
poussa un grand soupir. 
      M. Frédéric Moreau, nouvellement reçu bachelier, s’en retournait à Nogent-sur-
Seine, où il devait languir pendant deux mois, avant d’aller faire son droit” (19).   
135 Genette also cites Flaubert’s apparent preference for material objects over 
characters as a technique that contributes to the novelist’s larger cultivation of narrative 
“silence” in his novels (“Silences de Flaubert,” 242). 
136 Genette brings up the technique in reference to Balzac, many of whose novels 
and short stories (including Ferragus, Le Cousin Pons, and La Peau de chagrin) begin 
with it.  But where Balzac tends to use this “introit” to single out his protagonists as 
individuals worthy of exceptional comment, both Sentimental Education and Born in 
Exile begin with external focalization to mark the way in which the protagonist is 
unremarkable, how he is generic rather than enigmatic. 
137 William Paulson provides an elegant encapsulation of the way that Frédéric 
frustrates our expectations of the novelistic protagonist: “A sense of distinction, or a 
distance from conventional norms, contributes to the interest of many a novelistic hero, 
for it enables the character to incarnate a conflict between the actual social order and 
some real or imagined alternative.  The problem with Frédéric is that no such alternative 
emerges: he neither adopts conventional beliefs and modes of action nor possesses any 
strong and self-coherent position of his own” (37).  Contrasts between Flaubert’s 
protagonists and Julien Sorel—a nineteenth-century protagonist who fits Paulson’s 
description of the “novelistic hero” to a tee—are particularly striking to novel theorists.  
One such reader is Diana Knight, who in Flaubert’s Characters specifically contrasts 
Sorel’s “moral superiority” to Emma Bovary’s apparent moral emptiness (85).   
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138 Franco Moretti notes how nineteenth-century French and German 
Bildungsromane not only contain very few children, but also how children do not seem to 
be the implied readers of such texts: “Can you picture a child reading Wilhelm Meister, 
The Red and the Black, Lost Illusions?  Impossible.  But Waverley and Jane Eyre, David 
Copperfield and Great Expectations: here we have the ‘great tradition’ of children’s 
literature” (185).   
139 It will perhaps be argued that the ending of Sentimental Education contradicts 
my contention that the novel ignores Frédéric’s childhood and the nostalgia that we might 
expect to attend it.  The novel famously closes as Moreau and Deslauriers, now middle-
aged “failures” (manqués), reminisce about a trip to a notorious brothel that occurred 
during their teenage years.  Although locals see the two youths emerging from the 
establishment and the whole episode becomes a minor scandal, it turns out that Moreau is 
actually too embarrassed to go through with the act and that Deslauriers is forced to 
follow him out.   The two characters nevertheless agree, in the last line of the novel, that 
the bungled tryst was “the happiest time we ever had” (419).  While almost every critic of 
Flaubert has a different interpretation of this strange scene, I believe its presentation of 
Moreau’s and Deslauriers’ nostalgia acts as the narrator’s final comment upon the kind of 
imagination that leads not to action but to more imagining.  That the boys (now men) cite 
an abortive action as the happiest one they have ever known reaffirms the narrator’s 
depiction of Moreau as a character whose reflection becomes his primary action.  And it 
is this desire to cling to imaginary possibilities—a desire that the narrator emphasizes by 
using it for the novel’s ending—that obstructs the protagonist’s character development 
throughout the preceding pages. 
140 For more on the relationship between nostalgia and the first-person fictional 
autobiography, see Dames, Amnesiac Selves, 125-66. 
141 Flaubert’s contention that artists should not showcase their own opinions could 
hardly be plainer throughout his correspondence.  In a letter to Emile Zola on the latter’s 
early work, for example, Flaubert writes, “you express your opinion, something which in 
my poetics a novelist hasn’t the right to do” (Letters, 188).  The author makes an almost 
identical claim in his correspondence with George Sand: “a novelist hasn’t the right to 
express his opinion on anything whatsoever” (Letters, 94). 
142 Other contemporary works of criticism that see Flaubert as a forefather of 
modernism include Culler’s Flaubert: Uses of Uncertainty, Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, 
and Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious.   
143 For a discussion of the theoretical pros and cons of adopting the “narratorless” 
model of fiction, see Cohn’s Distinction of Fiction, 126-31.  Though Cohn ultimately 
refuses to do away with the narrator as a concept because of its “pragmatic” function for 
readers and critics, she concedes that the idea of an impersonal or nonexistent narrator 
usefully characterizes many readers’ perceptions of distant narrators such as Flaubert’s. 
144 “Il enviait le talent des pianistes, les balafres des soldats.  Il souhaitait une 
maladie dangereuse, espérant de cette façon l’intéresser. 
          Une chose l’etonnait, c’est qu’il n’était pas jaloux d’Arnoux; et il ne pouvait se 
figurer autrement que vêtue, - tant sa pudeur semblait naturelle, et reculait son sexe dans 
une ombre mystérieuse. 
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          Cependant, il songeait au bonheur de vivre avec elle, de la tutoyer, de lui passer 
la main sur les bandeaux longuement, ou de se tenir par terre, à genoux, les deux bras 
autour de sa taille, à boire son âme dans ses yeux!  Il aurait fallu, pour cela, subvertir la 
destine; et, incapable d’action, maudissant Dieu et s’accusant d’être lâche, il tournait dans 
son désir, comme un prisonnier dans son cachot.  Une angoisse permanente l’etouffait.  Il 
restait pendant des heures immobile, ou bien il éclatait en larmes” (98). 
145 Leo Bersani’s A Future for Astyanax, for example, deals specifically with this 
issue.  Bersani argues that the form of the realist novel “serves the cause of significant, 
coherently structured character” (55), but that this character is only a denial of the 
“incoherence from which all our fragmented experience ultimately derives” (61).   
146 “C’est un livre d’amour, de passion; mais de passion telle qu’elle peut exister 
maintenant, c’est-à-dire inactive.  Le sujet tel que je l’ai conçu, est, je crois, 
profondément vrai, mais, à cause de cela même, peu amusant” (Correspondance, 233). 
147 The term itself is a site of contestation among narrative theorists; I have 
heuristically chosen its most common English name.  Though Cohn prefers to call it 
“narrated monologue,” I offer her definition of the technique as the one I find most 
helpful.  “[Narrated monologue] may be most succinctly defined as the technique for 
rendering a character’s thought in his own idiom while maintaining the third-person 
reference and the basic tense of narration” (100).  For two markedly different accounts of 
this narrative phenomenon, see Ann Banfield’s Unspeakable Sentences and D.A. Miller’s 
Jane Austen, or The Secret of Style.  For a valuable synopsis of the angles that various 
schools of criticism tend to take vis-à-vis free indirect discourse (and for its author’s own 
interesting assertion that free indirect discourse is less a model of speech than a model of 
listening) see Gilbert D. Chaitlin’s “Listening Power: Flaubert, Zola, and the Politics of 
style indirect libre.” 
148 “Une faculté extraordinaire, dont il ne savait pas l’objet, lui était venue.  Il se 
demanda, sérieusement, s’il serait un grand peintre ou un grand poète; - et il se décida 
pour la peinture, car les exigences de ce métier le rapprocheraient de Mme Arnoux.  Il 
avait donc trouvé sa vocation!  Le but de son existence était clair maintenant, et l’avenir 
infaillible. 
    Quand il eut refermé sa porte, il entendit quelqu’un qui ronflait, dans le cabinet 
noir, près de la chambre.  C’était l’autre.  Il n’y pensait plus. 
    Son visage s’offrait à lui dans la glace.  Il se trouva beau, - et resta une minute à 
se regarder” (76). 
149 Proust refers to such lack of overt commentary—in which blank space can 
render the passage of time without “the parasitism of anecdote and the dross of 
history”—as one of Flaubert’s finest and most original achievements (269-70). 
150 “[L]a véhémence du désir, la fleur même de la sensation était perdue.  Ses 
ambitions d’esprit avaient également diminué.  Des années passèrent; et il supportait le 
désœuvrement de son intelligence et l’inertie de son cœur” (509). 
151 “Les plus indulgents trouvent que je n’ai fait que des tableaux et que la 
composition, le dessein manque absolument!” (Flaubert-Sand, 256). 
152 Critics have spent a good deal of time noting possible similarities between 
Flaubert and Frédéric Moreau.  Flaubert famously wished for Sentimental Education to 
be a chronicle of “the moral history of the men of my generation” (“Je veux faire 
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l'histoire morale des hommes de ma génération” [Letters, 80] ). Frédéric is, therefore, the 
same age that Flaubert would have been when the novel begins in 1841.  For more 
detailed connections between Sentimental Education and Flaubert’s own life—including 
comparisons of Frédéric’s obsession with Mme Arnoux and Flaubert’s fascination with 
Elisa Schlesinger—see the volume of essays titled Analyses & Réflexions sur Flaubert: 
L’Éducation sentimentale and Claudine Gothot-Mersch’s Préface to the 2001 Folio 
Classique edition of Les Mémoirs d’un fou (7-43) 
153 “Chaque matin, il se jurait d’être hardi.  Une invincible pudeur l’en empêchait; 
et il ne pouvait se guider d’après aucun exemple, puisque celle-là différait des autres.  Par 
la force de ses rêves, il l’avait posée en dehors des conditions humaines.  Il se sentait, à 
côté d’elle, moins important sur la terre que les brindilles de soie s’échappant de ses 
cisaux” (218-19).  
154 “[J]’avais toujours au fond de moi-même la musique de votre voix et la 
splendeur de vos yeux!” (512). 
155 “la substance de son cœur, le fond même de sa vie” (491). 
156 “Quelquefois, vos paroles me reviennent comme un écho lointain, comme le 
son d’une cloche apporté par le vent; et il me semble que vous êtes là, quand je lis des 
passages d’amour dans les livres” (511). 
157 “une convoitise plus forte que jamais, furieuse, enragée…Une autre crainte 
l’arrêta, celle d’en avoir dégoût plus tard.  D’ailleurs, quel embarras ce serait!” (513). 
158 “Ce fut comme un heurt en pleine poitrine” (512). 
159 Flaubert’s correspondence continually demonstrates its author’s distaste for 
moralizing; the author’s famous wish to write a work with no subject but style, for 
instance, shows us how he wanted to locate morality in aesthetic beauty rather than in 
human conduct (see Steegmuller’s Flaubert and Mme Bovary, 307).  Gissing’s 
relationship to moral teaching through his novels was more complex: as we see in Born 
in Exile, the unfortunate circumstances of Peak’s upbringing are not necessarily enough 
to redeem him in the eyes of the narrator.  In “Division of Purpose in George Gissing,” 
Jacob Korg discusses how the author’s desire for reform (obvious in “social problem” 
novels like The Odd Women and The Unclassed) stands at odds with his belief that art 
should be an end in itself. 
160 This problem of fictionality, in turn, gives rise to questions about the 
“reliability” of historical vs. fictional narrators that go back to Wayne Booth’s discussion 
of the “unreliable narrator” and continue to interest narrative theorists.  For a recent 
account of the poetics of unreliability across first-person novels and nonfiction memoirs, 
see Phelan’s Living to Tell About It. 
161For Cohn’s analysis of the status of “fiction” as a term within contemporary 
narratology, see The Distinction of Fiction, 109-131. 
162 I refer here to the incident in which the young Jean-Jacques is falsely accused 
of, and disciplined for, breaking Mlle de Lambercier’s comb: “[t]his first experience of 
violence and injustice,” he writes, “has remained so deeply engraved in my heart that any 
idea that is at all associated with it brings back the emotions I felt at the time” (19). 
163 Cohn makes this point years earlier, though with less elaboration, in 
Transparent Minds (5). 
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164 This analysis of the comparative mental representation of fictional and non-
fictional characters demonstrates another intersection between narrative theory and 
philosophy, specifically, to what philosophers often refer to as the “problem of other 
minds.”  How, that is, can we be sure of the existence—much less the qualitative feel—of 
minds other than our own?  For a concise discussion of this problem as it relates to 
contemporary philosophy of mind, see Searle 18-21. 
165 “Voici le seul portrait d'homme, peint exactement d'après nature et dans toute 
sa vérité, qui existe et qui probablement existera jamais. Qui que vous soyez, que ma 
destinée ou ma confiance ont fait l'arbitre du sort de ce cahier, je vous conjure par mes 
malheurs, par vos entrailles, et au nom de toute l'espèce humaine, de ne pas anéantir un 
ouvrage unique et utile, lequel peut servir de première pièce de comparaison pour l'étude 
des hommes, qui certainement est encore à commencer, et de ne pas ôter à l'honneur de 
ma mémoire le seul monument sûr de mon caractère qui n'ait pas été défiguré par mes 
ennemis. Enfin, fussiez-vous, vous-même, un de ces ennemis implacables, cessez de 
l'être envers ma cendre, et ne portez pas votre cruelle injustice jusqu'au temps où ni vous 
ni moi ne vivrons plus, afin que vous puissiez vous rendre au moins une fois le noble 
témoignage d'avoir été généreux et bon quand vous pouviez être malfaiteur et vindicatif : 
si tant est que le mal qui s'adresse à un homme qui n'en a jamais fait ou voulu faire, 
puisse porter le nom de vengeance” (23). 
166 “Avant que d'aller plus loin, je dois au lecteur mon excuse ou ma justification 
tant sur les menus détails où je viens d'entrer que sur ceux où j'entrerai dans la suite, et 
qui n'ont rien d'intéressant à ses yeux. Dans l'entreprise que j'ai faite de me montrer tout 
entier au public, il faut que rien de moi ne lui reste obscur ou caché ; il faut que je me 
tienne incessamment sous ses yeux ; qu'il me suive dans tous les égarements de mon 
coeur, dans tous les recoins de ma vie ; qu'il ne me perde pas de vue un seul instant, de 
peur que, trouvant dans mon récit la moindre lacune, le moindre vide, et se demandant : 
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